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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to explore the nature of productivity problems in building project 
coalitions arising from contractual interfaces and conflict. The study investigates the 
impact of contractual interfaces on the emergence of conflict in both the 
interorganisational relations of the contracting parties and the operational context of the 
building production process management. It analyses the dynamics of conflict in the 
behaviour and performance of the project participants to establish a link between conflict 
and productivity problems. The focus of the study is the interface between the mechanical 
and electrical (M&E) contractor and the main contractor. The interface between the main 
contractor and the client, as well as the design team members, is examined in so far as it 
affects the relationship between the main and the M&E contractor.
The investigation reveals conflict as a potentially creative or destructive behavioural 
process that emanates from competition between the economic interest of the client and 
the professional/commercial interests of the consultants and contractors, in conjunction 
with low levels of trust. In so far as the building production process requires the inputs of 
all the participants, i.e., the client, the consultants and the contractors, competition gives 
rise to negotiations. As long as the negotiations comprise integrative bargaining, conflict 
is creative and results in collective problem solving. In the presence of low levels of trust 
as reliability or predictability, the more powerful party resorts to strategies of control, 
domination or manipulation to pursue its own interests at the expense of those of others. 
Thus negotiations become distributive and conflict becomes dysfunctional. The weaker 
negotiating party either resists the strategies of power of the more dominant party by 
applying discretion in the use of their knowledge, and by matching their level of effort to 
rewards, or capitulates. The level of resistance or capitulation of the weaker party is 
dependent on their relative size and financial strength compared to those of the dominant 
party. The study indicates that the nature and level of conflict has a direct impact on the 
level of motivation, performance and consequently the productivity of the project 
participants.
The investigation finds that conflict is inherent to the contracting system and needs to be 
managed (Lavers, 1992; Smith, 1992; Langford et al, 1992). It finds that building project 
coalitions are organised as networks at the start of the project but may be transformed 
into political organisations during the project life-cycle (Mintzberg, 1991 (d): 374; Pfeffer, 
1981: 27-9). The imprecise definitions of functions and activities contained in the 
contractual documents provide the grounds for and facilitate the political activity of the 
project participants. The investigation therefore supports Clegg's (1992) postulation that
XI
the 'contractual documents provide the constitutional and constitutive grounds and 
framework within which the meaning of the contract is negotiated, contested, and 
sometimes contained' (Clegg, 1992: 135). The opportunistic interpretations resulting 
from negotiations over the meaning of the contract (Tavistock Institute, 1966) very often 
impede the full or effective enforcement of the contractual functions and activities, thus 
reinforce conflictual behaviour. The project managers' capability to manage conflict, 
though important in terms of preventing escalation of conflict, is indicated to have limited 
impact on performance levels of project participants.
The research concludes that the economic and legal governance structures in the wider 
business context of building production processes do not foster fair, co-operative and 
non-confrontational exchange relations (Lane and Bachmann, 1996), and do not appear to 
discourage the imposition of onerous business agreements by the economically more 
powerful on those more dependent. It therefore suggests that fundamental changes in 
both governance structures of building project coalitions as well as attitudes of project 
coalition representatives are required as the means by which productivity improvements 
may be carried out.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BRITISH CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Concerns about low productivity in the UK construction industry and the time and cost 
overruns that result from it have been voiced for a very long time and have led to 
numerous commissioned reports and studies on the subject (for example, NEDO, 1970; 
NEDO, 1983; NEDO, 1988). A wide array of inter-related factors contributing to delays 
and escalation in construction cost have been identified. They range from organisation of 
design and construction work to management and control of project participants' inputs 
(Ball, 1988, NEDO, 1983; NEDO, 1988). The common attribute of these factors is that 
they arise, in one form or another, from the fragmentation of the building production 
process and the multitude of contractual interfaces within the building project 'coalition5 
(Winch, 1989). The fragmentation of the building production process creates 
communication and co-ordination problems (Tavistock Institute, 1965; 1966; Shammas- 
Toma et al., 1998), whilst the contractual interfaces give rise to conflict (Clegg, 1992). 
Starting from the precedents set by previous research regarding how productivity 
problems arise from aspects of building production process management and 
interorganisational relations, this research explores the origins of such problems and 
provides reasons as to why they arise. Thus the following conceptual research question is 
posed, at the broadest level, to guide the direction of the study and is refined later:
Why do management processes and interorganisational relations in building project 
coalitions give rise to productivity problems?
1.1.1 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS
The literature addressing productivity issues and problems in the British construction 
industry attributes the productivity ills to the fragmentation of the production process, 
poor management methods and conflict, on the one hand; and the producers' motivation, 
attitudes and behaviour, on the other (for example, NEDO, 1983, 1988; Stephenson, 
1996; Beardsworth et al., 1988; Ball, 1988). Fragmentation of the production process 
exacerbates the problems of planning and control over the procurement process and 
creates difficulties of integration, communication and co-ordination (NEDO, 1983). 
Furthermore, it gives rise to a multiplicity of contracts and contractual interfaces which 
allegedly cause conflicts (Clegg, 1982).
Discrepancies and delays in the production of design information, ambiguities regarding 
the roles and responsibilities of design team members, poor leadership within design 
teams, and the inability of manual procedures and techniques to cope with complexities 
lead to inadequate design co-ordination and progress monitoring at the design stage 
(NEDO, 1988). Thus the conflicting design requirements of different technical disciplines 
may not be resolved and may give rise to conflict (Baden Hellard, 1992). The site 
management's lack of comprehensive technical competence or training in administrative, 
business and human aspects of management, as well as their absence of 'control over the 
quantity and quality of labour supply' may lead to poor performance of subcontractors at 
the construction stage (NEDO, 1988: 8). This may give rise to conflict between the main
contractor and specialist and trade contractors, between or amongst the latter contractors, 
and between the contractors' representatives (Langford et al., 1992).
Destructive conflict leads to higher insurance premia, more claims specialists in all their 
guises, increased risks and uncertainties, and higher project costs and prices (Fellows, 
1992: 123). It therefore has 'a negative impact on the costs and profitability of all 
involved' (Marshall and Bresnen, 1998: 25). The filing of a legal claim wastes time and 
financial resources which could be utilised more effectively by improving performance on 
current work, or pursuing potential future work. It moreover escalates the amount of the 
claim because 'a settlement in binding resolution is often for only 20 to 50 percent of the 
amount claimed' (Stephenson, 1996: 8).
The motivation, attitude and behaviour of producers are functions of their 
interorganisational and interpersonal relations. The temporary nature of building projects 
(Bryman et al., 1987) discourage the development of long-term relationships between 
project participants, and the projects' limited budgets encourage the participants to 
emphasise their short-term financial concerns (Zikmann, 1992: 54). This may lead to 
competition between the participants and conflicts of interest. The predominance of 
subcontracting as the means of organising construction activity often involves co- 
operation of people who have not worked together before (Beardsworth et al., 1988). 
The absence of familiarity both between the project management team and the specialist 
and trade contractors' management staff and between the latter and their operatives - who 
tend to be labour-only subcontractors (Bresnen et al., 1985), in conjunction with the 
limited duration of building projects, inhibit the build up of mutual confidence and trust in 
the parties (Beardsworth et al.: 613). Furthermore, owing to the division of project
management function between the project management team and the specialist and trade 
contractors' management staff, the former's lines of authority become blurred leading to 
ambiguity in responsibility which may result in conflicting objectives (Gardiner and 
Simmons, 1992: 111). Lacking adequate time to develop consultative procedures, the 
project management team may tend to adopt directive styles of management which may 
become a 'source of friction' (Beardsworth et al.: 615). The workforce, in turn, may not 
necessarily do or know what is expected of them. For example, they may produce poor 
quality work, adopt a slow pace so as not to complete tasks on schedule or walk off site 
without completing their tasks thus causing disruption to the works (Ball, 1988: 203-4). 
On the other hand, they may lack adequate training or motivation to carry out their tasks 
satisfactorily. In either case, their behaviour may cause conflict between their employers - 
the specialist and trade contractors - and the main contractor. The relationship between 
factors causing productivity problems and conflict in the construction industry is 
represented in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Links between productivity problems and conflict in the construction 
industry
Based on the above account, conflict is a main cause of productivity problems and 
appears to be a feature of both contractual and human relations. To investigate why it 
arises, the interorganisational and interpersonal relations between the project coalition 
participants and their representatives, and the way these relations are managed need to be 
explored. In view of the numerous organisations taking part in building project coalitions, 
the investigation needs to be narrowed down to include two key players. The main 
contractors, as organisers of construction activity, constitute the obvious choice as one of 
the key players. Mechanical and Electrical (M&E) contractors, by virtue of their 
substantial proportion of total project cost and the complexity of products and services 
they provide (Gray and Flanagan, 1989; Bennett and Ferry, 1990), constitute the second 
key player.
At this juncture, the research question posed earlier is reformulated in three parts, or as 
three related questions, to sharpen the focus of the investigation:
1. Why do main contractors' interorganisational and interpersonal relations with M&E 
contractors in building project coalitions give rise to conflict between the two parties?
2. How do main contractors' management processes facilitate or undermine their 
relations with M&E contractors?
3. How do main contractors' management processes and interorganisational relations 
with M&E contractors affect the parties' productivity problems?
1.1.2 GAPS IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON PRODUCTIVITY RELATED ISSUES
Despite the considerable volume of research carried out in and around the area of 
productivity and factors influencing it, the types and sources of productivity problems 
reported seem to have changed little over the past few decades (for instance, compare the 
findings of the Banwell report (1964) to those of Latham (1994)). This may be 
attributable, in part, to technical issues including the slow development of information 
production technology, construction techniques, and methods of project procurement. It 
may, on the other hand, be equally related to the more intangible and less well researched 
social issues of interorganisational power disparity, politics, conflict and lack of trust 
amongst project participants, as the initial observations of cases suggested. Therefore, 
consideration of the latter dimensions in parallel and assessment of their combined effect 
on the productivity of main and M&E contractors, form the core of investigation in this 
study.
The next section proposes a definition for productivity in the context of this study, and 
identifies the framework by means of which it is to be evaluated. Section 1.3, discusses 
the significance of the study, and section 1.4 outlines the plan of the thesis.
1.2 PRODUCTIVITY IN BUILDING PROJECT COALITIONS
The term productivity in the context of this study denotes a participant organisation's 
ability to meet the programme and cost targets set by the main contractor, which in turn is
determined by the client's required project completion date and budget. The programme 
and cost targets are a participant's project outcome. Compliance with the specified time 
and cost criteria is often taken as one of the benchmarks for a participant's performance 
(Lynton, 1993). The productivity of a participant organisation can therefore be evaluated 
on the basis of the discrepancy between the targets set by the main contractor and the 
performance achieved by the participant organisation (Liu and Walker, 1998: 210). This 
evaluation can be facilitated by a framework based on the behaviour-performance- 
outcome cycle. In this framework, the behaviour of a participant is governed by: the 
targets set by the main contractor, the participant's organisational goals and the aggregate 
behaviour of its representatives. The performance of a participant is determined by: the 
participant organisation's and their representatives' past success on previous projects, and 
the representatives' level of aspiration, motivation and willingness to apply initiative and 
expend effort (Ibid.: 212). The productivity of a participant organisation can therefore be 
explained through the analysis of its behaviour and performance variables.
Accordingly, the productivity of M&E contractors in building project coalitions may be 
explained, on the one hand, by the impact of their time and cost targets, their 
organisational goals, and the determinants of their organisational behaviour; and, on the 
other, by the implications of their behaviour and capability on their performance. The 
purpose of this investigation is limited to examining why M&E contractors, in selected 
building project coalitions, are or are not able to meet their contractual requirement of 
completing their tasks within specified programmes. The study does not intend to 
consider optimisation of productivity beyond that which is required by the client's 
specification.
1.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY
The level of performance of building projects is generally evaluated in terms of project 
completion within time and to cost targets set by clients (see for example, Latham, 1994: 
63). Because the building project coalition is a 'temporary multi-organisation' (Cherns 
and Bryant, 1984), each participant has their own targets the achievement of which 
determines the level of project performance for the organisation concerned. Therefore the 
level of performance of building projects is dependent upon the levels of performance of 
project participants or their productivity.
The productivity of project participants has a direct impact on the profitability of the 
project to the client and the participants, and on the losses incurred by the latter as 
penalties resulting from delays. The importance of productivity is further reflected in the 
productivity target of '30 percent real cost reduction by the year 2000', initiated by the 
Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply and recommended by the Latham Report 
(1994: 80). Because building production processes in the construction industry take place 
in the context of project coalitions, identification of productivity problems is likely to 
generate improvements which will benefit the industry in the long run.
Moreover, if particular interorganisational and interpersonal factors are identified that 
give rise to conflict and hamper the collaborative efforts of project participants, they are 
likely to present the pre-requisites for interorganisational collaboration and partnering in 
building projects, by default.
1.4 PLAN OF THE THESIS
The thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2, explores the nature of the link 
between conflict and productivity problems by considering the determinants of behaviour 
and performance, and how they may give rise to conflict. It then examines the link 
between conflict and productivity problems in building project coalitions by defining the 
concept of conflict, by identifying its sources in project participants' interorganisational 
and interpersonal relations, and by considering the potential impact of conflict on main 
and M&E contractors' performance in the building production process. Exploration of the 
themes leads to formulation of secondary questions that the fieldwork investigates and 
attempts to answer.
Chapter 3, discusses the research methodology by presenting the rationale for a 
qualitative research and a grounded theory approach, and by describing the research 
design. It moreover explains the nature of the data collected, how it informs the research, 
the context in which it was collected, the period over which it was collected, and the 
framework used to analyse it and to theorise from it.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the case projects selected for longitudinal study and the key 
findings. The results are supported by quotes from interviews and project meetings, tables 
constituting the conceptual models and organograms and graphical representations aiding 
the understanding of organisational structure and information flows.
Chapter 7, analyses the research data presented in the case studies, through comparisons 
and contrasts, and discusses the research questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2. By arguing
the weaknesses of current practices, the chapter proposes improvements that are 
comparable to on-going research, yet go further in terms of the changes they recommend 
and their possible impact.
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CHAPTER 2 CONTRACTUAL INTERFACES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCTIVITY 
IN BUILDING PROJECT COALITIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the themes emanating from the productivity related literature. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3, consider the determinants of behaviour and performance, 
respectively, both in relation to mechanical and electrical (M&E) contractors and at the 
broader theoretical level. Section 2.4, explores the behavioural issues that may give rise to 
conflict in building project coalitions thus establishing the premise for the emergence of 
conflict in interorganisational and interpersonal relations within these coalitions. Section 
2.5, discusses the occurrence of conflict both within and between the constituents of the 
building production process, examining how conflict may affect the performance of main 
and M&E contractors and how it may be contained or managed. Section 2.6, concludes 
the review of literature and categorises the secondary questions arising from the review 
thematically.
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2.2 DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOUR
M&E contractors' behavioural criteria, outlined in Chapter 1, have three components: 1) 
the combination of time and cost targets set by main contractors and services installation 
tasks defined by clients; 2) short and long term objectives of M&E contracting 
organisations; and 3) the aggregate of M&E contractors' representatives' behaviour. 
These components can be abstracted as the project goals, organisational goals, and 
organisational behaviour of M&E contractors respectively. Project goals are claimed to 
trigger the behaviour-performance-outcome cycle in project procurement by prompting 
participants' actions (Liu and Walker, 1998: 212). The nature of these actions is 
dependent upon the characteristics of project goals. For example, the fluidity and 
ambiguity of project goals may lead to self-interested action by participants through 
redefinitions and interpretations of goals which may result in acrimony (Tavistock 
Institute, 1966: 51-2). Organisational goals constitute some of the stimuli that cause 
individuals within the organisation 'to engage or not to engage in certain activities' (Liu 
and Walker, 1988: 212). Other stimuli include individuals' personal goals, capabilities, 
and motivation coupled with their perception of senior management's, and colleagues' 
expectations of them (Ibid.: 211). Organisational behaviour comprises two levels of 
activities: those at the macro level of the organisation, and those at the micro level of the 
individual. Macro organisational behaviour is concerned with structure, design and action 
of organisations in socio-economic contexts; micro organisational behaviour deals with 
individuals' attitudes, motivation and performance (Staw, 1984: 628). These dimensions 
of organisational behaviour are elaborated below.
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2.2.1 MACRO ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
The sociological, political and economic factors influencing the behaviour of organisations 
are collectively referred to as the environment or the business environment. The latter 
impact on organisations in a number of ways. The powerful interests within the 
environment create and sustain organisations which are dependent on the environment for 
legitimacy - balancing the social and economic goals (Mintzberg, 1991 (a): 389) - and 
resources (Benson, 1983: 35, 47). This dependence constitutes a source of uncertainty for 
organisations and hampers their control over factors influencing their operations (Pfeffer, 
1991: 382). The resource dependency of organisations links them together in 
interorganisational networks and populations of organisations (Benson, 1983: 50) making 
them interdependent (Pfeffer, 1991: 382). The link between technological, organisational 
and institutional innovations, characteristic of advanced capitalist societies, gives rise to 
large dominant organisations (Benson, 1983: 52), or corporations, which influence 
competitive conditions within the environment.
To manage uncertainty and interdependence, organisations - or rather their 
representatives - engage in political activities like merger, joint ventures, interlocking 
directorates, movement and selective recruitment of executives and other personnel, 
regulation, reduction of competition, and protection of markets and sources of supply 
(Pfeffer, 1991: 383; Harrigan and Newman, 1990; see Haughton, 1994; and Johnston and 
Lawrence, 1988 for examples of these activities). They enter into tacit agreements for 
voluntary, co-operative restraint of competition amongst their organisations, supported by 
antitrust and antimonopoly laws (Henderson, 1991: 378, 380). These political activities, 
though co-operative in appearance (Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Kanter, 1989: Chapter
13
5), may be characterised by competition, negotiations, co-operation or confrontation 
(Henderson, 1991: 377-9).
Henderson likens competition to a major battle which many contending businesses enter 
into. To survive it, organisational representatives negotiate in order to achieve a degree of 
co-operation or restraint from their adjacent business interests, or what Henderson refers 
to as 'competitors' (1991: 378). The success of negotiations, in terms of outcomes 
resulting in co-operation as opposed to conflict, depends on four factors. Firstly, the 
relative bargaining power of the negotiators which is proportional to their opponents' 
dependence upon them (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981: 209-10; Emerson, 1962: 32). This 
power may arise from the structure of the institutional framework within which the 
negotiations are carried out, or be attributable to capital and a dominant position in the 
market (Bachmann, 1998: 313). Secondly, the negotiators' tactics and skills in obtaining 
the best possible compromise from their opponents without antagonising them 
(Henderson, 1991: 377). The third factor which is persistently argued in the literature as 
contributing significantly to co-operation is the existence, nature and level of trust - 
whatever it is defined to be - in negotiators' relationship (for example, Lane and 
Bachmann, 1998; Fells, 1993 with reference to employer-employee relationship). The 
close links between trust and power/dependency (see for example, Fox, 1974 with 
reference to employment relations; Hardy et al.: 1998) create the conditions for the 
combination of trust and power constituting the fourth factor on which co-operation 
depends (for example, Bachmann, 1998).
In view of the above discussion, co-operation resulting from successful negotiations with 
adjacent business interests may be underpinned by institutional power of the legal system
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or state policy, on the basis of which interorganisational and interpersonal trust may be 
created (Bachmann, 1998: 313; Lane and Bachmann, 1996). It may be underpinned by 
market power and voluntarism in which case the dominant party's manipulation results in 
the weaker party's capitulation (Hardy et al., 1998). It may, on the other hand, be based 
on various forms of trust such as calculation of potential profit (Dasgupta, 1988; 
Henderson, 1991: 378; Williamson, 1993) or cost of retaliation in case of defection 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 148, 149); common values embedded in societal culture 
(Fukuyama, 1995) or mutual obligations developed through long-term relationships 
(Lorenz, 1998). Co-operation may moreover be based on a combination of power and 
trust (Fox, 1974 with reference to employer-employee relations). If co-operation is not 
reached voluntarily, negotiations break down and confrontation occurs. In a 
confrontation, deciding what is acceptable may be guided by emotions or arbitrariness; 
deciding what is attainable is based on evaluating the other party's degree of intransigence 
(Henderson, 1991: 378). Enforcement of co-operation in a confrontation may comprise 
external measures, such as resorting to law or other institutions who set codes of 
behaviour and practice (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 149-150).
The above accounts of political activity demonstrate the centrality of power to the 
behaviour of organisations, the importance of human agents who act out the power 
games, and the role that trust plays in interorganisational and interpersonal relations. On 
this premise, it is pertinent to consider power and its impact upon behaviour, through 
politics, in the context of organisations, as well as the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
issues of trust which allegedly constitutes a prominent feature of behaviour in 
interorganisational and interpersonal relations.
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Power and politics in organisations
The literature suggests two basic perspectives of power: legislation on 'what power is', 
attributed to Hobbes and his successors; and interpretations of 'what power does', 
ascribed to Machiavelli and his successors (see Clegg, 1989 for a review and critique of 
relevant literature). Although some angles of the concept of power are considered here 
for the purpose of defining it, emphasis is placed on the strategy and mobilisation of 
power in order to analyse its manifestations and consequences for organisational 
behaviour.
The concept of power, though pervasive in social theories, is problematic to define due to 
lack of consensus. Amongst features of power about which there is consensus are: its 
relational quality, its correspondence to subordination, and its reciprocity to hierarchical 
structures (for example, Clegg, 1989: Chapter 8; Fox, 1974: Chapter 2; Pfeffer, 1981: 2- 
4). Power exists in a relational context, or what Clegg refers to as a relational field of 
force (1989: 207), wherein party A gets party B to do what the former wants him/her to 
do and which party B would not otherwise have done (Pfeffer, 1981: 2-3). Party A's 
exercise of power over party B is contingent upon subordination of the latter by way of 
consent or capitulation (Clegg, 1989: 208; Fox, 1974: 98-9), or party A's capacity to 
overcome party B's resistance (Pfeffer, 1981: 3; Fox, 1974: 99). Party B's resistance is 
itself construed as power exercised by party B over party A, thus setting in motion a 
process that passes through circuits of power and resistance (Clegg, 1989: 207; 18). The 
relative power of one party over the other is rooted in the relative importance of the 
activities carried out by the former and, in this sense, is structurally determined (Pfeffer, 
1981: 98).
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In the context of organisations, two divergent concepts of power are identified: power as 
domination and resistance; and power as authority and illegitimate resistance (Hardy and 
Clegg, 1996: 626). The former concept is based on the premise that owners and 
controllers of the means of production have the capacity to dominate subordinates by way 
of power vested and legitimated in organisational structures; and that subordinates have 
the capacity to challenge this domination through their knowledge of operations and 
discretion in the use of that knowledge (for example, Fox, 1974; Friedman, 1977: Chapter 
6). The latter concept of power is grounded on two diverse assumptions. One assumption 
regards authority as power which has been transformed and legitimised through the 
development of norms and expectations. Accordingly, the process of transformation 
makes the exercise of influence, arising from hierarchical structures, acceptable or indeed 
expected (Pfeffer, 1981: 4-6). Thus authority is not resisted and not dependent on the 
determinants of power. The other assumption, views illegitimate or 'alegitimate' power as 
formally unauthorised, officially uncertified, widely not accepted (Mintzberg, 1991(b): 
372), and therefore essentially negative. This form of power is associated with the 
exercise of discretion by organisation members whose position within the organisational 
structure does not sanction their activities (Clegg, 1989: 189).
Mobilisation of power or political activity within organisational settings takes place 
around individuals' and groups' interests (Hindess, 1986: 115) and is aimed at protecting 
or furthering their interests. Therefore interests influence 'reasons for action' in so far as 
they are taken account of in the decision making process (Ibid.: 128-9, 121). The 
formulation of reasons, however, are limited to the discourses available to and 
implemented by individuals and groups which, in turn, are contingent upon these actors' 
situation and changes within it (Ibid.: 121-2, 130).
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Dominant actors within the organisation utilise power to either prevent or defeat conflict 
(Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 628). Prevention of conflict may involve management strategies 
aimed at resulting in the political inactivity of subordinates. Defeat of conflict, on the 
other hand, may involve management strategies aimed at opposing subordinates' 
resistance or subordinates' strategies aimed at opposing management's resistance. 
Conflict prevention strategies may entail responsible autonomy to subordinates, whereby 
the latter are given discretion over their work in order to win their loyalty; or direct 
control of subordinates, whereby close supervision of the latter attempts to limit their 
discretion (Friedman, 1977: 6-7). These strategies may result in subordinates' consent for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the subordinates are generally excluded from the decision- 
making process. Secondly, they may be ignorant of their own interests (Hindess, 1982) 
either because they know no alternatives, or view the status quo as natural and 
unchangeable, or regard it as beneficial (Lukes, 1974: 24). Thirdly, they may be ignorant 
of the nature and strategy of power implemented. Fourthly, they may regard the cost of 
achieving their aims as relatively higher than the benefits of success (Hardy and Clegg, 
1996: 628). The strategy of defeating conflict comprises political activity to 'acquire, 
develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in a 
situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices' (Pfeffer, 1981: 7).
The above characteristics of organisational political activity are reflected in Bacharach and 
Lawler's (1980) view of political behaviour as evaluation, by one party, of their power in 
relation to that of other significant competitors, and selection, by that party, of 
countertactics to thwart the competitor's tactics. These tactical encounters take place 
during the bargaining process and are conducted through it. Bargaining is 'the give-and- 
take that occurs when two or more interdependent parties experience a conflict of
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interest' (Ibid.: 44) and serves two contradicting purposes of resolving the conflict and 
benefiting both parties. The key constituent of bargaining is tactics used by one party to 
influence the other. The tactics used in a bargaining relationship can impact on the 
potential resolution of conflict.
Trust in interorganisational and organisational relations
The concept of trust, similar to that of power, is difficult to define owing to the differing 
contexts in which it may be considered, the numerous perspectives from which it may be 
viewed, and the various meanings ascribed to it. For instance, trust in the context of 
interorganisational relations, between representatives of organisations involved in an 
exchange relationship, may be viewed from an economic, legal, or political perspective 
(For example, Williamson, 1993; Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1994; Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1998; Fox, 1974; Hardy et al., 1998). Whilst trust in the context of 
interpersonal relations, between parties to a social relationship, may be viewed from a 
sociological or psychological perspective (see for example, Kramer and Tyler, 1996). 
Furthermore, there is evidence of multidimensional concepts of trust based on 
combinations of perspectives from which trust is viewed (see for example, Lane, 1998: 4 
for a review of corresponding literature). Accordingly, the theoretical bases on which 
trust is constituted comprise calculation, institutional, and power and dependency (Ibid.: 
4-14).
Calculation in economic exchange, equates trust to risk so that one party's decision to 
accept the risk involved in another party's performance - i.e. the probability that the 
latter's performance will be beneficial or at least not harmful to the former - is 
representative of the former's trust in the latter (Gambetta, 1988: 217). This perspective
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associates trust with 'the expectation of an ongoing relationship' and the knowledge that 
waning of trust in a long-standing exchange relationship will lead to higher transaction 
costs in the form of 'self-protective actions' by one party to counteract the potential 
opportunistic behaviour of the other (Tyler and Kramer, 1996: 3-6). It is claimed that this 
form of trust may be developed and strengthened through repeated exchanges between 
the same parties and may be linked to reputation (Dasgupta, 1988: 59). It is moreover 
claimed that trust could be learned through co-operation between members of exchange 
communities, such as networks, when they recognise their common interests, even in 
antagonistic situations (Powell, 1996: 52-62). This learning process is facilitated through 
governance structures which allow constant monitoring and consultation by and between 
the members (Ibid.).
The calculative model of trust leads to a fundamental consideration. If acceptance of risk 
is based on an evaluation of probabilities, if repeated exchanges between two parties take 
place owing to the benefits the latter gain, and if co-operation is based on common 
interests and facilitated through monitoring, then where does trust fit in? If trust 
fundamentally signifies 'reliability' (see for example, Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 153), 
then, is calculative trust not 'a contradiction in terms' as claimed by Williamson (1993: 
485)? Indeed Williamson rejects the notion of 'calculative trust' on the grounds that 'trust 
is irrelevant to commercial exchange' (1993: 469). He bases this assertion on the 
argument that commercial exchange relations take place between human actors who are 
boundedly rational and opportunistic, and that these relations involve incomplete 
contracting (Ibid.: 485). He therefore proffers that commercial relations be viewed as 
calculative relations involving risk rather than trust, and that trust be reserved for personal 
relations only (Ibid.: 485-6). Fox makes the same point by arguing that because the nature
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and extent of the terms of economic exchange are specifically defined or prescribed, and 
not left to the discretion of the parties as they are in a social exchange, the way is left 
open for bargaining over the terms; thus the parties do not trust each other (1974: 71). 
Consideration of these views poses the questions: To what extent does trust, as 
'reliability', feature in the exchange relations of project participants? Is it underpinned by 
calculation?
The institutional theory of trust views trust as a mechanism to reduce risk (Lane and 
Bachmann, 1996). This mechanism comprises shared assumptions and shared 
understanding, created through the constitution of meaning, and common expectations 
and common beliefs, created through the constitution of norms (for example, Sydow, 
1988: 36). Shared meaning and common norms are established by the legal and financial 
systems, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other institutions that constitute 
the business framework within which economic exchange takes place (Lane and 
Bachmann, 1996). They comprise the societal culture in which trust is said to be rooted 
(Fukuyama, 1995). By referring to these shared meanings and common norms in their 
interaction, organisational representatives are said to create predictability in their 
behaviour thus giving rise to interorganisational trust (Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Sydow, 
1998). It is suggested that the level of predictability in organisational representatives' 
behaviour is dependent on the degree to which they share norms and values and are able 
to subordinate their individual interests to those of their respective organisations 
(Fukuyama, 1995: 10). It is further suggested that the importance attached to 
predictability in behaviour is associated with the nature of the relationship, i.e., the level 
of uncertainty associated with future contingencies, the degree of interdependence, and 
the potential for opportunism (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 147).
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The way in which meaning is codified and the conditions for predictability established is 
through the business contract (for example, Bachmann, 1998: 315). The latter is said to 
create trust of a 'contractual' kind by providing a promise to fulfil a minimum set of 
obligations (Sako, 1998: 89). To underpin this promise with guarantees of performance, 
in other words to deter the contracting parties from behaving opportunistically, a business 
contract may either be supported by bonds, collateral, or provisions for penalty payments 
in case of breach, or it may contain incentive provisions for enhanced performance, such 
as piece work in employment contracts (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 149-150). The 
function of the contract in creating trust in interorganisational relations is seen to be 
related to the business framework and the effectiveness with which it promotes 
information flows, spreads the costs of conflict, monitors organisations, and reduces 
uncertainty (Ibid.: 155). This assertion is supported by comparative empirical research 
(Ibid.: 155-167; Lane and Bachmann, 1996: 372-389). The questions that arise from the 
institutional trust literature, are: To what extent does trust as predictability enter the 
project participants' relations? Is it underpinned by legal sanctions?
An alternative way of creating predictability in the behaviour of organisational 
representatives is suggested through the use of power, based on the premise that power 
may be considered a functional equivalent of trust (Hardy et al., 1988: 66). Power- 
induced predictability may take two forms. It may be merely an impression created by the 
dominant party, through management of meaning, in order to manipulate the weaker party 
into co-operation (Ibid.: 76-8, 81-2). It may, on the other hand, represent capitulation by 
the weaker party who has no option but to co-operate (Ibid.: 82-3). The link between 
power and trusting or distrusting relations is argued in a more or less similar way in the 
context of the employment relationship. Here the degree to which superordinates trust
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subordinates, i.e. the level of institutional trust, is perceived to be 'embodied in the rules, 
roles, and relations' the former imposes on or seeks to get accepted by the latter (Fox, 
1974: 67-8). Thus people occupying high discretion roles may be perceived as being 
trusted by their superordinates to exercise choice over their decisions within prescribed 
limits; whilst those occupying low discretion roles, which are highly prescribed in nature, 
may be perceived as being distrusted (Ibid.: 69). However, it is possible that the high 
discretion of the former group may be tolerated by the management owing to the potential 
illwill that may arise should prescription be increased (Ibid.: 95). Similarly, the low 
discretion employees may acquiesce to the status quo partly because they have been 
ideologically socialised or indoctrinated by various agencies into accepting hierarchy and 
their inferior status and partly because they perceive no alternatives (Ibid.: 88, 91; see also 
the discussion under power and politics). They therefore submit to 'a forced compliance 
underpinned by power' which appears like a high trust relation (Ibid.: 94). These 
considerations pose the questions: To what extent are impressions of trust created 
through power-induced predictability or capitulation? Are these impressions based on 
domination and dependency, respectively?
The literature on trust, on the one hand, argues in favour of trust as a basis for co- 
operation because the absence of trust leads to unco-operative behaviour and costs money 
or gives rise to mal-practices. Costs are generally associated with 'monitoring and 
measuring performance' by the less-informed party in a relationship involving 
'information asymmetry' (Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1994: 333). They are incurred to 
ensure equity in the exchange (Ouchi, 1980: 130). Mal-practices, in the form of failure to 
deliver a promise, lead to the foregoing of a renewal of contract in long-term relationships 
(Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1994: 334). On the other hand, it is recognised that the
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absence of trust in exchange relations is inevitable owing to the parties' opportunism 
(Williamson, 1975: 258), their goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980: 131-2), or the inadequacy 
of measures used to foster trust (Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1994: 344). It is therefore 
postulated that unco-operative behaviour and conflict are likely in exchange relations. 
Consequently, what has been suggested is that more emphasis be placed on 
proceduralising conflict resolution through institutional frameworks like trade 
associations, chambers of commerce, and quality assurance bodies (Ibid.). The 
relationship between the business environment and the modes of macro organisational 
behaviour is demonstrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between the business environment and macro 
organisational behaviour
2.2.2 MICRO ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
Having considered the impacts of power, politics and various guises of trust on macro 
organisational behaviour, attention is now focused on the impacts of these variables on 
organisational behaviour of individuals engaged in exchange relations. To assess these 
impacts, the way power and trust engendering methods may be used by one party in the 
exchange relation, and their potential influence on the motivation, work attitudes and 
performance of the other are considered.
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Power and politics in interpersonal relations
Power, in the context of interpersonal relations, may be defined as: one party's potential 
ability to influence the behaviour of the other, to overcome his/her resistance, and to get 
him/her to do things that they would not otherwise do (Pfeffer, 1992: 30). This definition 
comprises three important attributes of the power relationship. Firstly, the power 
recipient's perceptions and assessments of the power holder and his/her methods of using 
power (Jacobson, 1974: 52). This attribute represents the recipient's 'dependency' 
(Emerson, 1962: 32) or rather the conditions of interdependence giving rise to the power 
relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 40; Pfeffer, 1992: 38). Secondly, the power 
recipient's reasons for accepting or rejecting the power attempts (Jacobson, 1974: 52). 
This attribute represents the recipient's 'motivational investment in goals mediated by [the 
power holder]', and the 'availability of those goals to [the recipient]' outside the 
recipient-power holder relationship (Emerson, 1962: 32). Thirdly, power may be latent or 
implicit to the relationship and exist as a probable cause of behavioural change, or 
tendency to comply by the power recipient, when exerted, or it may be manifested 
explicitly through behavioural change (Jacobson, 1974: 52-3).
Potential power is utilised and realised through processes, actions, and behaviours 
referred to as interpersonal politics which influence the power recipient's behaviour or 
tendency to behave (Pfeffer, 1992: 30). The use of power is associated with competitive 
or zero-sum situations where one party's gain is equivalent to the other's loss (Riker, 
1974: 63). It is moreover linked with conditions of moderate interdependence where 
differences in point of view lead to disagreements and conflict (Pfeffer, 1992: 38-44; 
176). Low interdependence does not warrant the use of power; whilst high 
interdependence supposedly acts as an incentive for the parties to work together, to forge
25
common goals and to co-ordinate their activities (Ibid.). The nature and level of 
interdependence is related to scarcity of resources which in turn is related to budget 
allocations (Ibid.: 41). Differences in the parties' point of view about goal divergence or 
how to achieve goals arise from task specialisation and division of work, the diversity of 
the parties' backgrounds, training and incentives, and the absence of external threats or 
competitive pressures to encourage the parties to work together (Ibid.: 42-4).
The power recipient's perception of the power holder is related to the former's frame of 
reference which is governed by the principles of contrast, commitment and scarcity 
(Pfeffer, 1992: Chapter 10). The principle of contrast concerns the order in which 
situations and proposals are presented by one party so as to affect the judgement or 
response of the other in favour of the former. The principle of commitment is related to 
that of contrast in so far as the order of situations and proposals presented by one party 
affects the consistency of the other's behaviour and choice. The principle of scarcity is 
linked to the relative availability of/demand for resources and their price (Ibid.).
A change in the power recipient's attitude toward accepting power attempts may be 
effected through three processes of influence. One process is based on the motivational 
impacts of gaining potential benefits or avoiding potential punishments through 
'compliance' (Kelman, 1972: 142). This process utilises 'reward power' to mediate both 
material and personal rewards, such as social approval, acceptance and liking; and 
'coercive power' to mediate material and personal punishments, such as disapproval, 
rejection and dislike (Jacobson, 1974: 58-9; Raven, 1972: 174). The second process of 
influence derives from the recipient's desire to establish or maintain a relationship with the 
power holder through 'identification' (Kelman, 1972: 142). This process uses 'referent
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power', corresponding to the extent of attractiveness of power holder to the recipient, to 
engender opinions, attitudes and behaviours similar to those of power holder within the 
recipient (Jacobson, 1974: 60; Raven, 1972: 174-5). Parallels may be drawn between this 
source of power and the principle of ingratiation, entailing liking of one party for the 
other, which initiates the rule of reciprocity (Pfeffer, 1992: 213-221). The third process of 
influence is grounded in the recipient's value system and may give rise to the recipient's 
acceptance of influence through internalisation, i.e., by aligning his/her actions and beliefs 
with his/her values (Kelman, 1972: 142). This process utilises three sources of power, 
'expert power', arising from the power holder's knowledge and ability, 'legitimate 
power', arising from cultural values, and recipient's acceptance of hierarchy and power 
holder's legitimacy, and 'informational power' to change the recipient's cognitive system 
(Jacobson, 1974: 59-62; Raven, 1972: 173-5; Pfeffer, 1992: 207-213 with reference to 
informational influence).
The sources of power identified above emanate from the power holder's control over 
resources (including information), his/her ties to resource controllers, the combination of 
situational factors and the power holder's characteristics, his/her formal authority arising 
from his/her position within the hierarchy and within the communication structure, and the 
match between situational factors and the power holder's traits like style, skill and 
capacities (Pfeffer, 1992: 71-81).
In conclusion, the use of power involves making decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources in situations of interdependent activity, in favour of one party as opposed to 
another, which may lead to disagreements (Pfeffer, 1992: 54). The relationship between
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competitive situations and power-based modes of behaviour is demonstrated in Figure
2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between competitive situations and power-based modes of 
behaviour in interpersonal relations
Trust in interpersonal relations
Trust in the context of interpersonal relations is held to signify one party's decision to 
depend on the other, and is said to involve risk (Riker, 1974: 65). The decision to rely on 
others may be based on the potential advantages that the dependent party, or the trustor, 
is likely to gain (Lane, 1998). For example, broadening the responsibilities of subordinates 
may result in time and cost savings associated with monitoring, checking and controlling 
their work (Handy, 1976/1993: 283-4). Deciding to trust others may involve an 
evaluation or prediction of the trustee's behaviour (Riker, 1974: 76-81). This evaluation 
or prediction may be based on the trustor's prior experience of the trustee's work or 
capacity; trial and error, i.e., giving trust, releasing control and waiting for the trustee's 
response; and reciprocity (Handy, 1976/1993: 284). It may moreover be based on signals 
of trustworthiness, like 'reputation, brands, and adoption of quality standards', sent by the 
trustee (Lane, 1998: 21). The trustee's trustworthiness may in turn be governed by the
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degree to which their goals coincide with those of the trustor (Riker, 1974: 81). In these 
regards, both the trustor's and the trustee's behaviours may be considered to be 
motivated by calculativeness (discussed under 'trust in interorganisational and 
organisational relations', above).
Trust is associated with co-operative situations where the parties' gains are inter-related 
and the use of power may be superfluous (Riker, 1974: 63-4). A certain level of trust is 
said to develop in conditions where emphasis is placed on the long-term interests of the 
parties, where the risks are relatively small, and where effective and open communication 
between the parties is facilitated through easy contact (Good, 1988: 37). Certain types of 
communication, such as evaluative, spontaneous, emphatic, and equality-expressing, are 
said to build interpersonal trust (Jacobson, 1972: 101). For instance, evaluative 
communication, be it approving or disapproving comments, allegedly increases the 
willingness of the recipient to rely on the judgement of the communicator and leads to a 
change in the recipient's behaviour (Ibid.: 102). Whilst equality-expressing 
communication, entailing a reduction in the power distance between the communicator 
and the recipient, allegedly increases the recipient's attraction to the communicator and 
his/her tendency to imitate the communicator thus increasing the communicator's ability 
to influence the recipient (Ibid.).
The level of trust in interpersonal relations may be manifest in the degree of delegation of 
responsibility or control in a superordinate/subordinate or hierarchical relationship 
(Handy, 1974/1993: 283-5), in the level of discretion or prescription in work roles of 
subordinates (Fox, 1974), or in the nature of transaction rules - i.e., whether task-centred 
or function-centred (Marsden, 1998) - governing the employment relationship. On the
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other hand, these manifestations may be underpinned by complex power relations as 
discussed in the previous sub-section. Therefore just as self-reliance is an indicator of 
power over other people and control over events (Riker, 1974: 66), reliance on others, or 
trust, may be considered an indication of powerlessness over people or the outcomes they 
control. It may not reflect the superfluousness of power, as Riker claims, rather, it may 
depict the ineffectiveness of explicit power in situations of interdependence.
To the extent that interpersonal relations are based on communication, a central position 
in the communication network may constitute a source of power (see Pfeffer, 1992: 
Chapter 6). Therefore a superordinate or group leader located centrally in the 
communication structure of a group may be in a position to influence the group members 
in an apparently non-coercive manner. This inference raises questions about the 
differences between 'use of power' and 'development of trust' as influence mechanisms. 
Is trust fundamentally different from, and a more effective alternative to power? Or, is it 
merely a more agreeable form of power and dependence?
The relationship between co-operative situations and trust-based modes of behaviour is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Relationship between co-operative situations and trust-based modes of 
behaviour in interpersonal relations
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2.3 DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE
M&E contractors' performance criteria, outlined in Chapter 1, have three components: 1) 
M&E contracting organisations' and their representatives' past success on previous 
projects; 2) the level of aspiration of M&E contractors' representatives; and 3) the 
motivation and willingness of M&E contractors' representatives to apply initiative and 
expend effort. The past success or failure on previous projects has a direct or an inverse 
relation, respectively, to the level of aspiration on future projects (Liu and Walker, 1998: 
212). The level of aspiration refers to the time and cost targets the M&E contractors' 
representatives try to attain (Ibid.: 211). This may in turn be governed by project and 
M&E contractors' goals discussed in the previous sub-section. The motivation and 
willingness of M&E contractors' representatives to apply initiative and expend effort, as 
well as being related to the other two components of performance, are influenced by a 
number of other factors. These factors may be categorised broadly as reward and 
punishment, according to the scientific management principles, and job satisfaction, 
according to the human relations principles (for example, Druker and White, 1996: 71).
Reward and punishment represent sources of power, as discussed above, and are thus 
control mechanisms. Their influence on motivation is regarded as extrinsic and is 
explained by the theory of reinforcement (for example, Hamner, 1974) which associates 
modification of or change in individuals' behaviour with financial incentives (for example, 
Staw, 1984: 645-6). Broadly related to this theory, albeit from a somewhat different 
perspective, is the expectancy theory (for example, Vroom: 1964). This theory correlates 
individuals' tendency to behave in a certain way with the value they attach to the 
outcomes which, in turn, is related to the rewards they expect to attain by achieving the
outcomes as well as their capability to achieve high performance (Staw, 1984: 646). 
Emanating from this theory is the goal setting theory (for example, Locke and Latham, 
1990) which postulates direct and positive relations between goal difficulty and levels of 
performance (see O'Reilly, 1991: 431-4 for a review of relevant literature).
Job satisfaction represents attitudes to work and is considered as 'the fulfilment of 
individual values' (Locke (1976) in Staw, 1984: 631). Its influence on motivation is 
regarded as intrinsic and is explained by a number of theories like job design, equity, and 
leadership (Staw, 1984: 632). Job design theory (for example, Hackman and Oldham, 
1976, 1980) is based on need-fulfilment theory of motivation (for example, Maslow, 
1954) and attributes internal work motivation to the five job characteristics of skill 
variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback (Staw, 1984: 632). 
Equity theory (for example, Greenberg, 1987) relates performance levels of individuals to 
their perceptions of procedural and distributive justice and fairness of treatment (see 
O'Reilly, 1991: 431-4 for a review of relevant literature).
Leadership theories are derived from two perspectives. One perspective, focuses on the 
interaction between supervisors and subordinates (for example, Crouch and Yetton, 
1987); the other, on the impact of executive leadership on the entire organisation (for 
example, Gardner, 1990). This section is concerned with the former perspective. The 
impact of leadership on job satisfaction is governed by style and contingency theories. 
Style theories attribute the level of subordinates' effort and effectiveness to the style of 
leadership adopted by the group leader or the manager (Handy, 1976/1993: 100). Two 
opposing styles are identified in the literature based on the extent to which they involve 
the use of power by the leader. They are the authoritarian and the democratic styles, also
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referred to as structuring and supportive styles (Ibid.: 101). The former style is 
characterised by the leader's full authority to make decisions, to control, to reward or 
punish; the latter, is characterised by sharing decision-making and control with the group 
members (Ibid.: 100). Contingency theories add another dimension to style theories by 
linking them to the situational requirements governed by leader-member relations, the task 
structure, and position power of the leader (Fiedler, 1967) as well as the level of maturity 
of the group members (Hersey and Blanchard, 1977).
Leader-member relations determine the degree to which the group members trust and like 
the leader and are willing to follow him/her. The task structure determines how well the 
task has been defined for the group members and the extent to which it can be executed 
through detailed instructions. Position power of the leader determines the degree to which 
he/she can exercise authority to influence the group members through reward or 
punishment, for instance (Fiedler, 1967 cited in Mullins, 1993: 247-9). Maturity refers to 
the group members' experience in carrying out the type of task in question and their 
ability to set high but realistic goals and to accept responsibility for outcomes (Hersey and 
Blanchard, 1977 cited in Mullins, 1993: 252-4; Guirdham, 1990: 364). Based on these 
accounts, two leadership styles or behaviours have been identified, task behaviour and 
relationship behaviour, and four levels of readiness or maturity, low, low to moderate, 
moderate to high and high. Task behaviour is the extent to which the leader directs group 
members' actions, sets their goals and defines their roles and responsibilities. Relationship 
behaviour is the extent to which the leader partakes in two-way communication with the 
group members, listens to them and supports and encourages them. These behaviours may 
be used in four different combinations: high relationship/low task, high relationship/high 
task, low relationship/ low task and low relationship/high task.
These leadership styles and member maturity levels combine to create four leadership 
behaviours: telling, selling, participating and delegating. Telling involves high levels of 
guidance and limited supportive behaviour. It is appropriate for low levels of maturity. 
Selling involves high levels of both directive and relationship behaviours. It is appropriate 
for low to moderate levels of maturity. Participating involves high levels of two-way 
communication and supportive behaviour and low levels of guidance. It is appropriate for 
moderate to high levels of maturity. Delegating involves little direction or support with 
low levels of both task and relationship behaviours. It is appropriate for high levels of 
maturity. The relationship between style and contingency theories of leadership and 
leader's behaviours are presented in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between style and contingency theories of leadership and 
leader's behaviour
The leader performs three roles, motivating the group members, encouraging their 
participation and forging them into a team (Guirdham, 1990: 372-5). Motivation has 
already been discussed. Participation entails the involvement of subordinates or group 
members in the decision-making and control processes as a means of securing their
commitment (Handy, 1976/1993: 279-82). It is generally achieved through collective 
problem-solving (Guirdham, 1990: 373).
Team building, in order to be effective, needs to take account of group characteristics, the 
nature of the task and the environment in which the group is going to function. These 
factors present the constraints to team building (Handy, 1976/1993: 155). The group 
characteristics refer to group size, member characteristics, individual objectives, and the 
stage of development of the group (Ibid.: Chapter 6). Group size is directly linked to 
diversity of talent, skills, knowledge, and individuals' propensity for participation. 
Member characteristics like attitudes, values and beliefs govern the nature of groups; 
homogenous groups promote satisfaction, whilst heterogeneous groups display conflict. 
Individual objectives include hidden agendas that are not declared to the group. For a 
group to be effective individuals' objectives need to coincide through trade offs, they need 
to trust each other, and/or they need to have a 'common enemy' (Ibid.: 162). Team 
building is generally developed through the four stages of forming, storming, norming and 
performing (Ibid.: 165-6). Forming involves establishment of the group by discussing its 
purpose, its composition, and leadership. Storming involves conflict arising from 
revelations of individuals' agendas and a redefinition of group objectives, procedures and 
norms. Norming involves establishment of rules about how the group is to work, how it is 
to take decisions, and what the group's expectation of each member is. Performing is the 
culmination of the group development and involves the productive phase of the group 
provided the other stages have been completed successfully.
The nature of the task must match the type of group formed to undertake it. One way of 
doing this is by allocating task associated roles to each group member. The importance of
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the task to the group members is directly related to their level of commitment to the 
group. The environment in which the group functions affects team building through the 
leader's position power, the intergroup relations, and the physical location of the group.
In conclusion, the performance of group members is dependent upon a number of 
variables exerting external or internal influences upon group members' motivation, work 
attitudes and work outputs. Amongst these variables, leadership plays an important part 
and leads to the following question: How effective can leadership be in motivating group 
members, encouraging their participation in decision-making, forging them into a team, 
oiding or managing conflict, and having a positive impact on the participants' 
performance?
av
2.4 CONFLICT IN INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN 
BUILDING PROJECT COALITIONS
This section explores the contribution of building project participants' organisational 
behaviour to the emergence of conflict in interorganisational and interpersonal relations 
within building project coalitions. Firstly, various definitions of conflict in the context of 
building projects are reviewed. Secondly, power strategies, political activities, and bases 
for trust and distrust are considered in the interorganisational and interpersonal relations 
of project participants and linked to the forms of conflict identified.
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2.4.1 CONFLICT IN BUILDING PROJECT COALITIONS
Conflict in building project coalitions is viewed in two different ways. The 'pragmatists' 
(Lavers, 1992: 7) regard it as an inevitable characteristic of the contracting system which 
may have a positive or a negative effect on the performance of project participants and 
needs to be managed (for example, Smith, 1992; Langford et al., 1992). The 'strategists' 
(Lavers, 1992: 7), on the other hand, consider conflict as a negative influence on 
performance and are concerned with tackling its root cause in order to avoid it altogether 
(for example, Colledge, 1992; NEDO, 1991; Turner-Wright, 1992). Conflict is defined as 
'any divergence of interests, objectives or priorities between individuals, groups, or 
organisations; or nonconformance to requirements of a task, activity or process' 
(Gardiner and Simmons, 1992: 111). It takes two forms: functional and dysfunctional 
(Smith, 1992), also referred to as creative and destructive (Stephenson, 1996). Functional 
or creative conflict arises essentially from competition between the contracting parties and 
when managed and controlled, it is claimed to increase the parties' potential for success. 
Dysfunctional or destructive conflict arises when functional conflict is not resolved and 
leads to animosity or disagreement which limits the parties' potential for success (Smith, 
1992: 29, 30; Stephenson, 1996: 27).
Consideration of conflict in building project coalitions is important because in addition to 
the obvious costs like higher insurance premia, more claims specialists in all their guises, 
increased risks and uncertainties, and higher project costs and prices, it gives rise to 
hidden costs arising from reduced performance (Fellows, 1992: 123). Investigation of 
reduced performance attributed to conflict lies at the centre of this study and prompts the 
following questions: 1) Why does conflict arise in building project coalitions? 2) Why
does it becomes dysfunctional? 3) How does it affect the behaviour and performance of 
the parties in building project coalitions?
2.4.2 CONFLICT IN INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS OF BUILDING PROJECT 
COALITION PARTICIPANTS
Conflict in interorganisational relations of building project coalition participants is the 
outcome of the participants' organisational behaviour, which in turn is influenced by the 
macro factors comprising the project environment, the coalition structure, culture and 
technology. The project environment constitutes the context of operation of building 
projects and impacts on the way the project participants manage uncertainty, 
interdependence and competitiveness. The project coalition structure determines the 
relative power of project participants, and in conjunction with project culture and 
technology, influences their sources of power, the political activities they engage in and 
the power strategies they adopt.
Building project environment
The business environment of building projects comprises a wide range of public and 
private institutions from local government planning and building by law authorities, 
through public utility providers, to financial, commercial and legal organisations (Baden 
Hellard, 1988: 6). Each of these organisations represents distinct interests and exerts 
differing pressures, in terms of the demands for legitimacy, on project coalitions. These 
organisations, together with the construction industry on which building projects rely for 
their resources, constitute the sources of uncertainty and dependence for project 
coalitions.
The environmental complexity of building projects, together with the market diversity and 
hostility of the construction industry (Lansley, 1987: 144; Sidwell, 1990: 162) create a 
high level of competition and risk for the supply side. Competition leads to the absence of 
adequate measures taken to deal with the impact of risk as well as opportunistic behaviour 
manifested as avoidance or transfer of risk (Latham, 1994; see also the case studies). The 
occurrence of risk and consequential losses, the failure to anticipate risk, or ambiguous 
allocation of it are identified as some of the causes of conflict in building project coalitions 
(Lewis, Cheetham and Carter, 1992: 76-7). The adversarial nature of the construction 
industry is proof of the wide scope of this conflict (for example, Fenn and Gameson, 
1992; Latham, 1994; NEDO, 1991).
To manage environmental uncertainty and interdependence, construction project 
organisers delegate the tasks involved in the building production process, including the 
control, co-ordination and integration of inputs, to specialist professional and commercial 
firms. This trend reflects the fragmentation of the construction industry structure (Abdel- 
razek and McCaffer (1987), Ball, 1988: Bennett and Ferry, 1990; Gray and Flanagan, 
1989) and leads to narrow subdivisions of work and labour, packaged, sold and purchased 
as independent services and products through market transactions (Howell et al., 1996: 2- 
3). This mode of work organisation contradicts the principle of ends/means negotiation 
used to resolve design and construction problems in 'prototyping' models of production 
which are considered more appropriate to complex, uncertain and fast-track projects 
(Barlow et al. 1997: 5; Howell et al.: 1996: 3). The purchase of services and products has 
thus the potential to cause conflict between the project organisers, the professionals, and 
the commercial firms.
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To ensure the competitiveness of participant organisations, the project organisers select 
them on the basis of competitive tender processes. These processes mark the beginning of 
the political activities of organisations participating in building project coalitions. Inter- 
firm competition amongst professional and commercial firms exerts downward pressure 
on their prices limiting the resources available to them for the execution of the project 
(Loosemore, 1999: 177; Latham, 1994: 44). The inherent uncertainties of design, the 
developments in the design and construction and the emergence of unexpected problems 
during the course of the project, exhaust the firms' limited resources 'leading to the 
emergence of distinct winners and losers' and creating the potential for dispute 
(Loosemore, 1999: 177). In their attempts to redistribute the resources, the professional 
and commercial firms enter into negotiations with the project organisers/managers on the 
basis of claims for extra work and expenses (Baden Hellard, 1992: 38-9). The 
negotiators' effective response to conflict is likely to improve co-ordination, whilst their 
poor response may lead to escalation of conflict (Zikmann, 1992: 55).
Two types of response are identified as available to negotiators: passive and active 
(Zikmann, 1992: 55-6). Passive responses include: denial, avoidance and capitulation of 
conflict. Denial of conflict may increase tension between conflicting parties and lead to 
concealed hostility, frustration and gradual withdrawal of co-operation. Conflict 
avoidance may result in perseverance of unresolved problems and may reduce the parties' 
commitment to project goals. Capitulation to threats and demands of the other party may 
lead to suppression as opposed to resolution of conflict. Active responses to conflict 
comprise aggressive responses and creative responses. Aggressive responses are 
manifested as domination, distributive bargaining, and compromise. Domination of 
weaker parties may lead to stifling of future initiative, reduced creativity and poor future
decisions. Distributive bargaining, or driving a hard bargain, may lead to withdrawal of 
co-operation by the other party. Compromise may lead to over inflation of parties future 
demands, with the aim of achieving some of them. Creative responses, also referred to as 
integrative bargaining, may lead to co-operative and joint problem solving and workable 
solutions (Ibid.). The success of the negotiations depend on the 'personalities, experiences 
and attitudes' of the negotiators, the policies of their organisations, the nature of their
power relationship with their opponents, and their perceptions of their opponents 
(Loosemore, 1999: 178). The breakdown in negotiations leads to escalation of disputes 
and open conflict. The nature of negotiations and their potential outcomes are illustrated
in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Interorganisational negotiations and their potential outcomes
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The concept of authority, as power which has been transformed and legitimised through 
the development of norms and expectations, may be difficult to reconcile with the 
temporary nature of building project coalitions. This is reflected in the discussions about 
the difficulties faced by main contractors' management team in supervising subcontractors 
owing to the ambiguities of the lines of authority (for example, Beardsworth et al., 1988: 
616). Therefore in the context of building project coalitions, power as domination and 
resistance may be a more appropriate concept. Examples of domination as the type of 
power used to manage conflicts are provided by: denying or delaying payments, 
withholding contracts, and levying damages (Langford et al., 1992: 64). The sources of 
power available to project participants vary in accordance with their position within 
coalitions. For instance, clients, by virtue of funding building projects, have economic and 
decision taking power on which the other project participants depend; whilst professional 
and commercial firms have expert power on which clients depend. The economic 
domination of clients, through the tender process, may be resisted by other participants 
through submission of claims against variations as discussed above.
The political activities of building project participants are centred around their interests 
and distinctiveness as profit-making organisations (Loosemore, 1999: 178). The 
conflicting nature of these interests may be attributed to the diversity of their professional 
and commercial backgrounds which influence the frameworks of reference available to 
and implemented by the participants. The power strategies adopted by the latter may, 
accordingly differ. They may attempt to prevent or contain conflict, which according to 
some conflict management specialists is the essence of good management (for example, 
Baden Hellard, 1988: 35; Fellows, 1992: 122), or they may lead to escalation of conflict 
and the need for its defeat. Where large power disparities exist between the participants,
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or the will for resolving conflict is lacking, negotiations are counterproductive and 
formalised processes such as arbitration or even litigation may be required (Zikmann, 
1992: 57).
To explore the link between the building project environment, the project participants' 
power, political activity, tactics and conflict, the following questions are investigated: 1) 
To what extent does the project environment contribute to the emergence of conflict 
between the project participants? 2) What power strategies and tactics are adopted by the 
participants? 3) How do these strategies and tactics impact on conflict handling, and on 
the resolution or escalation of conflict?
Building project coalition structure: The network of independent firms
Building project coalitions comprise networks of independent organisations undertaking 
the functions of design, production, installation, and construction of the final building 
product. Therefore, they are vertically disaggregated (Miles and Snow, 1986: 64). The 
participant organisations are assembled as groups by agents. In some coalitions a single 
agent, for instance, the design and manage consultant or contractor, sublets all the 
functions (Masterman, 1992: 107). In others, two or more agents undertake this task, for 
instance, the project manager and the management contractor or the construction 
manager (Ibid.: 78; 96). Furthermore, each participant organisation may use an agent to 
sublet the sub-functions within the function that it undertakes, i.e., it may subcontract or 
sub-subcontract. In this respect, building project coalitions are brokered (Miles and Snow, 
1986: 64). The main functions of building project coalitions are integrated and controlled 
through the market mechanisms of contracts and payment by results. However, this
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mechanism does not eliminate the need for supervision by the main contractors' 
management team (Beardsworth et al., 1988: 616).
The vertical disaggregation, brokerage and market mechanism characteristics of building 
project coalitions identify them with 'dynamic networks' (Miles and Snow, 1986: 64-5). 
However, their reliance on supervision and their lack of full-disclosure information 
systems (NEDO, 1988; Shammas-Toma et al., 1998) - comprising continuously updated 
broad-access computerised information systems enabling mutual and instantaneous 
verification of contributions, set them apart from these network types. The full disclosure 
information system is the binding force within dynamic networks and is used to create 
trust speedily in relationships which have not had the opportunity to build trust over a 
long period of time (Miles and Snow, 1986: 65). Therefore its absence in building project 
coalitions is likely to have substantial repercussions for the coalitions' culture and the 
potential for trust building in interorganisational relations of project participants.
Dynamic networks take various forms. Examples include industrial districts, research and 
development networks, business groups, and strategic alliances (Powell, 1996: 53-62). All 
these forms involve some degree of long-term collaboration and pooling of know how; 
shared assets, responsibility and risk in the form of technological and managerial 
contribution and capital investment; and willingness to co-operate (Powell, 1990: 316-7; 
324-7). Building project coalitions, though sharing some attributes of these forms, do not 
fully conform to any particular configuration despite some claims to the contrary (for 
example, Powell, 1990: 306-7; see Winch, 1994: 596-7 for a discussion of the invalidity 
of such claims). For instance, building project coalition participants are more often than 
not selected on the basis of competitive tendering rather than long-term collaboration.
They tend to transfer their knowledge or skill through market transactions rather than 
exchange them through pooling. They attempt to avoid responsibility and transfer risk to 
other participants rather than share them (Shammas-Toma et al., 1998). These divergent 
attributes of building project coalitions from networks may be explained by the 
heterogeneity of the coalition group arising from the professionals' diversity (Powell, 
1990: 326). The latter characteristic is claimed to inversely relate to trust, to the 
participants' willingness to enter into long-term collaborations, and to their calculative 
attitudes (Ibid.). It is these distinguishing features of the building project coalition which 
have earned it the title: 'network of independent firms' (Winch, 1996(c): 5).
The uncertainty, complexity and dynamic characteristics of the business environment in 
which a building project coalition operates, necessitate an organic structure capable of 
'sophisticated innovation' - a structure 'that can fuse experts drawn from different 
specialties into smoothly functioning creative teams' through collaboration (Mintzberg, 
1991(c): 347). They further require a structure that relies on mutual adjustment, as the 
method of co-operation, facilitated through liaison devices like integrating managers and 
matrix structures. Such a structure would delegate to the integrating managers the power 
to make decisions according to need, whilst allowing the experts to decide on the basis of 
their expertise. It would be decentralised both vertically and horizontally (Ibid.: 348). Yet, 
based on the literature, the structures of building project coalitions do not appear to 
create smooth functioning creative teams, partly due to the dearth of collaboration 
discussed above, and partly because they rely on formal, sequential communication for co- 
ordination purposes (Tavistock Institute, 1966: 18-22; Shammas-Toma et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, negotiations for resources between the project management team and the 
professionals and contractors leads to the possibility of conflict (Sidwell, 1990: 163). This
conflict may be rooted in the competitive forces amongst the participants and the 'political 
games' they play (Mintzberg, 1991 (d): 372).
The above accounts of the building project coalition structure suggest a question and a 
hypothesis, respectively: 1) How does the building project coalition structure contribute 
to the emergence of conflict between the project participants? 2) The building project 
coalition is organised as a network at the start of the project but may be transformed into 
a political organisation during the project life-cycle (Mintzberg, 1991 (d): 374; PfefFer, 
1981: 27-9).
Building project coalition culture
Organisational culture is defined in two distinct ways. It is conceptualised either as 
'something an organisation 'has", or as 'something an organisation 'is" (Legge, 1995: 
185). The former concept characterises organisational culture as: shared values and norms 
learned collectively, through problem solving processes, over time, and established into a 
valid pattern of basic assumptions to be passed on to future members of the organisation 
(Deal and Kennedy, 1988: 4, 13-15; Ouchi, 1981: 195; Schein, 1992: 12). According to 
this concept, the culture of organisations is shaped by both external and internal factors. 
The business environment is considered as the single, most important influence; whilst the 
'values', or standards of achievement, the 'heroes', or the role models, and the 'rites and 
rituals', or the routines of day-to-day life, are identified as the requisite elements of a 
strong culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1988: 13-15). Thus the strength of culture is attributed 
to: the strength of conviction of the organisers; the stability of the group constituting the 
organisation; the intensity of the group's learning experience; and the quality of the 
learning process (Schein, 1994: 129). The concept of what an organisation is, regards
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organisational culture as: a phenomenon that is 'socially produced and reproduced over 
time, influencing people's behaviour in relation to the use of language, technology, rules 
and law, and knowledge and ideas', and which cannot be manipulated or changed; only 
described and interpreted (Meek, 1988: 293, cited in Legge, 1995: 187).
The instability of building project coalitions' membership, their insufficient shared history 
of experience, and the presence of many groups with different types of shared experiences 
is contrary to the conditions required for the creation of a strong culture as defined above. 
This may provide an explanation for short-termism and conflict-prone nature of 
interorganisational relations within building project coalitions (for example, Beardsworth 
et al., 1988; Shammas-Toma, 1998). Short-lived projects and short-term financial 
concerns are identified as disincentives to the development of long-term relationships, 
giving rise to an 'aggressive 'winner takes all' project mentality' (Zikmann, 1992: 54). 
This mentality is reflected in the 'use of threats, financial manipulation and other forms of 
coercion' which form the context for several types of conflict including: conflicts of 
interest, structural conflicts, value conflicts, relationship conflicts, and data conflicts 
(Ibid.).
Observers of social relations in the construction industry also tell a discouraging tale
about various participants' views of one another:
'I have seen many parties who have low respect for the skills of the other party. I 
may even venture to suggest that this seems a particular feature of the UK 
construction scene. Parties who see each other in a shallow way, as stereotypes, will 
not have much mutual understanding' (Smith, 1992: 32).
The multiorganisational constituency of building projects and the heterogeneity of the 
participant organisations together imply a variety of cultures based on 'people's different 
experiences of reality' and the existence of a range of sub-cultures within building project 
coalitions (Legge, 1995: 187). Therefore whilst a collective consensus, in the form of 
'shared values, shared beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding' (Morgan, 1997: 
138), is not likely to arise within project coalitions, the prominence of conflicting 
dominant sub-cultures is quite likely. One reason for this phenomenon may be attributed 
to the governance structure of project participants' interorganisational relations. The 
market transactions between the participants underpin their relationship with 'the power 
of legal sanction' and place a premium upon the value of the goods or services being 
exchanged rather than the relationship (Powell, 1990: 301-2). Therefore the participants 
tend to pursue their individual goals and interests independently and irrespective of those 
of others. This is contradictory to the functional interdependence of the coalition and 
creates conflicts of interests within the latter (Tavistock Institute, 1966: 22).
There are similarities and contrasts between the cultural aspects of building project 
coalitions and those of dynamic networks. The participants in both forms of organisation 
are heterogeneous. The networks may be formed for short or limited periods to undertake 
a project, as in the case of research and development networks or joint ventures; or they 
may be formed for extensive periods, as in the case of industrial districts or long-term 
partnering arrangements. The basis for the formation of networks is relational contracting 
involving 'sequential transactions within the context of a general pattern of interaction' 
(Powell, 1990: 301). The longitudinal nature of interaction in networks allows the 
potential for the evolution or the establishment of shared values, shared beliefs, shared 
meaning and shared understanding. Thus a more cohesive culture can exist within
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networks which emphasises reciprocity and mutually supportive action rather than the 
price of goods or services being exchanged. In networks one party is dependent upon the 
resources controlled by another and there are advantages in pooling of resources (Ibid.: 
303). Self-interested behaviour of a participant may result in its removal from the network 
(Miles and Snow, 1986: 65-6). Networks are formed to improve the competitive 
advantage of organisations who may independently be competitors.
The above discussion leads to the question: To what extent is a conscious attempt made 
by the project organisers to create cohesive cultures within building project coalitions? 
This question needs to be considered in the light of the influence of culture on conflict, 
since culture may determine the relative frequency of conflicts, the ability of participants 
to resolve conflicts, and the likelihood of achieving a productive or dysfunctional outcome 
(Gardinerand Simmons, 1992: 114).
Building project coalition technology
Information is by far the most important material in the building production process 
followed by the human skill implemented in producing, interpreting and using the 
information to construct the building product. The flow of information has been likened to 
the lifeblood of the system in which it circulates (Schein, 1994: 130). The building 
production process comprises three subprocesses: brief preparation, design, and 
construction. The flow of information from one sub-process to the next is facilitated by 
decision-making stages which increasingly reduce uncertainty about the final building 
product through time (Winch, 1996(a): 3-4).
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To the extent that the building production process involves the creation of a prototype, 
the building project coalition needs to 'learn, adapt, and innovate' (Barlow et al., 1997: 5; 
Schein, 1994: 130). The state of Information Technology (IT) within the coalition is 
claimed to determine the coalition's ability to learn through 'informating' (Zuboff, 1988). 
For instance, an information system that enables the construction of models of critical 
processes within the coalition will make those processes 'visible and understandable' to 
the project participants (Schein, 1994: 130). One example of such a system is Computer 
Aided Design (CAD). However, despite evidence of its increasing use, CAD is criticised 
on grounds of not allowing for the practicalities of construction and reducing the CAD 
operator's buildability experience by further separating the design and construction 
processes (Shammas-Toma, 1998: 187). Therefore the use of technology alone is not 
likely to improve the flow of information.
As the responsibility for building production is devolved to the designers, engineers and 
specialist contractors, the need for liaison between them increases giving rise to a greater 
requirement for integration and co-ordination mechanisms (Johnson and Scholes, 1989: 
280). This devolution further necessitates the monitoring and control of the quality of 
participants' inputs and increases the importance of co-ordination and direct supervision 
functions (Beardsworth et al, 1988: 607). The question that arises at this point is: What 
impact does the technology implemented in the production, co-ordination, integration and 
control of information make on the occurrence of conflict?
2.5 CONFLICT IN THE BUILDING PRODUCTION PROCESS AND ITS 
IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
The building production process comprises a number of subprocesses each of which is 
undertaken by one or more organisations. These organisations are related either 
contractually or functionally. The potential sources of conflict occur within or between 
these subprocesses at organisational interfaces (Baden Hellard, 1988). The management 
of the building production process involves co-ordination, integration, and control of 
participant organisations' inputs, facilitation of their co-operation, prevention of the 
occurrence of disputes or their speedily resolution (Baden Hellard, 1992: 35). It involves 
limiting the deterioration of functional conflict, which is a feature of building project 
coalitions, (Dodd and Langford, 1990: 395) into dysfunctional conflict. The participant 
organisations' willingness to co-operate and their propensity for bargaining and 
competition over financial rewards are subject to the project systems (Gardiner and 
Simmons, 1992: 112). The latter comprise the selection of the procurement method and 
interpretation of the contractual conditions, organisation of the building production 
process, and the quality and control system adopted for the project (Ibid.: 112-5). 
Potential sources of conflict exist within and between these systems.
Based on the above discussion, the success of building production process management 
appears to depend on the effectiveness of the project leader, on the one hand, and the 
project participants' teamwork, on the other. The measure of success is the extent to 
which the occurrence of dispute or dysfunctional conflict, as opposed to functional 
conflict, is prevented (Baden Hellard, 1992: 35). This section explores the potential 
sources of conflict within and between building production sub-processes and project
51
systems, and considers the potential impact of conflict management upon project 
participants' performance.
2.5.1 LATENT CONFLICT IN THE BUILDING PRODUCTION PROCESS
The building production process is of a pre-determined and limited duration referred to as 
the project 'life-cycle' (Sidwell, 1990: 159-61). The process comprises three broad 
stages: the establishment of the client's requirements and project objectives in the brief; 
the translation of these requirements and objectives into buildable information in the form 
of the design; and the implementation of this information into a built form through the 
process of construction. Each stage contains a number of subprocesses that are potentially 
conflictual (Gardiner and Simmons, 1992: 112).
The brief preparation stage
The brief preparation stage involves determining the function of the building, in terms of 
the technical and physical requirements; its aesthetics, in terms of the visual and 
experiential aspects of the external and internal spaces; its construction and running costs; 
and its period of construction, in terms of the occupation date. These elements, by their 
very nature, are conflicting (Baden Hellard, 1988: 7). The technical and physical 
requirements of the building may be incompatible with the aesthetics desired by the client. 
These requirements may not be achievable within the budget allocated. They may have 
higher running costs than that specified or they may not be realisable by the occupation 
date. Furthermore, the department responsible for funding the project within the client 
organisation may not approve it and may be in conflict with the department proposing it 
(Cherns and Bryant, 1984).
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These considerations give rise to the following questions: 1) What types of conflict 
emanate from the brief preparation stage? 2) How do they impact on the participants' 
level of aspiration, motivation, and willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
The design stage
The design stage comprises the selection of the design consultants and the production of 
construction, structural and services information by the consultants based on the client's 
requirements contained in the brief. The selection of the design consultants is generally 
based on competitive fee bidding (Latham, 1994: 44-5). This method is onerous both for 
clients and for consultants. It requires a good brief containing relatively fixed 
requirements in order to result in a lump-sum fixed fee for the consultants' design 
services. Whilst it encourages the consultants to submit low fee bids initially in order to 
secure the contract and attempt to claim for extra work resulting from inevitable 
variations in the client's requirements during the course of the contract. Competitive fee 
bidding is held to focus attention on 'issues of contractual liability, thereby undermining 
the possibility of co-ordination and teamwork' (Shammas-Toma et al., 1998: 185, 189). It 
gives rise to adversarial relations between the client and the consultants.
Each consulting organisation has its own project objectives and organisational interests 
which tend to conflict with those of others (Sidwell, 1990: 162, 163). The design process 
has three elements. The overall spatial configuration or form of the building is developed 
by the architect/design consultant who specifies the building materials and components 
based on the client's requirements. The building structure is developed by the structural 
consultant who specifies the structural system and its performance requirements. The 
building services is developed by the services engineer who designs the layout and
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specifies the performance requirements of the services system. The diverse organisational 
interests of the consultants, the conflicting elements of the brief and the diversity of a 
building project's technical requirements, result in conflicting design requirements 
between different disciplines that need to be resolved as part of the design process. For 
instance, an overlap may occur in consultants' technical and spatial requirements or their 
responsibilities (Baden Hellard, 1992: 38; 47). Negotiations involved in the process of 
resolving conflicts in the client's requirements or between the requirements of other 
organisations may give rise to a better design solution (Baden Hellard, 1992: 37). In this 
respect, conflict is 'creative'. However, if these conflicts are not resolved they give rise to 
acrimony and become dysfunctional.
The foregoing discussion leads to the following questions: 1) What types of conflict 
emanate from the design stage? 2) How do they impact upon the performance of 
participants?
The construction stage
The construction stage involves the selection of a main contractor, who in turn selects the 
specialist and trade contractors required for the production of the building based on the 
information supplied by the consultants. The selection of the main contractor is carried 
out through a competitive tender process. The firmness of the tender price is dependent 
upon the firmness of the client's requirements (Baden Hellard, 1992: 38-9). When these 
requirements change, the construction cost and time criteria become renegotiable and give 
rise to conflict between the client and the main contractor (Ibid.). The selection of 
specialist and trade contractors too is based largely on competitive tendering (Latham, 
1994: 61). The changes in the client's requirements may give rise to renegotiations of cost
and time criteria by the specialist and trade contractors and may lead to disagreements and 
disputes between them and the main contractor. Given the wide range and the large 
number of construction sub-processes and work packages employed on building projects, 
it is not hard to imagine the propensity for dysfunctional conflict arising from the 
construction process.
The construction process has two elements: conformance to the functional, aesthetic, cost 
and time criteria set out by the brief and conformance to the design. The source of conflict 
in the first element is changes to the client's requirements referred to above. Conformance 
to the consultants' design is one of the most contentious areas in the construction process 
(for example, Latham, 1994: 24). The fieldwork undertaken as part of this study, indicates 
that the design information produced by the consultants may prove impractical to 
construct (Chapter 5; Chapter 6). The division of responsibility for design, particularly 
between the consulting engineer and specialist engineering contractor, contributes to this 
problem (Latham, 1994: 28). The absence of co-ordinative measures regarding 
buildability issues broadens the gap between design and construction and exacerbates the 
potential for conflict between the consultants and the main/specialist and trade contractors 
(Shammas-Toma et al., 1998: 184). Furthermore, the diverse interests of the specialist 
and trade contracting organisations together with the numerous work package interfaces 
give rise to conflicting requirements by these contractors which need to be resolved 
during the construction process (Dodd and Langford, 1990). Figure 2.6 represents the 
composition of the building production process. The division lines within each stage 
represent the areas where dysfunctional conflict may occur.
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Figure 2.6: Building production process
The purchase of services and products from professional and commercial firms along the 
building supply chain has significant consequences for the management of building 
production. The leadership of management team has shifted away from the client's 
architect to the contractor or the quantity surveyor as project managers (Bresnen, 1996). 
This shift in project role may contribute to disagreements and disputes between the 
architect and the project manager as the case studies indicate. Another implication of the 
current modes of work organisation for building production management has been the 
increasing delegation of the management function to participant organisations. This has 
created control problems for project management team and is another source of conflict 
between managers and producers (for example, Beardsworth et al., 1988).
Based on the foregoing discussion the following questions are posed: 1) What types of 
conflict emanate from the construction stage? 2) How do they impact upon the 
performance of participants?
2.5.2 LATENT CONFLICT IN PROJECT SYSTEMS
Management of the building production process begins at the inception of the project and 
ends with the hand over of the completed building. Although the management tasks for 
each sub-process are delegated to the organisation leading the sub-process, the project
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manager oversees the entire production process (Gardiner and Simmons, 1992: 112; 
Sidwell, 1990: 159). The literature suggests that the contractual system, establishing the 
roles and relationships of the project participants, and the management and control 
systems, co-ordinating and overseeing participants' inputs, set the parameters for 
destructive conflict in interorganisational relations in building project coalitions (Gardiner 
and Simmons, 1992).
Contractual system: Procurement methods and contractual relations
The client's selection of a procurement method sets the framework for the building 
project coalition to meet its construction requirements. The procurement method defines 
the contractual relations between the coalition participants and allocates their roles and 
responsibilities for the duration of the project (Masterman, 1992: 1; Winch, 1996(b): 16). 
The contractual relations and the participants' responsibilities establish hierarchical and 
lateral relations between them giving rise to the network configuration of the coalition 
(see sub-section 2.4.1, above).
A wide array of procurement methods are implemented by clients to construct buildings. 
They are either based on standard forms of contract, amended to suit the client's 
purposes, or are custom-made forms produced by the client for the particular project in 
question or the types of project constructed on a regular basis. The procurement methods 
generally used divide into three broad bands: separated or co-operative, integrated, and 
management oriented, based on the degree of separation or integration of design and 
construction processes they provide (Masterman, 1992). This study is concerned with the 
separated and the integrated methods.
The most commonly used method in Britain is the separated or the traditional system 
(Masterman, 1992: 19, Chapter 3). This method entails the selection by the client of a 
design team and a main contractor based on competitive fee bidding and tendering 
processes, respectively. The contractor's bid is often prepared on the basis of the client's 
specifications - design, performance criteria and construction methods - generally put 
together by architects and engineers (Eccles, 1981: 451). The specifications provide 
information regarding the type of specialities and labour skills required on the project and 
form the basis for both hiring specialist and trade contractors by main contractors and 
hiring labour by specialist and trade contractors. The traditional method establishes 
contractual relations between the client and the design team; the client and the main 
contractor; the main contractor and the specialist and trade contractors; and the specialist 
and trade contractors and their subcontractors and labour-only subcontractors 
(Masterman, 1992: 25), as represented in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Contractual relations in the traditional procurement method
The sources of conflict in this method are ascribed to poor teamwork. Poor teamwork 
arises from poor communication, uncertainty and disagreements. 'Tenuous or non-
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existent' communication links between the project participants fail to establish 'team' 
attitudes towards the production task (Lewis et al., 1992: 74). The weakness of 
communication links is, in turn, associated with the mutual independence of the project 
participants which results from the institutionalisation of their roles (Tavistock Institute, 
1966: 45; 44; see also Ball, 1988: Chapter 4). The uncertainty surrounding the client's 
requirements, the design and the building construction is recognised by all the project 
participants. However, the responsibility for it is passed on by one participant to the other. 
(Tavistock Institute, 1966: 51). The disagreements amongst the design consultants have 
already been discussed (see sub-section 2.4.1, above). Those between the design 
consultants and the main contractor are the result of renegotiations arising from variations 
in the contract and buildability problems (Baden Hellard, 1988: 8; Masterman, 1992: 49). 
The disagreements between the client and the main contractor arise due to the conflict 
between the project objectives and the organisational goals of the contractor. Those 
between the main contractor and the specialist and trade contractors are often caused 
over the payment of extra items, or the late payment of interim instalments, etc. (Langford 
et al., 1992: 64-5). The disagreements amongst the specialist and trade contractors are the 
outcome of the poor definition of the boundaries of their corresponding work packages 
(Dodd and Langford, 1990: 393-4).
The design and build procurement method is the most prominent amongst the integrated 
systems. The most appealing characteristic of this method to the client is the single point 
of contact established by selection of a main contractor responsible for both design and 
construction of the building. The selection is based on a competitive bid prepared on the 
basis of the client's requirements which may vary in the extent of design detail. The 
contractor organises the design and construction activities by implementing: 'pure design
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and build', whereby it supplies both design and construction expertise contained in-house; 
'integrated design and build', when it buys in design expertise in addition to the in-house 
resources; or 'fragmented design and build', when no in-house design expertise exists and 
the contractor buys it in on a project-basis to be able to undertake design and build 
projects (Masterman, 1992: Chapter 4). The design and build procurement method 
establishes contractual relations between the client and the main contractor; the contractor 
and the design team; the contractor and the specialist and trade contractors; and the 
specialist and trade contractors and their subcontractors and labour-only subcontractors 
(Masterman, 1992: 59). These relationships are represented in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Contractual relations in the design and build procurement method
Despite claims that the design and build procurement method fosters a more co-operative 
relationship (for instance, Grout, 1991), some researchers consider that both functional 
and dysfunctional conflict exist to equal measures in this method as they do in the 
traditional method (for example, Smith, 1992: 33). This consideration leads to the 
question: What, if any, is the link between the procurement method implemented and 
intracoalition conflict?
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The sources of conflict in this method are attributed to ineffective co-ordination and 
quality of built product (Shammas-Toma, 1998: 186). The general trend seems to be for 
contractors to subcontract the design to consultants based on competitive tendering. 
Therefore the production of design details are not generally undertaken by consultants 
until they have been awarded the job. This shortens the time available to contractors to 
consider the buildability of the design. Furthermore, as the main reason for adopting the 
design and build procurement method is financial, the quality of the building may not live 
up to expectations (Ibid.: 187).
The literature suggests that the occurrence of conflict is not necessarily related to the type 
of procurement method adopted. It is more fundamentally related to the contractual 
system that describes and governs the building production process (Clegg, 1992). The 
contract documents, irrespective of the procurement mode they represent, merely 
construct an 'ideal model' of the building project coalition which is 'unreal: it does not 
actually exist' (Ibid.: 133-4). Therefore they cannot and do not provide ways of dealing 
with the 'uncertainties' of every day life in the coalition. Furthermore, owing to the 
'indexicality' of the contract documents and the role diversity of the coalition participants, 
the contract documents are interpreted differently and very often in a self-interested way 
(Ibid.: 134-5). One instance where the contract indexicality, the role diversity of the 
participants and the uncertainties of the building production process combine to create 
conflict, is exemplified by the participants' 'role ambiguity' (Dodd and Langford, 1990). 
Based on the indexical and unreal attributes of contracts, Clegg goes on to theorise that: 
1) '[Contractual documents provide the constitutional and constitutive grounds and 
framework within which the meaning of the contract is negotiated, contested, and 
sometimes contained' (1992: 135). 2) Conflict is an outcome of the 'functioning of
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power/knowledge relations on construction sites.' Manifestations of conflict represent 
'the strategies of power of the participants in the site organisation seeking to maintain 
control over costs and profits' (Ibid.: 139). These theories seem to be compatible with the 
second hypothesis formulated in subsection 2.3.1 above, and will constitute the third and 
fourth hypotheses of this study.
Subcontracting relations
Owing to the separation of design and construction activities, the responsibility for the 
production of each process may be devolved to separate entities of designers and 
contractors. Therefore subcontracting of activities may include subletting any one or 
combination of the constituent elements of the design process, for example, design of the 
form, structure or services (see Figure 2.7). It may also include any one or combination of 
the inputs in the construction process such as: hiring the workforce; hiring the workforce, 
equipment and materials; hiring the plant; or hiring the workforce, plant, and the purchase 
and assembly of materials (Ball, 1988: 91).
The subletting of design work was established in the nineteenth century with the 
phenomenon of professionalisation (Ball, 1988: Chapter 4). The subletting of construction 
work by the main contractor has been ascribed to: the 'span' of the type of work it 
undertakes, the 'short-term overload' in the main contracting firm, the inconvenience of a 
project's geographical location, or the main contractor's 'lack of specialist capability' 
(Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1990: 138). Accordingly, four types of activities or inputs may 
be subcontracted: fix only; supply and fix; design, supply and fix; and design, 
manufacture, supply and fix (Gray and Flanagan, 1989: 11). The provision of these inputs 
- by a specialist or a trade contracting firm to a main contracting firm - which are then
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incorporated into the final building product, constitutes a subcontracting relation 
(Thoburn and Takashima, 1992: 1).
The nature of the subcontracting relation, in terms of its independence from or relative 
dependence on the contractor, is governed by the degree of subcontractor's control over 
the four phases of the work process: 'product conceptualisation, design process, work 
organisation, and production' (Druker and Macallan, 1995: 53 based on Chaillou, 1977). 
Based on these criteria, three subcontracting relations may exist in the context of building 
project coalitions: speciality subcontracting, which involves responsibility for 
conceptualisation and design of certain aspects of the project; supplier subcontracting, 
which involves responsibility for design, work organisation and production; and capacity 
subcontracting, which involves responsibility for production in accordance with specific 
instructions to meet demand (Druker and Macallan, 1995: 53-4; Rainnie, 1992: 55; 
Thoburn and Takashima, 1992: 13, 2). Consideration of the subcontracting relation 
prompts the question: To what extent does the subcontracting relation contribute to the 
emergence of conflict between the contracting parties?
The Japanese dimension
In view of the success of Japanese interfirm networks, low levels of dispute and conflict in 
Japan's construction industry and major Japanese construction firms winning an 
increasing share of the international construction market, a Japanese dimension is added 
to this research for comparative purposes (Bennett et al., 1987: 7; Edwards and Samimi, 
1997; Fellows, 1992: 126). This is done through the study of a building project procured 
by a major Japanese contracting firm. The comparative study is aimed at exploring 
whether Japanese management methods succeed in avoiding or containing conflict, in the
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context of the British construction industry? If these management methods succeed, they 
may provide useful lessons.
There are six major contractors in Japan which operate identically in terms of providing 
construction services, and recruitment and training of staff (Bennett et al, 1987: 26-52). 
Their services range from finding construction sites for clients, helping to arrange the 
required finance and then designing to constructing and maintaining high quality buildings 
and engineering products. They tend to have long-term relations with major clients and 
negotiate or bid for projects on the basis of considerable detailed design, and construction 
works budgets and schedules. Upon entering a contract both contractors and clients, 
guided by 'a Confucian sense of social obligation' (Ibid.: 33), tend to sustain their long- 
term relationship. According to the authors claims for loss and expense are rare. If, 
however, a contractor demonstrates incurring extra costs despite performing well, 
adjustments to the contract sum are negotiated between the contractor and the client. The 
outcome of these negotiations is dependent upon the bargaining power of the parties.
The procurement of a project, once a bid is won, starts with attempts to control the 
construction process through construction works planning, scheduling, quality control, 
safety and committing the site work-force to the project's success. The major contractors 
tend to have long-term relationships with their specialist and trade contractors and 
suppliers, some of whom work exclusively for the contractor within a network of 'shita- 
uke' (Porter, 1990: 407-8). The contractors in turn belong to groups of affiliated 
companies or 'keiretsu' (Powell, 1996: 58; Porter, 1990: 408).
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Project management and control systems
Management of the building production process, similar to all other management 
activities, involves planning, organising, leading and controlling humans, materials, 
machines, methods and financial resources. The humans also require motivating (Baden 
Hellard, 1988 : Chapter 4). These management functions are generally carried out by the 
project manager or the project team. The combination of management functions and skills 
and the leadership styles required to carry them out vary at every stage of the building 
project life-cycle owing to the differing environmental conditions and management 
problems (Sidwell, 1990: 159-60). At the brief preparation stage, the influence of external 
factors like the investors, the owners/operators, the local planning authority, the 
community or pressure groups, etc. require 'flexibility, awareness, entrepreneurial skill 
and political perspicacity' (Ibid.: 160). The management functions include: planning 
decisions based on the client's likely future requirements, organisational decisions, and 
leadership decisions. The planning decisions determine the function, aesthetics, cost and 
time elements of the project. The organisational decisions concern the selection of project 
participants and the extent of their management responsibilities. The leadership decisions 
comprise the overall management of the project coalition including the motivation and 
control of the project participants (Baden Hellard, 1988: 43). Therefore the manager 
needs to adopt a high relationship/high task leadership style (see Section 2.3; Figure 2.4).
At the design stage, the influence of various consultants, the planning authority, building 
by laws, etc. require liaison, co-ordination and negotiation skills and the ability to cope 
with bureaucracies (Sidwell, 1990: 160). The management activities at this stage 
comprise: delegating the responsibility for the design development to the consultants, co- 
ordinating and controlling the four facets of function, aesthetic, cost and time stipulated
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by the brief, and stimulating the consultants (Baden Hellard, 1988: 44). At the 
construction stage, the influence of manufacturers, suppliers, labour, etc. require 
monitoring, control and leadership skills (Sidwell, 1990: 160). The management function 
at this stage includes: programming and planning of activities, selection and appointment 
of specialist and trade contractors, recruitment of labour, control and supervision of the 
participants and the workforce (Beardsworth et al., 1988: 612-17). The most appropriate 
leadership styles at these stages may be both high relationship/high task and low 
relationship/high task (see Section 2.3; Figure 2.4). The choice of style is contingent upon 
the situational factors discussed in Section 2.3. Based on this discussion, the following 
question arises: To what extent does the project manager's leadership style create conflict 
amongst the participants?
The flow of management authority varies at every stage of the project life-cycle and is 
related to the emergence of disputes. At the brief preparation stage, it is both downwards 
from the client to the project manager and upwards from the project manager to the 
client. The downward flow is related to the client's contractual position. The upward flow 
represents the project manager's responsibility to manage the client's requirements in an 
order of priority (Baden Hellard, 1988: 43). At the design stage, the management flow is 
downwards from the project manager to the consultants and inwards from the consultants 
over their operation work tasks. This downward flow is supposed to remedy the 
'sideways management' situation arising from the equal status of the consultants which 
may lead to conflicts of their functional requirements (Baden Hellard, 1988: 46-7). At the 
construction stage, the flow is downwards from the contractor to the specialist and trade 
contractors and upwards from the contractor to the project manager (Baden Hellard, 
1988: 47-8). In the design and build procurement method the main contractor undertakes
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the project management functions. The management flows within the three stages of the 
building production process are represented in Figure 2.9.
tt
<
V V
7
y,
^>
\ 
Figure 2.9: Management flows at the three stages of the building production process 
in the traditional and design and build procurement methods
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The divisions within the management flow between the client and the professional project 
manager and between the latter and the commercial contractor are said to be at the root 
of many disputes (Baden Hellard, 1988: 37). The question that arises at this juncture is: 
How do divisions within the flow of management authority give rise to conflict between 
the project participants?
By far the most fundamental divisions are those of control, resulting directly from the 
fragmentation of the building production process. For example, the regimentalisation of 
the design functions within the boundaries of each consultant's remit creates narrow 
visions of the design problem and leads to each consultant guarding against the intrusion 
by others' functional requirements. This militates against the functional interdependence 
of the building production process (Tavistock Institute, 1966: 44, 45). Another example 
of fragmented control is provided by the site operations. The division of work into self- 
contained packages undertaken by the autonomous specialist and trade contractors in a 
sequential manner creates problems of 'activity density', on the one hand, and poor 
workmanship, on the other (Beardsworth et al., 1988: 614-16). This raises the need for 
greater supervision by the site management thus contradicting the financial economies that 
constitute one of the reasons for subcontracting. The absence of hierarchical authority of 
the site management, however, makes the enforcement of control over the specialist and 
trade contractors' workforce difficult and at times impossible (Ibid.: 616). This discussion 
leads to the question: How do divisions of control amongst design functions and site 
operations impact on the performance of participants?
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Management of conflict in the building production process
The foregoing discussion identified the areas within the building production process 
where conflict inducing factors occur. To facilitate the smooth operation of the process 
and the harmonious relations of the project participants, the management team must either 
keep these factors under control to prevent the emergence of disputes, or effectively 
respond to them once they have arisen (Zikmann, 1992: 54).
To keep conflict inducing factors under control, collaborative skills are required. These 
skills are regarded as significant pre-requisites for teamwork and are said to play a 
decisive part in managing conflict constructively by turning varied solutions and 
arguments into more effective and comprehensive decision-making and problem-solving 
processes (Guirdham, 1990: 3). Destructive conflict can turn discussions into contests and 
can lead to ineffective or no solutions, as well as destroying working relationships (Ibid.). 
Japanese style of management is exemplified for its collaborative orientation, emphasis 
upon relationship skills - developing subordinates and supporting supervisors, and co- 
operation rather than individual performance (Ibid.).
Based on the discussions in this chapter, it is pertinent to consider: What conflict 
management methods are implemented by project managers and how they impact on 
participants' performance?
Conflict resolution and its impact upon performance
Conflict resolution depends upon the effectiveness of project planning and advance 
consideration of possibilities or likelihood of conflict as well as on the project manager's 
response to conflict. The project manager's response to conflict is similar to those of
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negotiators discussed in Sub-section 2.4.2. The effectiveness of project planning is 
contingent upon risk management. Risk management is considered the most important 
duty of a project manager (Lewis, Cheetham and Carter, 1992: 80). Risk management 
techniques should be applied at the early stages of a project when the potential for 
management and control is greatest (Ibid.). Risk management is said to take place through 
three phases of identification, analysis, and response. Risk identification involves 
establishing the risks which are likely to cause the most serious threat to project success. 
This is done by thinking through the project, anticipating the problems and considering 
solutions. Risk analysis comprises the quantification of the effects of anticipated risks on 
the project. Risk response is based on the consideration of avoiding, reducing, retaining, 
or transferring risk (Ibid.: 80-81). Risk transfer and allocation are carried out through the 
contract, by means of cost-contingencies, or through insurance, by means of insurance 
premiums. The question that emerges from this discussion is: What conflict management 
methods are implemented by project managers and how do they impact on the participants 
performance?
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter explores the nature of the link between conflict and productivity problems by 
considering the relationship between productivity and determinants of behaviour and 
performance. It thus establishes the premise for investigating why the link occurs by
relating conflict to the factors influencing behaviour and performance. This relationship is 
represented in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: Relationship between conflict, behaviour, performance and 
productivity problems
Project goals, organisational goals, power, political activity, and trust are identified as the 
factors which influence and determine M&E contractors' behaviour at both the macro 
level of the organisation and the micro level of the individual. At the macro level, power 
relations may give rise to dominance and resistance, or authority and illegitimate 
resistance. Power may be used to prevent conflict by implementing 'responsible 
autonomy' or 'direct control' strategies; or it may be used to defeat conflict. Trust as 
reliability and a basis for co-operation in interorganisational relations may develop on a 
calculative basis, it may be used as an impression to manipulate the opposite party, or it 
may disguise capitulation by the weaker party. On the other hand, it may constitute a risk- 
reducing mechanism used to create predictability in the behaviour of parties to avoid 
conflict. At the micro level, one party may influence the other through: compliance, by 
using reward or coercive powers; identification, by using referent power; and 
internalisation, by using expert, legitimate or informational power. Relations may give rise 
to dominance and resistance, or authority and illegitimate resistance. The source of one 
party's power over the other is attributed to: control over resources, ties to resource
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controllers, combination of situational factors and power holder's characteristics, and 
formal authority. Trust in interpersonal relations may develop on similar bases to those in 
interorganisational relations. It is manifested in: the delegation of responsibility and 
control, discretion or prescription in work roles, and task-centred/function-centred 
transaction rules. Power and trust in interpersonal relations may be used to prevent, defeat 
or avoid conflict.
The past success on previous projects, the level of aspiration of representatives, and the 
motivation and willingness of representatives to apply initiative and effort constitute the 
factors which determine M&E contractors' performance. The latter aspect of performance 
is influenced by both extrinsic factors, like reward and punishment, and intrinsic factors, 
like job satisfaction. Amongst the intrinsic factors, leadership makes a major contribution 
to the motivation of group members. The combination of leadership styles and situational 
requirements give rise to the level of trust between group members and the leader, the 
level of task definition, the level of leader's authority, and the level of the group's ability 
to set realistic goals and to accept responsibility for the outcomes. The leader's three roles 
of motivating the group members, encouraging their participation in decision-making, and 
forging them into a team play an important part in the performance of the group members.
The link between conflict and productivity problems in building project coalitions is 
established by defining the concept of conflict, identifying its sources in project 
participants' interorganisational and interpersonal relations, and considering the potential 
impact of conflict on participants' performance in the building production process.
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Consideration of the above issues gave rise to subsidiary questions and hypotheses that 
were used to guide data collection and analysis during fieldwork. These questions and 
hypotheses - distinguished by the letters Q and H before the question or hypothesis 
number - are categorised thematically below.
2.6.1 CONFLICT AND ITS RELATION TO BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE
This theme contains the questions relating to the emergence of both creative and 
dysfunctional conflict in building project coalitions, and their impact on the behaviour and 
performance of project participants (see pp. 37-8).
Ql) Why does conflict arise in building project coalitions? 
Q2) Why does it become dysfunctional?
Q3) How does it affect the behaviour and performance of the parties in building project 
coalitions?
These questions correspond to the three research questions posed in Chapter 1. They are 
elaborated further under the themes of contractual/interorganisational conflict, 
operational/interpersonal conflict, management of conflict, and impact of conflict on 
performance.
2.6.2 CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT
This theme aggregates the questions relating to the emergence of conflict attributed to the 
contractual framework (pp. 60, 63-4), the building project environment (pp. 43), project 
coalition structure (p. 46), culture (p. 49), and technology (p. 50), on the one hand; and 
the questions relating to various forms of trust in the project participants' exchange
relations (pp. 21, 22, 23), on the other. The questions address research questions 1 and 2 
posed in Chapter 1.
Conflict attributed to contractual framework
Q4) What, if any, is the link between the procurement method implemented and
intracoalition conflict? 
Q5) Do Japanese management methods succeed in avoiding or containing conflict in the
context of the British construction industry? (This question applies to the second
case study, only.)
Conflict attributed to building project environment
Q6) To what extent does the project environment contribute to the emergence of
conflict between the project participants? 
Q7) What power strategies and tactics are adopted by the participants?
Conflict attributed to project coalition structure
Q8) How does the project coalition structure contribute to the emergence of conflict 
between the project participants?
Conflict attributed to project coalition culture
Q9) To what extent is a conscious attempt made by the project organisers to create 
cohesive cultures within building project coalitions?
Conflict attributed to project coalition technology
Q10) What impact does the technology implemented in the production, co-ordination, 
integration and control of information make on the occurrence of conflict?
Trust in project participants exchange relations
Qll)To what extent does trust, as 'reliability', feature in the exchange relations of
project participants? Is it underpinned by calculation? 
Q12) To what extent does trust as predictability enter the project participants' relations?
Is it underpinned by legal sanctions? 
Q13) To what extent are impressions of trust created through power-induced
predictability and capitulation? Are these impressions based on domination and
dependency, respectively?
2.6.3 OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
This theme combines the questions relating to the emergence of latent conflict at brief 
preparation, design and construction stages (pp. 53, 54, 56), on the one hand; and conflict 
arising from project management and control systems (pp. 66, 36, 68), on the other. The 
questions address research questions 2 and 3 posed in Chapter 1.
Latent conflict at brief preparation stage
Q14) What types of conflict emanate from the brief preparation stage? 
Q15) How do they impact on the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, and 
willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
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Latent conflict at design stage
Q16) What types of conflict emanate from the design stage?
Q17) How do they impact upon the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, and 
willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
Latent conflict at construction stage
Q18) What types of conflict emanate from the construction stage? 
Q19) How do they impact upon the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, and 
willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
Conflict arising from project management and control systems
Q20) To what extent does the project manager's leadership style cause conflict?
Q21) How effective can leadership be in motivating group members, encouraging their 
participation in decision-making, forging them into a team, avoiding or managing 
conflict and having a positive impact on the participants' performance?
Q22) How do divisions within the flow of management authority give rise to conflict?
2.6.4 MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
This theme groups the questions relating to the way interorganisational and interpersonal 
conflict is handled and/or resolved (pp. 43, 70) and links them to the participants' 
performance. The questions address research question 2, and 3 posed in Chapter 1.
Q23) How do the power strategies adopted by the participants impact on conflict 
handling, and on the resolution or escalation of conflict and the participants' 
performance?
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Q24) What conflict management methods are implemented by project managers and how 
do they impact on the participants' performance?
The above questions help the investigation of conditions on the basis of which the truth or 
falsity of the following hypotheses is asserted.
HI) '[Contractual documents provide the constitutional and constitutive grounds and 
framework within which the meaning of the contract is negotiated, contested, and 
sometimes contained' (Clegg, 1992: 135; see p. 61).
H2) Conflict is an outcome of the 'functioning of power/knowledge relations on 
construction sites.' Manifestations of conflict represent 'the strategies of power of 
the participants in the site organisation seeking to maintain control over costs and 
profits' (Clegg, 1992: 139; seep. 61-2).
H3) The building project coalition is organised as a network at the start of the project 
but may be transformed into a political organisation during the project life-cycle 
(Mintzberg, 1991 (d): 374; Pfeffer, 1981: 27-9; see p. 46).
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The review of productivity literature, the nature of the research questions emanating 
subsequently, and the conceptual framework linking productivity to behaviour and 
performance, pointed towards a qualitative research orientation and design. The early case 
visits, indicated the importance of social issues like power disparity, politics, and trust in 
interorganisational and interpersonal relations of project participants and their 
representatives. These indications led to further reviews of literature in the corresponding 
areas, and the emergence of sub-questions which constituted the framework for data 
collection.
This chapter is organised in two sections. Section 3.2, discusses the research methodology 
by explaining the paradigm selected, the strategy adopted and the design of the 
investigation procedure. Section 3.3, considers the analytical framework by describing the 
data analysis methods, and drawing conclusions with theoretical implications.
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Based on the research design literature, there are two paradigms for carrying out research, 
the quantitative and the qualitative. The quantitative paradigm assumes only one reality 
which constitutes the truth being investigated, and which can be viewed and measured 
objectively and independently of the researcher (Creswell, 1994: 4). It assumes that the 
facts of the investigation can be extracted and reported from the evidence collected 
allegedly without value judgements and that the research findings are based on established 
and well defined concepts and variables (Ibid.: 5-7). The qualitative paradigm, on the 
other hand, accommodates several realities constructed subjectively by the informants and 
the researcher, and influenced by the researcher's interactions with and interpretations of 
the situation being investigated (Stake, 1995: Chapter 3). It leads to the emergence of 
definitions that evolve from value-laden information during the course of the investigation 
(Ibid.).
The quantitative paradigm or methodology comprises a theory or a hypothesis selected 
prior to the investigation and proposed to be tested, a definition of the unit of analysis and 
the variables, the measuring tools, the testing, and the verification processes (Jankowicz, 
1995: 89). It is based on a deductive logic, or the principle of cause and effect and is used 
both to understand and explain phenomena through references to theories, and to 
contribute to those theories through development of generalisations (Creswell, 1994: 7). 
The qualitative methodology involves investigation of complex problems that are multi- 
disciplinary in nature and arise from social rather than technical and scientific issues 
(Jankowicz, 1995: 90-93, 95-99). It is based on inductive logic and uses large units of 
analysis as settings in which situations unfold to allow the emergence of patterns or
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theories which may explain the phenomena being investigated (Creswell, 1994: 7; Stake, 
1995: Chapter 3).
Both quantitative and qualitative methodologies may be used to discover or generate a 
theory - referred to as grounded theory - through the comparative analysis of social units 
of any size (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: Chapter 1). The comparative analysis process 
comprises 'joint collection, coding, and analysis of data' drawn from documentary or 
empirical evidence (Ibid.: 43, Chapter 2). The main criticism of grounded theory concerns 
its problem of credibility ascribed to 'unsystematic', 'impressionistic', and 'exploratory' 
characteristics of qualitative methods, and 'sloppy' or 'unsophisticated' nature of flexible 
quantitative methods used to arrive at a theory (Ibid.: Chapter 9). The advantage of the 
theory is related to the varied insights it facilitates from which theoretical 
conceptualisations may be derived (Ibid.: Chapter 11).
3.2.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY
The selection of a paradigm for the research process is ascribed to a number of factors 
such as the researcher's worldview, training and experience, and psychological attributes 
as well as the nature of the problem and the audience for the study (Ibid.: 9). This study 
bases the selection of the paradigm on the nature of the research problem. In so far as the 
latter is concerned with understanding relationships and social consequences, it is 
exploratory and is therefore investigated by describing the scenarios in which the 
relationships are embedded and by analysing the situations that give rise to the social 
consequences (Jankowicz, 1995: 98). In other words, the research problem is investigated 
by adopting a qualitative approach (Ibid.).
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In the domain of qualitative research, a broad range of strategies govern approaches to 
investigation. These include ethnographies, phenomenological studies, histories, case 
studies, and multisite case studies (Creswell, 1994: 11-12; Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 
40). Before discussing the criteria for selection of a strategy, a brief summary of each 
strategy is outlined below.
Ethnographies, phenomenological studies, and histories
Ethnographies are in depth studies of particular aspects of a society, culture or group, 
through participant observation over lengthy periods of time (Bell, 1987: 7-8). They are 
not based on theoretical models (Yin, 1994: 14). Instead, they facilitate recognition of 
common problems, by members of similar groups, and present potential ways of resolving 
them (Bell, 1987: 8). The main criticism of ethnographic studies is their problem of 
representativeness and generalisability (Ibid.).
Phenomenological studies are in depth studies of shared human experiences and the way 
these experiences are structured to form worldviews (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 82). 
They involve descriptions of a small number of people, studied over extensive and 
prolonged periods of time, with the purpose of developing 'patterns and relationships of 
meaning' (Creswell, 1994: 12). They comprise a continuous analytical process comprising 
clarification of the researcher's preconceptions and biases, identification of the 
phenomenon being investigated, and synthesis of the patterns and relationships of meaning 
into structures of experience (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 82-83).
Histories are accounts of past events based on primary or secondary sources of data 
comprising testimonies of eyewitnesses, documents, records, etc., or reports based on
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eyewitness accounts, respectively (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 89). The data may be 
collected by utilising a range of techniques from in depth interviews to study of archives 
(Ibid.: 40).
Case studies and multiple case studies
Case studies are all-encompassing or holistic studies of contemporary events or 
phenomena within their real-life contexts (Yin, 1994: 13). They involve the collection of a 
wide range of data, both qualitative and quantitative, the nature of which may be guided 
by the review of theoretical literature (Ibid.). Case studies are criticised on the basis of 
their lack of vigour, the impact of the researcher's bias on the direction of the findings and 
conclusions, their problem of generalisation, and the cumbersome data they generate 
(Ibid.: 9-10). Multisite, multiple, or comparative case studies are considered as variants of 
case studies in terms of design or selection criteria, and are distinguished from them on 
the premise of each case serving a distinct purpose in the overall process of inquiry (Ibid.: 
14).
The selection of a strategy for investigation is attributed to the level of analytic interest, 
i.e., whether individual, group, organisation, or interorganisation; the informational 
adequacy and efficiency of the method, i.e., whether it enables the research questions to 
be investigated thoroughly and within the available time; and the theoretical framework 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 42). It is moreover related to three conditions: 1) the type 
of research questions and the nature of the study; 2) the investigator's control, or lack of 
it, over behavioural events; and 3) the focus of the investigation on 
contemporary/historical events (Yin, 1994: 4).
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In this study, two levels of analytic interest emanate from the research questions, 
interorganisational and individual. The research questions necessitate the study of context 
specific behaviour, processes, relationships, and interactions incorporating complex and 
unknown variables. Therefore they need to be explored within their real life situations and 
explained in terms of contextual variables identified during the research process (Ibid.: 43- 
4). Because the research findings are aimed at answering questions rather than testing or 
verifying theories and hypotheses, and in so far as they may give rise to generalisations 
drawn from recurrence of certain activities, problems or responses, the research adopts a 
qualitative, multiple case study approach.
The exploratory and explanatory nature of the research established above and suggested 
by the 'why' and 'how' type research questions posed, suggest ethnography, history, case 
study and multiple case study strategies (see Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 41; Yin, 1994: 
6-7). Lack of participation in the research process and absence of control over 
behavioural events, eliminate ethnography from the list of potential strategies. 
Furthermore, the contemporary focus of the research, which is an implicit feature of the 
research questions, removes history from the above list of strategies. To examine the 
extent of contextual impact on behaviour, processes, relationships and interactions, 
multiple case studies are selected with each case presenting a different operational 
framework.
3.2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
The design of multiple case studies is generally based on the logic of 'replication' (Yin, 
1994: 45). Replication involves selection of cases to support the prediction of conditions 
under which certain phenomenon does or does not take place. Accordingly, replication
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may be literal or theoretical, respectively (Ibid.: 46). The design process starts with the 
formulation of research questions, and involves the definition and selection of cases, 
identification of data sources, outline of data collection techniques, proposals for 
validation of data, access arrangements and consideration of confidentiality (Stake, 1995: 
51-4).
Definition of cases
The cases, in the context of this study, comprise portions of building project coalitions. 
They present the real life situations in which the context specific behaviours of main and 
mechanical and electrical (M&E) contractors, the building production management 
processes, and the interpersonal relations and interactions of the contracting 
organisations' representatives are studied. The cases are bounded by contractual 
interfaces between clients and main contractors and those between main contractors and 
M&E contractors. The key problems anticipated at the outset were those of access to all 
the parties involved, and inhibitions to open communication with the parties' 
representatives which might affect the data collected. The major events to be observed 
were identified as site meetings between main and M&E contractors where the actors 
could be watched in situ so that their power relationships, the politics they engaged in, 
and the existence, nature, or absence of trust in their interactions could be studied.
Selection of cases
The cases were selected, firstly, to facilitate understanding the problems that arise from 
real life situations discussed above, and their impact upon main and M&E contractors' 
performance and productivity. Secondly, they were expected to lead to assertions or 
modifications of generalisations about main and M&E contractors' behaviour,
performance, and productivity presented in the literature. To facilitate understanding the 
above problems, the cases needed to be diverse so as to present a range of possible 
scenarios. They moreover needed to provide easy and open access to data sources (Stake, 
1995: 4). This meant that they had to be both easy to get to and supportive of the study 
by providing the data required. To lead to assertions or modifications of generalisations, 
the cases needed to incorporate similar operations or conditions that may give rise to 
recurrence of activities, problems and responses.
Based on the above criteria, the cases were selected from industrial, commercial and 
public sector and were procured through integrated design and build and the traditional 
methods. They were located in London and the South East because the initial contacts 
and informants who facilitated access were based in London and could provide suitable 
projects in Kent, Cambridge, Woking and London. Furthermore, this part of the UK was 
the centre of building activity in the mid-1990s when the research was undertaken. The 
cases incorporated a high proportion of mechanical and electrical services input. They 
were of comparable size, cost, and complexity, the limits of which were dictated by the 
research programme and objectives which imposed a restriction of maximum twelve 
months services installation duration on the projects.
At the start of fieldwork, four cases were selected; one each from the industrial and 
commercial sectors, and two from the public sector. The former cases were procured 
through the integrated design and build method and involved small M&E contracting 
organisations of relatively equal size. The latter cases were procured through the 
traditional method and included large M&E contracting organisations of comparable size. 
To add a cultural dimension to the study, one of the design and build projects was
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selected on the premise of being organised by Japanese interests. These similarities and 
differences constituted the grounds for comparisons and contrasts of the cases from which 
analytical generalisations were to emerge.
Shortly after the fieldwork had begun, one of the cases from the public sector was 
abandoned because it provided limited insight into the real life situations and the problems 
arising from them that the research intended to investigate. It was therefore predicted that 
the required data may not be collected from the case and that the corresponding research 
effort may be put to better use on the other cases.
Data sources
The data sources were selected on the premise of providing the opportunity to learn about 
the cases. Therefore they were not absolutely identical in every case. Although there was 
a core of data sources that were used in all the cases, additional or alternative sources 
were used to supplement or provide data which could not be obtained through the other 
sources. The data sources used comprised documents, key representatives of 
organisations participating in building project coalitions, and site meetings. The 
documents included contracts between main and M&E contractors, clients' 
requirements/briefs, minutes of site meetings, and company literature. The key 
representatives, forming the core of data sources, included architects/design consultants, 
services consultants, main contractors' project managers, and M&E contractors' project 
engineers. The other representatives who provided additional sources of data included 
main contractors' in-house quantity surveyors, a main contractor's M&E installation 
advisor, a main contractor's contracts co-ordinator, a main contractor's site manager, and 
an M&E contractor's operational director. The site meetings between main and M&E
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contractors comprised forums for discussing progress of the works, problems and 
potential solutions. They constituted the scenarios where interaction between the 
contractors' representatives took place and where insight into events, problems, 
responses, etc. was provided.
Data collection techniques
In so far as the major characteristic of qualitative research is identified as interpretation, 
the emphasis in this study is placed upon observation of the workings of the cases, 
recording what happens, examining what it means, redirecting observation, and refining or 
substantiating the meanings (Stake, 1995: 8-9). The data collection techniques correspond 
to the data sources. They comprise review of the documents discussed above, in depth 
interviews with the key people identified above, non-participant observation at the site 
meetings between main and M&E contractors, and viewing and first hand experience of 
the progress of the works on the sites themselves.
Document review
Review of documents served two purposes of providing background information on the 
cases and contextual information on the participant organisations; as well as presenting 
clues about meanings of actions and the possible root of problems.
In depth interviews
In depth interviews were used to obtain both general background and particular topic 
related data about the cases. They were moreover used to obtain various subjects' 
perspectives on the cases, events, and problems so as to construct the 'multiple realities' 
that are said to characterise cases (Stake, 1995: 64). Two sets of interviews were planned
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at the outset. One set was carried out at the early stages of the research and involved the 
key representatives of participant organisations constituting the core of data sources, as 
well as those who provided additional sources of data. The questions underpinning these 
interviews related to early thought processes about the research. The second set of 
interviews were carried out at the end of case projects and involved main contractors' 
project managers. These interviews were aimed at plugging the gaps in the information 
provided by the data already collected, providing additional data necessitated by 
redirectioning the investigation, and obtaining project managers' views about M&E 
contractors' performance and productivity.
The degree of structure incorporated in the interviews was guided by the range and types 
of questions required to ascertain the nature of case projects, the modes and conditions of 
engagement of project participants, their roles and responsibilities, and their modus 
operandi particularly the management processes they utilised. These topics formed the 
framework for the questions (see Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991: 74-5). To the 
extent that the questions were posed broadly and sought to elicit interviewees' attitudes 
and perceptions, they were semi-structured. They led to both informal and semi-formal 
conversational type interviews (Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman, 1988: 60) that helped 
uncover the processes at work and discover the subjects' meaning perspectives (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1995: 80), i.e., the meanings that interviewees attached to issues and 
situations (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991: 73).
Because a diverse range of subjects were interviewed in each of the cases and the cases 
varied, each questionnaire was designed separately to obtain the required data. However, 
the design was systematic across the cases, to obtain comparable data with regard to the
context, conditions governing interorganisational relations, management processes, etc. 
The questionnaires tended to be rather long, around or in excess of twenty questions, in 
order to obtain the specific information referred to above. The decisions regarding the 
contents of the questions were to a large degree guided by the researchers' experience as 
an architect and knowledge of the construction industry. The interviewees were sent a 
copy of the questionnaire prior to the interview so as to form an awareness of what was 
to be asked and how long the interview might take. They were sent a copy of the 
interview notes in due course, with a 'thank you' note, and were asked to comment on the 
accuracy or misinterpretations of the researcher. Three interviewees replied with their 
alterations which were incorporated in subsequent interpretations. Copies of interview 
questionnaires are provided in the Appendix.
Altogether, thirty interviews were conducted. Of these, five proved abortive when one of 
the case studies was abandoned as explained previously. Of the remaining interviews, four 
were held with people who provided access to the cases and were not involved with the 
projects; eleven were carried out informally on the sites as conversations with the 
participant organisations' representatives; and ten were organised as semi-formal 
interviews either on the sites or in the representatives' offices. The problems encountered 
with interviews included some subjects' reluctance to partake at all or to divulge 
information.
Almost at the outset of research the use of audiotapes was ruled out in favour of note- 
taking both during and immediately after the interviews. This decision was based, most 
importantly, on the sensitivity of the issues and the belief that more confidential 
information may be obtained in the absence of a tape recorder. It was moreover
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influenced by the transcription time or cost, and by the large volumes of raw data it would 
generate.
Observation
Observation was carried out to increase understanding of the cases through watching the 
actors in their own environment and recording events, telling the stories as they unfolded, 
describing the situations, the problems, their resolution or irresolution (Stake, 1995: 60- 
2). It therefore required longitudinal involvement of varying durations with each case. It 
took the form of non-participant attendance at the site meetings between main and M&E 
contractors. In total, sixty seven meetings were attended: twenty one in Kent, over an 
eight months period; seventeen in Cambridge, over a nine months period; and twenty nine 
in London, over a twenty months period (see the Case Study Diary on page xi). The site 
meetings were held at regular intervals although the regularity varied from case to case. 
For example, the fortnightly and the weekly site meetings in Kent and London, 
respectively, were conducted quite regularly with one or two cancellations during the 
attendance period. Whilst those in Cambridge, particularly the design co-ordination 
meetings, were quite irregular and had a high rate of cancellation over the attendance 
period.
The observations provided insight into the subjects' behaviour, thus enabling 
interpretations of meanings of those behaviours based on the assumption that 'behaviour 
is expressive of deeper values and beliefs' (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 79). At the early 
stages of research, observation was general and was recorded as descriptions of events 
and behaviours in the site meetings as site diaries. As the research sub-questions emerged,
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through the second literature review, observation became more focused around the topics 
of the questions and the recorded accounts were gradually categorised accordingly.
Data validation
To establish the validity and reliability of the case studies, a number of principles were 
used. These included triangulation (Stake, 1995: 111-5; Yin, 1994: 91-3) to enable 
transferability of the findings to another context (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 143-4); 
creation of case study databases (Yin, 1994: 94-98) to establish the credibility and validity 
of the findings (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 143, 145); and maintenance of a chain of 
evidence (Yin, 1994: 98-9) to ensure confirmability of the findings (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995: 145).
Triangulation
The type of triangulation employed was methodological involving collection of data 
through the combination of approaches described above (Stake, 1995: 114-5). These 
multiple sources of evidence enabled the study of a wide range of historical, attitudinal, 
and behavioural issues which converged to provide answers to the research questions 
posed (Yin, 1994: 92-3). These answers led to conclusions from which generalisations 
were made based on and tied to the theoretical framework adopted for the study. Thus 
the findings were made transferable to other contexts (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 143-
Case study databases
The case study data bases were compiled in the following manner. The contract 
documents provided data on the nature of interorganisational relations between main and
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M&E contractors and the quality of information supplied by the former to be processed 
by the latter. The clients' briefs presented data on the nature of projects and the facilities 
they sought to provide. Minutes of meetings produced detailed information on the 
progress of the works, the project participants' tasks and thus implicit data on the 
performance and productivity of the latter. The company literature presented 
impressionistic images of the contracting organisations involved thus giving rise to data 
on their relative size, market share, dominance and power. The in-depth interviews 
expanded on the data relating to interorganisational relations, and provided data on the 
contracting organisations' performance targets, the contextual framework within which 
they carried out their tasks, the processes and procedures that governed their actions, and 
the attitudes of the participant representatives. The non-participant observation enabled 
collection of data on the behaviour of representatives and the factors which influenced 
them. The various categories of data were then compiled so as to tell the storey of each 
case. The credibility or validity of data was ensured through a degree of cross-checking 
facilitated by some overlap in the questions directed at the subjects interviewed.
Chain of evidence
To maintain a chain of evidence, the case studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 make 
cross-references to the databases whenever appropriate. The databases were compiled as 
readily accessible hard or soft copy files and were referred to regularly during the write 
up. Furthermore, the data confirm the general findings and lead to the implications of the 
findings (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 145).
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Access and confidentiality
The approach adopted in gaining access to the cases was 'opportunistic', i.e., contacts 
were used as far as possible (Bryman, 1988: 15; Buchanan et al, 1988: 56; Crompton and 
Jones, 1988: 70) to select potential projects, and then clearance was sought from the 
people responsible for the projects (Bresnen, 1988: 38, 39). The contacts were either 
directly involved with or had knowledge of appropriate projects. When negotiating 
access, they were assured that the findings would not be published (Buchanan et al, 1998: 
57) and were promised a copy of the executive summary upon completion of the study. 
The emphasis on confidentiality was carried through to the interviews and was 
demonstrated by the absence of tape recorders as explained previously. It was believed 
that overt expression of confidentiality would improve the quality of data collected 
(Crompton and Jones, 1998: 70) and would result in disclosure of sensitive information 
which the subjects would not divulge in the presence of a tape recorder. The procedure 
followed in gaining entry to the cases is outlined below.
In the case of the first project, a meeting with a contact in an M&E consultant firm was 
set up where provisional access to the project was provided subject to the client's and the 
main contractor's approvals. The client's consent was sought and obtained by sending 
them a copy of the research proposal and assuring them of the confidentiality of data 
collected. They then provided a contact in the main contracting firm who was also sent a 
copy of the research proposal, assured of the confidentiality of data collected, and 
informed about the nature of access required. Upon perusal of the research proposal, the 
contact in the main contracting firm agreed to a meeting. The meeting revolved around 
the project and was effectively an introduction to it. It was followed by an introductory
93
visit to the site of the project where the project manager's consent to my regular 
attendance at the site meetings was obtained.
In the case of the second project, the research proposal was sent to a contact in a main 
contracting firm. Upon the study of the proposal, the contract arranged a meeting where 
the nature of access to the project was discussed and entry to the project agreed. The 
contracting firm was the client's agent and did not require the client's approval. The 
meeting led to an introductory visit to the site of the project where the project manager's 
approval to my observations at the site meetings was obtained.
In the case of the third project, a meeting with a contact in the Heating and Ventilating 
Contractors Association was set up where a number of personnel managers in large M&E 
contracting organisations were contacted by the former. Three personnel managers 
responded positively and were sent copies of the research proposal. Three meetings were 
attended with them and access to two projects was obtained. However, one of these 
projects was abandoned a third of the way through the contract period as discussed 
above.
The problem of access to data was not resolved by gaining entry to the projects (Bryman, 
1988: 16). On the first case study, the M&E contractor's project engineer co-operated 
reluctantly and partially, on grounds of being too busy to partake in interviews. On the 
third case study, a considerable period of time elapsed before both the main and the M&E 
contractors' suspicions about my role as a spy for the other organisation dematerialised 
(Buchanan et al, 1988: 58).
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3.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The analytical framework comprises the methods and tools implemented to analyse the 
data collected and to theorise from the findings. It is therefore considered in terms of data 
analysis procedure, analytic methods, and generation of theory.
3.3.1 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS
Data analysis is defined as 'the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to the 
mass of collected data' (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 111). Qualitative data analysis, in 
particular, is considered as 'a search for general statements about relationships among 
categories of data' from which grounded theory may be constructed (Ibid.). The process 
of data analysis consists of examination, categorisation, tabulation, and recombination of 
the evidence with the purpose of addressing the objectives of the inquiry (Yin, 1994: 
102). It is considered an integral part of qualitative research, commencing when first 
impressions are made and continuing until the final write up (Stake, 1995: 71).
Analytic strategy
The analytic strategy is influenced by decisions made prior to data collection regarding the 
conceptual framework, selection of cases, research questions, and data collection 
approaches (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10; Stake, 1995: 84). The adoption of a strategy 
for analysis is regarded as a means of treating the evidence fairly, producing convincing 
analytic conclusions, ruling out alternative interpretations, and selecting an appropriate 
analytical technique (Yin, 1994: 103). Analytic strategies may be based on theoretical 
propositions, or case descriptions (Ibid.: 104-5). The former strategy focuses attention on 
certain data, identified by theoretical considerations of the investigation, so that other data
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may be ignored. It helps to organise the entire case study and to define alternative 
explanations that are to be examined as part of the validation process of the findings. It is 
guided by the research questions posed (Ibid.: 103-4). The latter strategy identifies types 
of events which may be quantified, and 'patterns of complexity' which may explain them 
or their causes (Ibid.: 104-5). Analytic strategies may, moreover, be based on the way 
meanings about cases are reached. This may take two forms: Direct interpretation of 
individual instances, or categorical aggregation of instances (Stake, 1995: 74). The former 
strategy ascribes meaning to single occurrences of phenomena. The latter strategy 
interprets collective occurrences of phenomena (Ibid.: 76). It is more suited to case 
studies aimed at understanding phenomena or relationships within them (Ibid.: 77).
This investigation adopted a combination of three analytic strategies. The conceptual 
framework and the research questions that developed from theoretical considerations 
proceeding the initial stages of data collection, guided the type of data sets that were 
collected. The case descriptions presented accounts of events under study as they 
unfolded, thus providing insights into why they took place based on which explanations 
about the events were proposed. The focus on relationships identified in the research 
questions gave rise to categories of phenomena from which interpretations were made.
3.3.2 ANALYTIC METHODS
A number of analytic methods are suggested in the literature (for example, Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995: 113; Yin, 1994: 102). They all seem to have the following features in 
common: coding data; reflecting and commenting upon data; searching data for 'similar 
phrases, relationships between variables, patterns, themes, distinct differences between 
subgroups, and common sequences'; identifying patterns and processes and applying them
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to the next set of data collection; formulating generalisations about consistencies found in 
the database; and comparing the generalisations with formal theories identified in the 
literature (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 9).
In this study, the analytic method adopted was based on Miles and Huberman's 
'interactive model' of data analysis (1994: 12). This model comprises an iterative process 
of three flows of activity, namely, data reduction, data display, and conclusion 
drawing/verification (Ibid.: 10-12). The components of this model are represented in 
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Interactive model of data analysis (Miles and Huberman: 1994: 12)
Data reduction
Involves condensing the raw data collected through review of documents, interviews, and 
observations by selecting, focusing on, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data 
appropriate to the inquiry (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10). This process may be 
undertaken by applying any number of the following eight analytical methods: Contact 
summary, codes and coding, pattern coding, memoing, case analysis meeting, interim case 
summary, vignettes, prestructured case, and sequential analysis (Ibid.: Chapter 4). This 
study employed most of these analytical methods except for vignettes and prestructure
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case. The methods that were employed are described briefly below, before their 
application to the data collected is discussed.
Contact summary
A contact summary is a precis of the key points of the field notes taken after a case visit. 
It is based on a few key questions that focus attention on the essence of the data 
recorded. The questions may address the people, events or situations observed; the 
dominant themes or issues; the research questions and the variables in the conceptual 
framework; the potential hypotheses, speculations, or hunches suggested by the visit; and 
other data sets that need to be collected on future visits (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 51- 
2)-
In this investigation, the contact summaries prepared after each site visit contained the 
following information: The participant organisations' representatives attending the 
meeting; the agenda discussed; the problems relating to the items of the agenda, 
particularly those affecting the performance of the participants and the progress of the 
works, the solutions suggested or proposed, or irresolution of the problems and their 
consequences; the possible roots of the problems observed and the reasons for participant 
representatives' behaviour; the gaps in information that needed to be plugged.
Codes and coding
In order to make sense of contact summaries, interview notes and documentary evidence, 
they are analysed into sections of distinct but related information which are labelled, or 
coded, to ascribe meanings to them. These labels or codes are then used to categorise the 
sections of information so that they are retrievable for clustering, display and drawing
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conclusions/verifications. This process of analysis and combination is referred to as 
coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56-7).
Codes can take three forms: descriptive, interpretative, and pattern codes representing 
different levels of analysis ranging from descriptive to inferential, respectively (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 57-8). They may be created, as a structured list, derived from the 
conceptual framework, the research questions, etc., prior to data collection (Ibid.: 58); or 
be allowed to emanate from the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 105). In either case, the 
codes change as the research develops, as the data are analysed or further data collected, 
or as unpredicted themes emerge. It is important to maintain the relationship of the codes 
in a coherent structure.
This study employed all three forms of codes referred to above. In the early stages of raw 
data analysis, descriptive codes representing classes of phenomena being investigated, 
were used. They were derived from the initial research aims comprising the investigation 
of the relation between: 1) M&E contractors' selection procedure and conditions of 
appointment; 2) their behaviour and performance; and 3) the effectiveness of the services 
system delivered. Four codes were created, namely, project description, client 
organisation, project conception and history, and project procurement. The data coded 
'project procurement' were analysed using the subcodes of procurement method, project 
design, organisation of construction work, and management of construction work. The 
data coded 'project design' were further analysed using the sub-subcodes of services 
design, design teams, and management of project at design stage, and so on. The coding 
procedure was structured to reflect the relationships between the research aims. Table 3.1 
presents this initial coding procedure. The first column refers to the coded text; the
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second column contains the codes; and the third column denotes the particular research 
aim to which the code relates.
Table 3.1: The initial coding procedure applied to early stages of data analysis
SECTIONS OF DATA CODED CODES RESEARCH 
AIM
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF PROJECT 
Description of facilities
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 2 AND 3
NATURE OF OWNER/OPERATOR 
Description of companies funding and/ 
or operating the facilities
CLIENT ORGANISATION
PROJECT EVOLUTION
Description of project 
development, and realisation
PROJECT 
HISTORY
CONCEPTION AND 1.2 AND 3
conception,
OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF PROJECT 
Selection of procurement method 
Description of procurement method adopted 
Main contractor's responsibility
CONDITIONS GOVERNING PROJECT DESIGN 
Design development of facilities 
Design responsibility 
Relationship between design and cost
Client's services requirements 
Nature of services design input
Design team members 
Their selection criteria 
Their roles and responsibilities
PROCUREMENT METHOD 1 AND2
PROJECT DESIGN 2 AND3
Services design
Design teams 2 and 3
The management structure of the project at Project management at design 2 and 3 
design stage stage 
Management of information flow 
Communication modes and channels
NORMS GOVERNING CONSTRUCTION WORK ORGANISATION OF CONSTRUCTION 1.2 AND 3 
ORGANISATION WORK
Subdivision of work into work packages 
The tendering system
Pre-tender list, pre-tender interview, tender Main contractor's tender process 1, 2 and 3 
invitation and documents 
Client's requirements
Tender information produced by main Main contractor's tender 1 
contractor documents
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
SECTIONS OF DATA CODED CODES RESEARCH
AIM
Criteria for selection of main contractor Main contractor's selection 1
process
Conditions governing main contractor's Main contractor's conditions of 1 
appointment appointment 
The letter of intent 
The form of contract
Nomination of M&E contractors M&E contractor's tender process 1 
History of M&E contractor's involvement
Tender information produced by M&E M&E contractor's tender 1 
contractor documents
Criteria for selection of M&E contractor M&E contractor's selection 1
process
Conditions governing M&E contractor's M&E contractor's conditions of 1 
appointment appointment
Components of project structure, their function Project coalition structure 2 
and their inter-relation
THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION 2 AND 3 
AT CONSTRUCTION STAGE WORK
Management of information flow
Modes of communication and communication
channels
Motivating trade contractors Management of trade contractors 2 and 3
Encouraging teamwork amongst them
Controlling their productivity, workmanship,
and observation of Health and Safety
regulations
As the number of observations increased, the conditions governing the participants' 
behaviour and performance were better understood, the participants' interactions made 
more sense, their strategies and tactics were gradually grasped, and the consequences of 
their actions became increasingly clear. These observations led to modification of the 
research problem and questions, further reviews of literature, and formulation of 
subsidiary questions presented in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions inspired reviews of
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codes into more interpretative forms. For example, the codes relating to main and M&E 
contractors' selection procedure and conditions of appointment were modified to those 
addressing the contractors' interorganisational and interpersonal relations (Research 
question 1). Conflict, as a salient feature of the these relations, was introduced into the 
coding procedure (Research question 1). The data relating to project participants' 
behaviour were coded as conflict inducing, conflict handling, and conflict resolving 
processes (Research question 2). The data related to M&E contractors' performance 
were coded as performance enhancing and performance deteriorating processes (Research 
question 3). The codes relating to the effectiveness of the services system delivered were 
omitted. The final version of these codes is provided in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: The final coding procedure applied to final stage of data analysis
SECTIONS OF DATA CODED CODES
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS CONTEXT
Client organisation
Design teams
Main contracting organisation
Construction group
M&E contracting organisation
ENGAGEMENT OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of
design team members
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of
main contractor
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of
construction group
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of M
& E contractor
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Project conception
Project history
Project design and management
Project construction and management
CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTERORGANISATIONAL CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK
RELATIONS
Power disparity
Power strategy
RESEARCH
QUESTION
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1 AND3
land 3
land 3
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
SECTIONS OF DATA CODED CODES RESEARCH 
QUESTION
Trust-based co-operation land 3
INTERPERSONALOPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK:
RELATIONS
The leadership behaviours
Motivation of project participants
Participation in decision making
Team building
CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT
Conflict attributed to contractual framework 
Conflict attributed to building project environment 
Conflict attributed to project coalition structure 
Conflict attributed to project coalition culture 
Conflict attributed to project coalition technology 
Low trust in project coalition exchange relations
OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
Latent conflict at brief preparation stage
Latent conflict at design stage
Latent conflict at construction stage
Conflict arising from project management and control
systems
MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON 
PERFORMANCE
CONFLICT
2 AND3
2 and 3 
2 and 3 
2 and 3 
2 and 3
1 AND 3
land 3 
land 3 
land 3 
land 3 
land 3 
land 3
1
1
1
1
1,2,3
2 AND3
Pattern coding
Pattern codes, by virtue of grouping categories of information into coherent and 
meaningful units of analysis, allow themes to emerge. They focus data collection on 
particular types of phenomena. They facilitate the formation of a 'cognitive map' and 
enable deeper understanding of events and interactions. Finally, they provide the basis for 
cross-case analysis through identification of common themes (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 
69). Pattern codes comprise the four elements of themes, causes/explanations, 
relationships among people, and theoretical constructs (Ibid.: 70).
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The analysis of the codes set out in Table 3.2, into the four constituent elements of 
pattern codes, gave rise to the categories of patterns presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Four categories of pattern codes
CATEGORIES 
OF PATTERN
PATTERN CODES
THEMES The conflict process
Emergence of interorganisational conflict
Emergence of conflict in the building production management process
Impact of conflict on the performance of project participants
CAUSES/ 
EXPLANATIONS
The nature of building production processes and procedures and emergence of
creative conflict
Power disparity, power strategies, distributive bargaining, dysfunctional conflict
and its impact on resources and performance
Fragmentation of production process, fragmentation of control, functional
inefficiencies, divergent sub-cultures, poor quality and slow dissemination of
information, and exacerbation of conflict
Calculation, risk, legal sanctions and power-induced predictability in project
participants relations
Project manager's inability to enforce project participants' performance
RELATIONSHIPS 
AMONG PEOPLE
Determinants of project participants' interpersonal relationships
Limitations of management processes to contain or resolve conflict arising from
clashes of organisational interests
Limitations of management processes to contain or resolve conflict arising from
clashes of human factors
The strategic nature of conflict management
EMERGING 
CONSTRUCTS
Conflict is inherent to the contracting system
The political nature of building project coalitions
The inter-relationship between national culture and socio-legal structures
The impact of professional bodies and commercial associations upon the
divisions amongst the project participants
Based on Table 3.3, a behaviour-conflict-performance-outcome cycle (see Figure 2.10) is 
proposed as a more accurate model explaining performance in building projects than a 
purely behavioural one. This model may be expanded as shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Behaviour-conflict-performance-outcome cycle
Memoing
Memoing or memo writing involves abstraction of ideas about coded data and their 
relationships, and integration of these abstractions into a coherent concept (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 72). They constitute the analytical framework that enables derivation of 
pattern codes from coded data. They moreover provide the tools for examining, 
questioning, and modifying the initial framework (Ibid.: 74).
One example of the memo written to guide derivation of the first pattern code in the 
theme category (see Table 3.3), involved conceptual abstraction from the data coded 'pre- 
contract processes', 'contractual conflict', 'interorganisational conflict', and 
'interpersonal conflict' (Table 3.2). The memo comprised:
Although conflict seems to have many varied causes, explanations, and 
manifestations, it appears to be processual, originating somewhere, fluctuating 
positively and negatively during the project life-cycle, and culminating somewhere. 
Where does it originate?
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Case analysis meeting
A case analysis meeting provided the opportunity for the researcher to present a summary 
of the case to other researchers for the purpose of obtaining feedback and guidance (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994: 76). These types of meetings occurred regularly during the course 
of the investigation. They mostly comprised one-to-one meetings between the researcher 
and the supervisor. However, on occasions, attendance in seminars involving other 
researchers and colleagues provided the opportunity for exposure to broader perspectives 
and cross fertilisation of ideas.
Interim case summary
The interim case summary is a report on what has been found and what remains to be 
found on a case. It contains a review of findings, the quality of supporting data, and the 
agenda covering the proceeding data collection (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 79). Several 
interim report summaries were prepared during the course of this investigation.
Sequential analyses
The various methods of analysis discussed above, ranging from data coding through 
generation of pattern codes and memo writing to interim case summaries, comprise an 
iterative process of analysis. They progressively lead to more focused data collection and 
more in depth analyses of data through further iterative processes. Thus, they constitute a 
sequential analytic process (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 86).
The interim case summaries formed the formal junctures in the study at which the iterative 
process of analysis engaged in up to that point culminated; and the case analysis meetings
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were the occasions during which the next iterative process or the next stage in the 
sequential analysis began.
Data display
Data displays are tools for drawing and verifying descriptive conclusions about a case. 
Similar to the analytic methods discussed previously, data displays can be used 
throughout the investigation as a means for analysis. By presenting the full data set in the 
same location, they facilitate comparisons, recognition of differences and similarities, and 
identification of patterns, themes, trends, etc., thus enabling formation of answers to 
research questions and aiding generation of theories (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 90-92).
Data displays take three broad forms. They may comprise reduced, focused data 
organised in a coherent structured manner; they may take the form of matrices composed 
of defined rows and columns; or they may constitute networks consisting of nodes of text 
linked together by lines (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 93). Data display forms correspond 
to research questions and data codes. Exploratory research questions or data coded at the 
early stages of research may require partially ordered displays like context chart or 
checklist matrix (Ibid.: 102-110). Studies concerned with unfolding of events and 
sequence of processes, may favour time-oriented displays such as event listing, event-state 
network, etc. (Ibid.: 110-122). Research questions and data codes addressing people's 
interactions, such as the questions posed and data coded in this study, may best be served 
by role-ordered matrices (Ibid.: 122-7). Finally, when a set of clearly defined variables are 
available, a conceptually oriented display like the conceptually clustered matrix, the 
cognitive map, or the effects matrix may be most appropriate (Ibid.: 127-141).
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To aid a better understanding of the relationships between the project participants, the 
contractual relations within the building project coalitions, the organisation of the design 
teams, the construction groups and the services works packages, and the information flow 
routes within them were represented graphically by 'organograms' (Luck, 1996: 77). 
These demonstrated the hierarchy and the lines of authority within the project coalitions 
and presented comprehensive pictures of all the members of the management teams 
involved in the projects including those not taking part in the meetings. Various other 
matrices indicating the relationships between variables were also composed in the first 
case study and referred to in the second and third. The analysis of the cases was based on 
the conceptually clustered data developed in the conclusion to Chapter 2.
Conclusion drawing/verification
The comparisons and contrasts of the cases pulled the various strands of data together 
and condensed the findings into concepts and issues that the study had set out to 
investigate, examine and possibly propose. The conceptual overlaps in the analytical data 
clusters provided verification of the findings by allowing the examination of the data to be 
carried out from various angles and perspectives. The pattern codes that emerged from 
the conceptual clusters case data constituted the framework for the conclusions drawn.
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3.4 SUMMARY
This chapter described and discussed the use of case studies and multiple case studies as 
the research strategy adopted to carry out the investigation. It defined the three relatively 
comparable building projects that were selected as the cases and their selection methods. 
It described the data sources used and the data collection techniques employed. 
Documents, organisational representatives, and site meetings attended on a regular basis 
over the greater portion of the projects' life-cycle comprised the data sources. Non- 
participant observation of interchanges amongst key players, and interviews with 
architects, services engineers, main contractor's project managers, M&E contractor's 
project engineers, an M&E contractor's operations director, and a main contractor's site 
manager constituted the data collection techniques.
The chapter moreover examined the data validation processes engaged in, and the issues 
of access to and confidentiality of the cases and the companies involved. Having 
considered the context, nature and collection of data, the chapter then went on to discuss 
the strategy and methods implemented to analyse and display data, through coding, and to 
draw conclusions and verifications from the information thus produced, through pattern 
codes.
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CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY i: THE COLD STORE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the first example of the construction project coalitions selected for 
in depth, longitudinal study of the main and mechanical and electrical (M&E) contractors' 
behaviour, building production management processes, and interpersonal relations and 
interactions of the contracting organisations' representatives. In the first instance, it 
provides a descriptive account of the main participants' characteristics, their engagement 
procedures, and the properties of the project which constitute the context for events, 
processes and interactions being investigated. It then considers the contractual and 
operational frameworks which govern the main and M&E contractors' interorganisational 
and interpersonal relations, respectively, thus identifying the salient feature of the relations 
and building production management processes. It subsequently examines the impact of 
the main contractor's management processes on the performance of the M&E contractor. 
The chapter comprises four sections:
Section 4.2, provides outline profiles of the main participants; sets out the pre-contract 
processes establishing the roles and responsibilities of the design teams, the main and the 
M&E contractors; and describes the conception, history, design and construction of the 
project.
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Section 4.3, examines the nature of the project participants' interorganisational relations 
arising from the contractual framework; and assesses the nature of their representatives' 
interpersonal relations vis-a-vis the operational framework.
Section 4.4, identifies conflict as a dominant feature of the relations discussed in the 
previous section. It establishes the types and manifestations of emergent conflict, 
considers the management processes implemented to handle or resolve conflict, and their 
impact upon the behaviour and performance of the main and M&E contractors.
4.2 CONTEXT
This section provides a brief description of the organisational characteristics of the client, 
the design teams involved, and the main contractor. It defines the selection processes, the 
appointment criteria, and the roles and responsibilities of the design teams, the main 
contractor, and the M&E contractor. It then recounts a precis of the project's conception, 
history, design development and construction process.
4.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS 
Client organisation
The client organisation was a limited company formed for the purpose of commissioning 
this project and comprised a joint venture between the financiers (Finance Co.) and 
operators of the facility (Operation Co.). For convenience, the client organisation is
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referred to as FinOp Ltd. The relationship between the partners was rather complex. 
Finance Co. agreed to fund the project on the condition of purchasing the freehold of the 
land on which it was to be constructed. Operation Co., who were the landowners, agreed 
to sell the freehold of the site and to become leaseholder operators of the facility upon its 
construction. By virtue of their position in the relationship, Finance Co. were the 
dominant party and had overall control over decisions regarding project procurement.
Design teams
There were two design teams involved in this project, FinOp Ltd's team, and main 
contractor's (Construction Co.'s) team. FinOp Ltd's design team comprised an 
architectural firm (Design Co.), a structural engineering firm (Structure Co.), and a 
services consulting firm (Services Design Co.). The team consulted with FinOp Ltd's 
project manager (Principal Project Manager) with regard to matters of considerable 
financial implication, and interfaced with Construction Co.'s design team through an 
interfacing project manager (Interfacing Project Manager). FinOp Ltd's design team was 
organised as shown in Figure 4.1. The solid links represent lines of influence arising from 
the team member's position and role within the organisation.
Figure 4.1: Organisation of FinOp Ltd's design team
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Construction Co.'s design team comprised an architectural firm (Design Associates), a 
structural engineering firm (Structures Associates) and the M&E contractor (Services 
Co.). The team consulted with Construction Co.'s project manager (Project Manager). 
The latter, in turn, consulted with Construction Co.'s site-based quantity surveyor (Site 
QS) and an M&E installation advisor (M&E Advisor). The design team were organised as 
shown in Figure 4.2. The solid links represent the lines of influence arising from the team 
members' position and role within the organisation.
Figure 4.2: Organisation of Construction Co.'s design team
Main Contracting organisation
The main contracting organisation (Construction Co.), is a Limited Company and the 
main operating subsidiary of its Parent, a leading public limited construction company 
established in 1970, which offers construction services throughout the UK and overseas. 
Construction Co. is a functionally divisionalised organisation, the operations of which are 
controlled by nine autonomously managed regional offices. It is involved in a broad 
spectrum of activity ranging from construction, civil and structural projects, to water 
industry development, and mechanical and electrical engineering. It has experience in a
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number of procurement methods including traditional, target cost, construction 
management, or design and construct.
Since their formation, Construction Co. has pursued a strategy of steady growth planned 
around diversification. A prominent example of this strategy is their joint venture with one 
of Europe's leading construction companies, which has extended Construction Co.'s 
range of activities to include the large infrastructure projects in the UK. This extension of 
activities has been facilitated by Construction Co.'s access to their joint venture partner's 
advanced construction technology and enhanced expertise. To implement their strategy of 
steady growth, Construction Co. alleged rely upon the calibre of their staff, by recruiting 
the best people and continually developing and motivating them; and focus on customer 
satisfaction irrespective of the project size.
Construction Group
The construction group comprised Construction Co.'s management team and the 
specialist and trade contractors. Construction Co.'s management team consisted of the 
Project Manager, a site manager (Site Manager), and four site supervisors (Site 
Supervisors 1, 2, 3, and 4). The organisation of the construction group is presented in 
Figure 4.3. The solid links represent the lines of influence arising from the group 
members' position and role within the organisation.
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Figure 4.3: Organisation of construction group
4.2.2 ENGAGEMENT OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS
To establish the basis for the relationship between Construction Co. and Services Co., 
their respective selection processes, appointment criteria and roles and responsibilities 
were investigated and are described at some length in this sub-section. Observations 
indicated that the parties' relationship was subject to, the procurement method, FinOp 
Ltd's relations with their design team, Construction Co.'s relations with their design team, 
Services Co.'s relations with other members of Construction Co.'s design team and with 
members of the construction group. Therefore outlines of the procurement method, the 
engagement criteria of design team members and those of construction group members 
are also provided here.
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Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of FinOp Ltd's design team 
members
FinOp Ltd had varying relationships with their design team members some of whom were 
appointed as individuals from known organisations. Others were selected, based on 
previous working relationships, and appointed as service providing firms through a 
competitive fee bidding process. FinOp Ltd's design team produced the scheme design 
and supervised its development into detail design and construction.
The principal Project Manager worked within Finance Co.'s organisation. He was 
responsible for managing the project from FinOp Ltd's perspective, in terms of making the 
'important decisions' which had financial implications. The Interfacing Project Manager 
worked in Services Design Co.'s project management division. FinOp Ltd had appointed 
him, based on QS Co.'s recommendations, to act as their Project Manager and to interface 
between their and Construction Co.'s design teams. QS Co.'s representative worked in 
Services Design Co.'s quantity surveying division which, at the time of study, had a 
working relationship with Finance Co. of over three years. FinOp Ltd had appointed QS 
Co. to provide advice on project procurement method, to monitor the cost of the project 
and to prepare monthly interim certificates indicating the amount and cost of the work 
undertaken.
Design Co. was the first consulting firm to get involved in the initial phase of the project 
in the late 1980s, and the only survivor of the professional team which grew around the 
project between late 1980s-early 1990s. They were responsible for the design of the 
building from feasibility to planning stages. Despite their long-term relationship with 
Operation Co., however, Finance Co. considered them unsuitable to act as FinOp Ltd's
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agent owing to the small size of their practice. Finance Co. selected and engaged 
Structure Co. on the basis of their previous work experience with them. The latter were 
responsible for the schematic structural design of the building. Services Design Co., who 
were recommended to Finance Co. by QS Co., were engaged on an hourly basis prior to 
the commencement of contract, and thereafter were re-engaged on a fixed-fee basis owing 
to their satisfactory performance. Services Design Co. produced the technical 
specification document for the services and were responsible for overseeing and 
monitoring the installation of services, witnessing commissioning and commenting upon 
Services Co.'s design proposals. The nature of FinOp Ltd's relationship with their design 
team members is summarised in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: FinOp Ltd's relationship with their design team members
DESIGN TEAM 
MEMBER
Principal Project 
Manager
Interfacing Project 
Manager
QSCo.
Design Co.
Structure Co.
Services Design Co.
ORGANISATION OF 
ORIGIN
Finance Co.
Services Design Co. : 
Project Management Div.
Services Design Co.: 
Quantity Surveying Div.
Design Co.
Structure Co.
Services Design Co.
NATURE OF 
ENGAGEMENT
Appointment of 
individual
Appointment of 
individual
Appointment of firm
Selection and 
appointment of firm
Selection and 
appointment of firm
Hourly-based 
appointment of firm 
followed by project- 
based appointment
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
FINOP LTD
Employee of Finance Co.
Recommended by QS Co.
3 years plus with Finance 
Co.
10 years plus with 
Operation Co.
Previous work experience 
with Finance Co.
Recommended by QS Co.
Procurement method
Services Design Co.'s representative explained that Finance Co. selected the design and 
build (D&B) procurement method based on QS Co.'s recommendation and owing to time 
restrictions both before and after the commencement of construction. These restrictions
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related to Operation Co.'s target date for having the building operational in order to store 
the current year's harvest. Construction Co.'s Project Manager, on the other hand, 
considered Finance Co.'s choice a strategy of shifting all the design and construction 
responsibility onto Construction Co.. The appropriateness of this selection was doubted 
by both Services Design Co.'s representative and the Project Manager. The former 
believed that the D&B method could have been appropriate had Operation Co. not made 
changes to the design as the project progressed. The latter was of the opinion that Finance 
Co.'s choice was misguided in view of the considerable amount of design carried out by 
Design Co. prior to tender stage, and that the traditional procurement route would have 
been better suited to the project.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of Construction Co.'s design team 
members
Construction Co. appeared to have a stable and steady relationship with most of the 
design team members. The Project Manager and the Site Qs were employees of 
Construction Co. The former was responsible for the development of FinOp Ltd's 
concept design into a buildable scheme and its construction. The latter was responsible for 
measuring and valuing the work carried out by the specialist and trade contractors.
Design Associates were known to Construction Co. both as a good practice in the South 
East and on the basis of their previous involvement on traditional contracts, for seven to 
eight years. Their participation on this D&B project was a one-off, however, not to be 
repeated, according to the Project Manager. Design Associates were engaged on the basis 
of Construction Co.'s own conditions of appointment - developed over the years and 
continually updated. These conditions did not vary much from the standard conditions of
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appointment but were tailored in Construction Co.'s favour. They required Design 
Associates to produce information more quickly. Design Associates were responsible for 
the production of detailed design and construction production information. Structures 
Associates had worked with Construction Co. for around five years. Their engagement 
was based on Construction Co.'s own conditions of appointment. They were responsible 
for the design of building structure and drainage system. M&E Advisor had worked with 
Construction Co., in an M&E consultant capacity, for three to four years. The 
engagement of their representative on this project, in a supervisory capacity, indicated 
Construction Co.'s uncertainty about Services Co.'s performance. Services Co. was one of 
two nominees proposed by FinOp Ltd. Their selection, appointment, roles and 
responsibilities are discussed later in this sub-section. The nature of Construction Co.'s 
relationship with their design team members is summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Construction Co.'s relationship with their design team members
DESIGN TEAM 
MEMBER
Project Manager
Site QS
Design Associates
Structures 
Associates
M&E Advisor
Services Co.
ORGANISATIO 
N OF ORIGIN
Construction Co.
Construction Co.
Design Associates
Structure 
Associates
M&E Advisor
Services Co.
NATURE OF 
ENGAGEMENT
Appointment of individual
Appointment of individual
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Appointment of individual
Selection and appointment 
of firm
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CONSTRUCTION CO.
Employee of Construction Co.
Employee of Construction Co.
7-8 years
Around 5 years
3-4 years
None. One of two nominees 
by FinOp Ltd
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of Construction Co. 
Construction Co. 's selection
Construction Co.'s selection was based on a competitive tender process. FinOp Ltd, their 
design team, and QS Co. collectively agreed to include six main contractors - chosen on
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the basis of their experience - on a pre-tender list. They invited the contractors to a pre- 
tender interview and selected four of them to submit tenders. Services Design Co. sent 
out tender invitations to the four contractors accompanied with tender documents. The 
latter comprised FinOp Ltd's requirements for phase A of the development - the large 
sized facility, basic drawings and few estimates of work packages but no Bill of 
Quantities1 , and the form of contract to be entered into by the prospective main 
contractor.
The contractors were given five or six weeks (five, according to Construction Co., six, 
according to Services Design Co.) to produce their tenders. Upon receipt of tender 
documents, Construction Co. assessed the potential contractual risk of the project with 
the aid of their legal consultant. Halfway through the tender period, Finance Co. decided 
to limit their financial risk and fund the smaller facility in phase B of the development first. 
Their aim was to extend their investment to include phases A and C, if and when the 
prospects seemed favourable. Thus FinOp Ltd's outline requirements changed, leaving 
Construction Co. with two weeks to prepare their new tender.
During this period, Construction Co. - with the aid of their design team engaged on a no- 
job-no-fee basis - rationalised the building structure, although they did not have enough 
time to simplify the complex construction of the roof into a more buildable solution. They 
moreover lowered the specification of drainage facilities, based on ground condition tests 
carried out at own cost, and suggested the use of excavated material as ground-fill. Thus 
Construction Co. proposed a more economical means of producing the building that gave
1. A document which itemises the elements of work to be undertaken thus enabling them to be priced 
individually and then summed up so as to produce a reasonably accurate estimate of the works.
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them a competitive advantage over the others. These and other initiatives gave rise to 
savings that were used to provide additional facilities in the project. Before preparing their 
tender submission, Construction Co. visited Operation Co. to find out about their 
operational requirements by discussing the shortcomings of their existing facilities.
Construction Co.'s tender submission comprised their previous D&B experience, the 
contract sum analysis, the contractual terms and conditions to be resolved, their standard 
Bond format, their proposals, an alternative design bid and associated savings, 
preliminaries, building insurer's register Rules and Certification, architectural 
specifications, structural specifications, mechanical and electrical specifications, 
management team at construction phase, the curriculum vitae of the staff involved, the 
consulting civil, structural, high way and drainage engineers' (Structure Associate's) 
company brochure, the programme of works, management method of specialist and trade 
contractors, health and safety provisions, Construction Co.'s Quality Assurance (QA) 
system and QA system management, and architectural and structural drawings.
To prepare the programme of works, Construction Co. prepared a Bill of Quantities on 
the basis of the tender documents they received. They analysed it to obtain bulk figures 
for the amount of work contained in every construction phase. These figures together 
with Construction Co.'s data banks, containing rates of production of various elements of 
the works, and their expertise determined the duration of construction phases. Key dates, 
like the start of steel frame, then determined the start of each phase.
To arrive at the overall tender price, the cost of carrying out each element of the Bill of 
Quantities, such as foundations, drainage, finishes, services, etc., was estimated based on
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the number of human hours involved and their hourly rate stored on Construction Co.'s 
data base; these costs were summed up, and to them were added the overhead, the profit 
and the contingency sum. The latter provided financial cover for unforeseen 
circumstances.
During tender negotiations, Construction Co.'s negotiator made the commercial decision 
to take sums of money off certain elements. This decision was based on the assumptions 
that the elements in question may be provided cheaper than priced, and/or FinOp Ltd's 
requirements were vague and open to interpretations. The deductions eroded the 
contingency per element of the works. The tender cost around £40,000.
Services Design Co. singled out Construction Co.'s cost, i.e., the reduced contract sum 
they agreed to subsequent to negotiations with FinOp Ltd, as the most important criterion 
for their selection, followed by their proposal and their previous work.
Construction Co. 's appointment, roles and responsibilities
FinOp Ltd appointed Construction Co. on the basis of a letter of intent. A letter of intent, 
according to the Project Manager, is effectively a summarised version of the contract and, 
together with client's monthly payments, forms a legally binding contract in a court of law. 
Though not a substitute to the contract, a letter of intent is used as a temporary legal 
arrangement between the parties to the contract to plug the time-gap spanning the 
contractor's appointment and the preparation of the contract proper that, owing to 
protracted legal proceedings, very often exceeds the contractor's lead-in period or even 
the contract period itself. On this project, the Contract was not prepared until the last
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month of the contract period. Construction Co. regarded this time-lag as a ploy by 
solicitors to charge larger fees.
Construction Co.'s conditions of appointment, as set out in their letter of intent, 
constituted their roles and responsibilities and stipulated their system of payment. 
According to these conditions, Construction Co. were responsible for the design and 
construction of Phase B described in the Contract documents within a fixed lump-sum 
price and a 32 weeks period. They were to provide a Design Warranty and a Performance 
Bond to FinOp Ltd by signing the Bond form tailor-made by the latter - Construction Co. 
modified this condition by providing their standard Bond form. They were moreover to 
require the provision of direct design Warranties to FinOp Ltd by their design consultants 
and trade contractors with design liability. The letter of intent further stipulated that if the 
works were brought to a halt for some reason attributable to FinOp Ltd, Construction Co. 
would be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of work already undertaken. Although 
Construction Co. did not experience any problems associated with working on the basis 
of a latter of intent, the Project Manager speculated that problems could have arisen had 
they fallen out with FinOp Ltd at an early stage in the project.
The Form of Contract finally entered into was the JCT Standard Form of Building 
Contract with Contractor's Design, 1981. FinOp Ltd made minimal modifications to this 
Contract primarily because Construction Co. countered those modifications which would 
have had onerous implications for them. For instance, they refused to accept the changes 
to the 'contractor's obligations' clause, requiring the disclosure by Construction Co. of 
the warranty agreements between them and their trade contractors with design liability; 
and altered the wording of the 'Design Warranty Agreement' which FinOp Ltd required
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Services Co. to sign. Construction Co.'s payment system was based upon monthly 
valuations carried out by QS Co. Variations or savings were added to or subtracted from 
the following valuation. Construction Co. passed on the payment system to Services Co. 
and other Trade Contractors.
Selection and appointment of construction group
The specialist and trade contractors were largely selected through tender processes. 
Construction Co.'s Proposals Co-ordinator - the person responsible for negotiating with 
FinOp Ltd at tender stage - explained the rationale for this method of work organisation. 
He stated that it avoided the management liability and risks that direct employment of 
tradesmen would impose on the firm; compensated for the limited estimating resources at 
the firm's local offices; and obtained a realistic picture of the market rather than relying on 
manufacturers' and suppliers' prices. He expressed a preference for long-term commercial 
contracts with specialist and trade contractors, however, claiming that partnerships were 
more viable means of procuring construction projects. An example of the engagement of a 
specialist contractor is provided below in relation to Services Co..
The limited tender period together with trade contractors' reluctance to tender 
competitively with the knowledge that their chances of securing a contract were slim, 
made the job of obtaining 4-6 tenders for every work package impractical. Therefore 
Construction Co. submitted quotations for some of the work packages at tender stage, 
based on their experience of previous works, and invited tenders later on. Some tenders 
received subsequently exceeded these quotations forcing Construction Co. to engage the 
trades people involved in the work packages directly, as supply-and-fix or labour-only
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subcontractors. The trade contractors' engagement was based on letters of intent and 
those who refused to work on this basis were not considered.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of Services Co. 
Services Co. 's selection
Services Design Co.'s representative explained that subsequent to meetings between 
Operation Co. and their Fruit Specialist - who had no contractual standing and acted as a 
Sub-Consultant to Operation Co. - agreement was reached to nominate two M&E 
contractors. The nominations were based on the contractors' regional location, their 
capability in terms of suitability to the project, their history of involvement with the 
project from the early days, their quotations submitted in the early 1990s, their reputation 
and previous experience.
Services Co. received their final invitation to tender from Construction Co. in October 
1994. The tender documents comprised Operation Co.'s outline services requirements, 
amounting to 258 pages of performance specifications, and basic drawings but no Bill of 
Quantities. Services Co.'s Project Engineer expressed dissatisfaction at being given only a 
month to compile the final tender compared to the five years that Operation Co. had had 
to make up their mind. Services Co. translated Operation Co.'s outline services 
requirements into detail design specifications, comprising technical/performance 
specifications, and layout/sizing of the services. Their tender documents moreover 
contained the cost of the M&E works and their installation programme. Construction Co. 
negotiated both of these down; the cost reduction is not known but the programme was 
reduced form 27 weeks to 19.
125
Services Co.'s cost - the reduced price of the M&E works package they agreed to 
subsequent to negotiations with Construction Co. - was the deciding factor in Services 
Co.'s selection, according to the Project Manager.
Services Co. 's appointment, roles and responsibilities
Construction Co. appointed Services Co. on the basis of a letter of intent. The Project 
Manager claimed that although they tried to avoid the practice of engaging trade 
contractors on letters of intent, it was not always possible to do so for reasons already 
discussed. He further pointed out that the practice was rife in the construction industry. 
Services Co.'s letter of intent contained their conditions of engagement in terms of the 
nature and duration of their work, the agreed cost of the works, their 
responsibilities/liabilities, and the form of contract that Construction Co. required them to 
enter into. It further stipulated that if the works were brought to a halt for some reason, 
Services Co. would be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of work already undertaken. 
The letter of intent moreover required Services Co. to provide a design warranty to 
Operation Co. and a performance Bond to Construction Co.
Once FinOp Ltd and Construction Co. signed the main Contract, Construction Co. and 
Services Co. entered into the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract with Contractor's 
Design, 1981: Dom/2. Construction Co. countered FinOp Ltd's attempts to impose 
onerous Design Warranty conditions on Services Co. by crossing the conditions out, on 
behalf of Services Co., upon the return of the signed Warranty.
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4.2.3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Project conception
The project, which from this point onward is referred to as The Cold Store', was 
conceived by Operation Co. who are a family firm composed of two brothers. The latter 
are fruit and hop farmers who own 700 acres of farmland - on which they grow apples 
and pears - as well as a cold store and distribution centre where they store and package 
their fruits before distributing them to retail outlets. One of their plots incorporates the 
existing site on which a development comprising 3 separate but functionally similar 
buildings, containing cold stores, was envisaged in 1988/9 to replace the existing facility.
Project history
The project planning phase, preceding conception, has a long history. One of the partners 
in Operation Co. was the chairman of the Parish council around two decades ago. During 
that period, he built a number of small industrial units in the vicinity of the present site to 
which no one objected. Ten years later, he applied for and obtained established 
[industrial] use for the site and submitted an application for planning approval for the 
present development without any local opposition. The Local Authority granted planning 
approval around late 1988/early 1989 possibly because of the employment opportunity 
that the development was likely to create for the region. The start of the development 
process took a further five years owing to shortage of funds.
During this period Operation Co. looked for sources of finance while the Funders of the 
project (Finance Co.) looked for additional cold storage facilities for their imported fruit. 
One of the directors in Finance Co. is an ex-merchant banker and therefore has access to 
funds; while the site in question is 30 minutes away from Finance Co.'s ports. Both parties
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knew an agent in the fruit import industry who introduced them and effectively brought 
them together. Providing financial assistance to realise the project seemed advantageous 
to Finance Co. and the formation of a joint venture appeared a viable proposition to both 
parties. The initial joint venture negotiations began in August 1994 and the final 
agreement was reached in February 1995.
The Cold Store, comprises a new cold storage facility, a chilled distribution centre, 
associated roads and parking areas, new access into site, road widening works to the side 
road adjacent to the site and drainage works. The facility stores fruit produce grown on 
the surrounding grounds as well as imported fruit. The Cold Store, constitutes phase B of 
a three phased development, 33,000 metre square in area. Each phase contains facilities of 
similar nature but of varying sizes. The Cold Store is the medium sized facility and 
occupies the central section of the site. It has a gross foot print of 10,600 metre square 
and consists of:
Controlled atmosphere industrial stores for fruit storage, of approximately 1,450
metre square floor area.
Pre-pack and grading area, approximately 3,000 metre square.
Chilled storage area, approximately 2,200 metre square.
Chilled assembly and distribution area, approximately 1,800 metre square.
Office space, 700 metre square in area.
Ancillary ground floor accommodation - including offices, canteen and toilet facilities,
500 metre square in area.
Storage, 700 metre square in area.
A gate house, 45 metre square in area.
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Operation Co. had envisaged to incorporate their existing facility, in terms of equipment 
and machinery, in the new premises. However, this concept was only partially realised as 
the cost of moving and upgrading some of the old machinery to match the new proved 
uneconomical.
The development had an initial contract value of approximately £6 Million, which grew 
larger upon completion2 . The construction works began in January 1995, were scheduled 
for completion in 32 weeks, that is, in August 1995, and were completed by the end of 
October 1995. The services installation had an initial contract value of around £600,000 
and cost around £800,000 upon completion. The installation began in May, were 
scheduled for completion in 19 weeks, and were completed in 23 weeks.
Managing project design
The changes in concept design at tender stage, discussed earlier, which led to 
Construction Co.'s inability to simplify the roof construction, resulted in a five fold 
increase in the tendered cost of the roof that was financed by Construction Co.. Further 
design changes were introduced by FinOp Ltd, during this phase, subsequent to reviews in 
operations, which gave rise to alterations in layout. Although reductions in the amount of 
work Construction Co. had to carry out resulted from these changes, they added two 
weeks to the programme. While some of the changes could be incorporated into the 
works and were absorbed in the programme, others involved dismantling and re-routing 
of services and led to extra work. Subsequently not all the savings arising from the 
changes accrued to FinOp Ltd; a portion was allocated to Construction Co. for the extra 
work, and further sums were paid to trade contractors who had been inconvenienced.
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Services design
The M&E Advisor commented that the quality of Services Co.'s work was good but the 
level of their specification was based on cost rather than on durability and the services 
were designed to last around ten years only. FinOp Ltd instigated and paid for a series of 
design changes related to the main refrigeration. There were design development and 
other changes too that, according to the Project Manager, Services Co. should have 
anticipated and were thus asked to pay for.
The design of services was dogged with two problems. The first, based on the Project 
Manager's comments, was obtaining responses from Services Design Co. because the 
consultant they dealt with was relatively young and inexperienced and lacked the 
specialist knowledge required on this project. Consequently he was reluctant to approve 
information at will, which caused Services Co. a lot of aggravation. The second problem 
was Services Co.'s delays in the design of mechanical services, and their slow costing of 
changes owing to staff shortages. The Project Manager thought that Services Co. should 
have sublet the design of mechanical services.
Flow of design information
Construction Co.'s design team members produced the building design information 
electronically and transferred it to one another in hard copy format by mail or courier. The 
flow of design information generally took place in the following way:
2. The Project Manager did not divulge the final contract sum.
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The Project Manager prepared a schedule of information required from Construction 
Co.'s design team at the beginning of the project and tied it into the main programme. 
The design team produced and sent their design information to one another and to the 
Project Manager who sent it to the Interfacing Project Manager to distribute amongst 
FinOp Ltd's design team for comments/approval.
FinOp Ltd's design team commented upon/approved the design information and sent it 
to the Interfacing Project Manager who, in turn, sent it back to the Project Manager. 
The latter logged in the new information and distributed it within Construction Co.'s 
design team for revision.
The information relating to design alterations required by Operation Co. generally flowed 
from the latter to the Interfacing Project Manager, and through him to the Project 
Manager and Construction Co.'s design team. If the design alterations involved an 
important decision that had substantial financial implications for FinOp Ltd, the 
corresponding information was sent to the Principal Project Manager for consideration 
and comments before being sent to the Interfacing Project Manager. The flow routes for 
information relating to building design and alterations are presented in Figure 4.4. The 
black flow route represents information sent by Construction Co.; the blue flow route 
represents that sent by FinOp Ltd. The dashed line represents informal communication.
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Figure 4.4: Building design information flow route
The flow of information was subject to communication within Construction Co.'s design 
team and between them and FinOp Ltd's design team, on the one hand, and decision- 
making processes by the members involved, on the other.
Communication
Construction Co.'s design team members communicated mostly informally - represented 
in dashed line in Figure 4.4 - by telephone and facsimile; confirming matters of contractual 
importance, drawing approvals, etc. in writing. They met formally with the Project 
Manager at design co-ordination meetings, and communicated with him informally in the 
interim periods. The Project Manager and the Interfacing Project Manager were the
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principal channels of communication between FinOp Ltd and Construction Co., 
respectively. Their communication was strictly formal and took place through monthly 
meetings and correspondence. FinOp Ltd's design team members communicated largely 
informally, by telephone and facsimile, according to Services Design Co.'s representative, 
although they did meet formally every fortnight and backed up important issues with 
correspondence. They communicated with FinOp Ltd, regarding contractual matters, 
through the Interfacing Project Manager. No contractual information was regarded as 
authorised under their contract with FinOp Ltd unless issued by the Interfacing Project 
Manager. To the query as to whether the Interfacing Project Manager slowed down the 
communication process, Services Design Co.'s representative responded that he did but 
not to the detriment of the project. He claimed that 'a response from the Interfacing 
Project Manager could be obtained in 24 hours or less, when required'.
Decision-making processes
In the context of construction projects no design decision, however minor, can be made in 
isolation, without considering the chain of consequences it is likely to give rise to. For this 
reason, any design decision that needed to be made by a member of Construction Co.'s 
design team had to be communicated to the Project Manager and other team members or 
discussed in design co-ordination meetings. Once a decision was agreed upon or 
ultimately made by the Project Manager - who was the decision-making authority within 
Construction Co.'s design team organisation - it was communicated to FinOp Ltd's design 
team, via the information flow route, for comment or approval. At least this was what was 
supposed to take place in theory. In practice, the Project Manager made the urgent 
decisions before communicating it to FinOp Ltd in order to keep to the programme.
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Design co-ordination and control
Construction Co. took on the responsibility for design co-ordination, partly to save the 
fees that Design Associates would have charged for undertaking the task, and partly 
because they considered themselves better suited to the job. The Project Manager stated 
that Construction Co.'s usual practice was to employ full-time design co-ordinators on 
projects either with a contract value in excess of £12M, or of complex nature. The low 
contract value of this job made the employment of a design co-ordinator economically 
nonviable; whilst the fast track nature of the design and variability of FinOp Ltd's 
requirements gave rise to management complexities that merited the services of a full-time 
design co-ordinator. Construction Co. decided not to allocate a design co-ordinator; a 
decision that was rashly made in the opinion of the Project Manager. Design co- 
ordination and control took place through meetings held at fortnightly intervals between 
Construction Co. and their design team and chaired by the Project Manager.
The design co-ordination meetings involved identification of problems and attention to 
queries raised by FinOp Ltd, in response to which the team members suggested solutions 
and made comments and the Project Manager recommended a course of action to each 
member. The meetings moreover served as a forum for monitoring the progress of 
information production by the design team members. In the Project Manager's view, 
Design Associates did not have adequate experience in D&B projects, did not produce 
their design input on time or to adequate quality and thus delayed Structures Associates 
and Services Co.'s input production. According to Design Associates' Project Architect, 
the slow production of design information was a result of inadequate resources - the 
equivalent of one and a half persons' time - allocated to the job.
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Managing project construction 
Planning the construction works
During the two weeks lead-in period prior to commencing construction, Construction Co. 
set out their aims and objectives, established their goals and targets, and planned the 
construction works by mobilising the key specialist and trade contractors they had already 
selected, and selecting those outstanding. Construction Co.' aims were to finish on time, 
which, according to the Project Manager, was a challenge; to do better, financially, than 
the margin they had allowed against the job; to develop a good working relationship with 
FinOp Ltd to secure the potential for more work; to produce as good a quality job as they 
could - bearing in mind the 'gulf between what FinOp Ltd expected and what they were 
paying for'; and to achieve a very low incident job by preventing the occurrence of 
accidents.
To finish on time, Construction Co. expanded the programme of works, developed during 
the tender process, to include detailed activities. The duration of each activity was 
determined using data banks containing the production rates for the activity, in 
conjunction with Construction Co.'s expertise and judgement. To improve their margins, 
they negotiated down the tender prices of their prospective specialist and trade 
contractors, and used low specifications when they came across vague areas in FinOp 
Ltd's requirements. To develop a good relationship with FinOp Ltd, the Project Manager 
arranged monthly technical meetings attended by all the design consultants and 
occasionally by the trade contractors or their subcontractors, to discuss and answer the 
queries of Structure Co. and Services Design Co., which by the end of the project 
exceeded 250 per consultant. Construction Co. were budget conscious in their production 
quality which caused disagreements between them and FinOp Ltd. This was reflected in
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the Project Manager's comment: '[FinOp Ltd] are paying for a Ford and expecting a Rolls 
Royce'. To prevent the occurrence of accidents, Construction Co. prepared a safety plan, 
based on CDM regulations, which required every trade contractor to submit a Method 
Statement and Risk Assessment stating the party responsible for the risk. The Project 
Manager enforced the safety plan.
Planning of the construction works revealed three problem areas. Firstly, certain works 
had not been anticipated, priced, or programmed. Secondly, some items of work were 
grossly under-priced. Thirdly, some delivery periods were incorrectly anticipated. These 
factors squeezed the programme towards the end date and required skilful juggling of 
activities within the available spaces in order to complete the works. To compensate for 
the planning errors, Construction Co. reanalysed their tender price and renegotiated the 
prices of work packages in parallel with the design and procurement of various stages.
Flow of production information
The flow of production information during the construction process generally took place 
in the following way:
  
Construction Co.'s design team sent the production information to the Project 
Manager who checked, commented upon and returned it for revision.
  
Construction Co.'s design team sent the revised information to the Project Manager, 
who sent it to the Interfacing Project Manager to distribute amongst FinOp Ltd's 
design team for comments/approval - when Construction Co.'s design team urgently 
required feedback/approval, they sent the information to FinOp Ltd's design team 
directly with a copy to the Interfacing Project Manager.
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Upon receipt of the approved information, the Project Manager sent it to Services Co. 
and other trade contractors through the Site Manager.
When Services Co.'s or other trade contractors' Foremen received information that 
conflicted with the situation found on site - which happened quite often3 - they lodged 
requests for further information with Construction Co.'s Site Supervisor, who passed 
it on to the Site Manager, who forwarded it to the Project Manager, who, in turn, sent 
it to their Design team. This process was lengthy and inefficient because by the time 
the response to a query reached the site it was already out of date. Moreover, FinOp 
Ltd's continued design alterations throughout the construction stage exacerbated the 
query process.
The flow routes for information relating to building construction and design alterations, 
and that requested by trade contractors are presented in Figure 4.5. The black flow route 
represents information sent by Construction Co.; the blue flow route represents that sent 
by FinOp Ltd; and the green flow route represents the queries raised on site. The dashed 
lines represent informal or direct communication which by passes the stipulated
information flow route.
Communication
The modes and channels of communication within and between the design teams remained 
the same at construction stage as they were at design stage. Further channels were created 
to facilitate communication between Construction Co.'s design team and the construction 
group. These, which comprised the Site Manager, Construction Co.'s Site Supervisors,
1-?7 1 J I
and Services Co.'s and other trade contractors' Foremen, were the only official mediums 
for the flow of information between the two entities.
\//\
Figure 4.5: Building construction information flow route
3. Services Co.'s Electrical Subcontractor commented, in a site meeting, that consultants' drawings were 
set aside almost as soon as they were received because they did not bear any resemblance to the way 
the building had been constructed or the services had been installed.
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The operation of a formal system of communication within the project coalition arose 
from the contractual relations and was related to the decision-making processes. This 
meant firstly, that only parties bound by contracts - for example, FinOp Ltd and 
Construction Co.; Construction Co. and the Services Contractor; etc. - could discuss 
project-related issues and make mutually binding decisions under their contracts. 
Secondly, because of the great number of participants in the coalition, representatives 
were needed to communicate the problems and make the necessary decisions they were 
authorised to make - very often decisions that had financial implications were referred to 
superiors within the representatives' organisations. Thirdly, because FinOp Ltd was the 
head of the coalition and paid for the project they had to approve all the decisions that 
involved deviations from the work specified in the Contract Documents.
Decision-making processes
The decision-making processes were delegated in the following manner. The site related 
issues such as trade contractors' access to areas, the quality of their workmanship, their 
observation of Health and Safety regulation, and resolution of disagreements between 
them were often decided by Construction Co.'s Site Supervisors in liaison with the Site 
Manager. Issues relating to the programme of works and its revision, such as delays at the 
interfaces arising from late delivery of materials/components or unavailability of 
operatives and the consequent juggling of trade contractors' activities, were decided by 
the Site Manager in liaison with Construction Co.'s Site Supervisors and trade 
contractors' Foremen. In both cases the outcomes were reported to the Project Manager. 
The design related issues were usually decided by the Project Manager in consultation 
with Construction Co.'s design team and with or without FinOp Ltd's approval, depending 
upon the severity of the risk involved in the decision being made. Owing to the slow
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production of construction information by Construction Co.'s design team, particularly 
Design Associates, the Project Manager faced a dilemma: To build at risk, without FinOp 
Ltd's approval; or to obtain approval and delay the works. A choice was often made based 
upon the extent or gravity of the risk involved.
The decision-making processes were generally directed by financial considerations and 
comprised exercises in damage limitations. When a problem arose on site, the potential 
solutions were often examined in the light of their costs and potential disruption, and 
often the cheapest solution causing the least disruption to the works were opted for.
Co-ordination and control of production inputs
Co-ordination of complex work packages, like services installation, with construction 
works took place through site meetings between the Site Manager and the trade 
contractors' foremen. The meetings between the Site Manager and Services Co.'s 
Foremen were held at weekly intervals and involved identification of problems that often 
related to discrepancies between design and construction, progress of the works, labour 
resources and safety issues. In response to these problems, solutions were discussed and 
comments made by all participants and the Site Manager recommended a course of action 
to each Foreman.
According to the Project Manager, levels of motivation varied amongst the trade 
contractors. Some were very keen and tended to pursue the Site Manager to gain access 
to their corresponding part of the site to get on with their work. On the other hand, there 
were those who needed a lot of 'pushing and organising' in order to get on with their 
work. When confronted with the latter category, the Site Manager tended to approach the
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trade contractors' foremen, in the first instance, and require them to prompt their 
operatives. If this approach failed, the Project Manager contacted the project engineers 
and sometimes the directors of the companies. At times, if the organisations appeared to 
lack effective management, the Project Manager or the Site Manager intervened directly 
and helped along with the organisation of trade works, for instance, they ordered 
materials and ensured that those materials arrived on site when required. This was done to 
prevent delay in the execution of work packages which could delay the entire programme, 
claimed the Project Manager.
Construction Co. had problems with ten or so trade contractors who were unable to 
manage their work packages. Most of them were small organisations. Construction Co.'s 
major problems, however, were experienced with the Electricity and Gas Mains Suppliers 
who only installed their services a week before handover. Construction Co. pursued the 
Electricity Mains Supplier for six weeks to obtain a connection date before they were 
informed of the £3,000 payment required to be granted a wayleave4, plus £300 to cover 
administration charges, together with a further £3,000 returnable deposit. The Project 
Manager regarded this payment as financial inducement.
The Project Manager arranged safety inductions, carried out at intervals on site, when the 
works began. At their pre-contract meetings, the specialist and trade contractors were 
informed of their safety requirements, including submission of method statements and risk 
assessments. The Site Supervisors monitored the observation of Health and Safety 
Regulations by the trade contractors, on a day-to-day basis, and reported deviations to the
4. Apparently the Electricity Mains Supplier owned the road adjacent to the site which the services 
mains had to cross before entering the site.
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Site Manager. The latter brought these deviations to the attention of trade contractors' 
foremen and required conformance.
Services installation: organisation, co-ordination and control of services inputs
Services Co. subdivided the services works into electrical, mechanical and specialist 
refrigeration installations. They sublet the electrical installation to a local electrical 
contractor (Electric Co.); the manufacture of mechanical and public health services to a 
supply-only firm; their installation to labour-only subcontractors (Installers); and their 
insulation to a supply-and-fix firm (Insulate Co.) under their own supervision and control. 
They commissioned the services themselves and sublet the production of the Controlled 
Atmosphere Stores, chlorination and refrigeration pipes to specialist firms (CAS Co., 
Chlorin Co., and Refpipe Co.) with whom they worked closely.
Services Co.'s management team controlled the services installation. The team comprised: 
the Project Engineer, responsible for mechanical and refrigeration systems' design and for 
overseeing the progress, cost and quality of the installation; the Electrical Engineer, 
responsible for electrical design; the Public Health Engineer, responsible for the design of 
public health services; the Electrical, Mechanical, and Refrigeration Foremen, responsible 
for supervising the installation of corresponding services. The organisation of services 
installation is represented in Figure 4.6. The links represent lines of influence arising from 
the team member's position and role within the organisation.
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Figure 4.6: Organisation of Services works package
The Project Manager claimed that the mechanical and public health installations were not 
managed well and threatened to let Construction Co. down: '[Services Co.] had trouble 
with [plumber Installers] and [Insulate Co.'s] delivery and altogether had not organised 
themselves well owing to their inadequate financial and human resources.'
Changes in the services design shifted Services Co.'s time targets both laterally and 
longitudinally. They reprogrammed their activities so as to incorporate some of the 
changes and intensified installation during the last two weeks of operations to meet the 
end date. However, certain elements, like the Controlled Atmosphere Stores, could not be 
completed until the building was operational. Therefore Services Co. were given four 
weeks extension without incurring damages. They exceeded their financial targets partly 
as a result of unanticipated requirements and partly owing to the intensification of 
activities involving operatives working round the clock, seven days a week. The services 
installation cost around 10% more than the tender price. The Project Manager pointed out
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that Services Co. were reluctant to accept some of the risks they should have allowed for 
at tender stage.
Services Commissioning
The commissioning process had to start six weeks before the hand-over and required 
power. However, power was not available until two weeks before hand-over. Therefore a 
lot of commissioning did not take place for hand-over. The commissioning tests indicated 
that the facility met the performance criteria specified by Services Design Co. and 
therefore satisfied FinOp Ltd's quality requirements.
4.3 CONTRACTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
This section interprets the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria for 
the parties' relations by establishing whether these relations express power disparity and 
power strategies or various forms of trust. It then goes on to interpret the impact of the 
Project Manager's and the Site Manager's leadership, motivation of participants, 
involvement of participants in decision-making and their formation into a team, on the 
participants' interactions.
4.3.1 CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS
The interorganisational relations emanating from the contractual framework of the main 
project participants being investigated here, may be considered as a sequence or a
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hierarchy of subcontracting relations. FinOp Ltd sublet the detail design and construction 
production information functions to Construction Co.. Construction Co. sublet the design, 
manufacture, installation and commissioning of the services to Services Co.. The latter 
sublet the manufacture and installation of electrical, mechanical, and refrigeration services 
to subcontractors, and the installation of public health services to labour-only 
subcontractors. This hierarchical relationship is represented in Figure 4.7, and is explored 
below under subcontracting relations.
Figure 4.7: Participant organisations' contractual relations in The Cold Store 
Subcontracting relations
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Subcontracting relations
The nature of subcontracting relations, defined in terms of subcontractors' independence 
from or relative dependence on the main contractor, and governed by subcontractor's 
control over the four phases of work process ((Druker and Macallan, 1995: 53, based on 
Chaillou, 1977; Chapter 2: 66-7), may be represented in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Dimensions of subcontracting relations in the Cold Store
Based on this Figure, Construction Co. were in a position of relative dependence on 
FinOp Ltd (hatched area in black on Figure 4.8). Not only had they (Construction Co.) 
not had control over the conceptualisation process, but they could not exercise total 
control over the development of design and construction by relying on their own technical 
and management expertise. Services Co., by virtue of being responsible for all four phases 
of services installation process, were in a position of independence relative to 
Construction Co. (hatched area in red on Figure 4.8). However, by subletting the 
production phase to subcontractors and labour-only subcontractors and lacking adequate
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financial and human resources to organise and manage the works, Services Co. were 
relatively dependent upon their subcontractors and operatives (hatched area in blue on 
Figure 4.8).
Power disparity
Chapter 2 identified the existence of power in a relationship with power disparity (see 
pages 16-17). This means party A exercising power over party B - by getting him/her to 
do what the former wants - because party B is in a subordinate position and consents or 
capitulates to party A, or party A has the capacity to overcome party B's resistance by 
way of party A's position in the hierarchical structure (Pfeffer, 1981: 2-3; Clegg, 1989: 
208; Fox, 1974: 98-9). Thus power was defined as a field of force between domination 
and resistance, or authority and illegitimate resistance. These alternative concepts of 
power are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Alternative concepts of power relations
POWER RELATIONS SOURCES OF POWER
Domination 
Resistance
Power vested in organisational structure (Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 626; 
Fox, 1977; Friedman, 1977: Chapter 6).
Power of knowledge and discretion in the use of that knowledge 
(Ibid.).__________________________________
Authority 
Illegitimate resistance
Power legitimated through norms, expectations and structural 
hierarchy (Pfeffer, 1981: 4-6).
Power formally unauthorised, officially uncertified, widely not 
accepted (Mintzberg, 1991(b): 372).___________________
To examine the existence of power in the relationships between the contracting parties, 
power disparity needs to be established. FinOp Ltd exercised power over Construction 
Co. by getting them to accept a number of onerous conditions including the brief tender 
period, change in requirements during tender stage, the complex concept design, the
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reduced tender price, and appointment on the basis of a letter of intent. Construction Co. 
consented because they were in a subordinate position. They operated in a competitive 
market - a buyers market - and hoped to obtain further contracts from FinOp Ltd. 
Construction Co., in turn, exercised power over Services Co. by requiring them to accept 
a reduced tender price, a shorter programme of installation, and appointment on the basis 
of a letter of intent. Services Co. consented for the same reasons that Construction Co. 
had consented to FinOp Ltd. Therefore power disparity characterised the relations 
between the contracting parties being investigated. However, the nature of power 
relations changed during the project life cycle.
In the relation between FinOp Ltd and Construction Co., the former tended to dominate, 
on the strength of their position as flinders of the project, whilst Construction Co. tended 
to resist this domination through negotiations over the financial implications of design 
changes, etc. by relying on their knowledge and relative discretion in the use of that 
knowledge. In the relation between Construction Co. and Services Co., Construction 
Co.'s domination was curbed by their relative dependence on Services Co.'s knowledge 
and relative discretion in the use of that knowledge. Therefore the power relations 
between the contracting parties was domination and resistance rather than authority and 
illegitimate resistance.
Power strategy
Chapter 2 identified two strategies adopted to use power, prevention of conflict and 
defeat of conflict (see pp. 18-19). The former involves management strategies resulting in 
the political inactivity of subordinates, like responsible autonomy or direct control 
(Friedman, 1977: 6-7). The latter comprises management strategies opposing
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subordinates' resistance, and subordinates' strategies opposing management's resistance 
through acquisition, development, and use of power (Pfeffer, 1981: 7).
To utilise their respective powers to achieve their aims, the contracting parties employed 
differing power strategies. FinOp Ltd used direct control to scrutinise Construction Co.'s 
actions, whilst Construction Co. used the uncertainties and changes in FinOp Ltd's 
requirements to acquire bargaining power. In their relationship with Services Co., 
Construction Co. allowed the latter discretion over their work whilst supervising them 
through the M&E Advisor. Services Co. used their power of discretion to act in their own 
interest when allocating resources to the project and when specifying materials and 
components.
The implications of the contracting parties' power strategies for the emergence, handling, 
and resolution of conflict are elaborated in the next section. Having established the 
existence of power in the parties' interorganisational relations and their strategies for its 
use, attention is now focused on examining whether trust featured in these relations and if 
so, in what form and to what extent.
Trust-based co-operation
Chapter 2 defined three forms of trust in interorganisational relations, reliability, 
predictability and power-induced predictability, based on economic, institutional and 
political theories, respectively. It then argued the importance of trust-based co-operation 
whilst recognising the difficulties of establishing trust in exchange relations. The three 
forms of trust, their definitions, and the conditions on which they depend are presented in 
Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Alternative forms of trust
FORM OF TRUST DEFINITION OF TRUST CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR TRUST
Reliability Calculated risk 1. Expectation of an on-going relationship.
2. Knowledge of higher transaction costs 
arising from waning of trust.
3. Repeated exchanges and reputation.
4. Co-operation within networks based on 
common interests.
5. Constant monitoring and consultation by 
and between members.
Predictability Risk reducing mechanism 1. Business contract supported by bond, 
collateral, penalty clauses, or incentive 
provisions for enhanced performance.
2. The effectiveness with which the contract 
promotes information flow, spreads the 
costs of conflict, monitors organisations and 
reduces uncertainty.
Power-induced 
predictability
Impression created to 
manipulate weaker party 
into co-operation.
Capitulation.
1. High discretion roles reflecting 
superordinates' trust in subordinates or 
their fear of illwill created through 
prescription.
2. Low discretion roles reflecting subordinates 
acquiescence to hierarchy or perceptions of 
no alternatives
To examine whether the contracting parties co-operated on the basis of trust, the nature 
of their co-operation is scrutinised on the basis of a few simple questions and the 
information provided in the above Table.
Co-operation ofFinOp Ltd and Construction Co.
Did FinOp Ltd rely on Construction Co.? They appear to have taken a calculated risk by 
appointing Construction Co. to undertake the project. However, this risk was not based 
on the expectation of an on-going relationship, repeated exchanges, or co-operation 
within a network formed around common interests. It involved high transaction costs 
associated with constant monitoring and consultation by FinOp Ltd's design team and 
Interfacing Project Manager. Therefore it is doubtful as to whether the risk taken
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reflected FinOp Ltd's reliability on Construction Co.. Did Construction Co. rely on FinOp 
Ltd? They certainly took risks by accepting the concept design and reducing the tender 
price. These risks may have been based on the potential for future work on the remaining 
two phases of the development; they were not, however, based on other conditions 
necessary for the development of calculative trust.
Did FinOp Ltd depend on Construction Co.'s predictable behaviour? FinOp Ltd entered 
into a business contract supported by bonds, collateral and penalty clauses. However, the 
flow of information and the monitoring mechanisms were not effective and uncertainty 
was compounded throughout the project rather than reduced. Thus providing 
Construction Co. with the opportunity of behaving unpredictably, for example, by making 
design or construction decisions without approval. Therefore FinOp Ltd could not depend 
on Construction Co.'s predictable behaviour. Did Construction Co. depend on FinOp 
Ltd's predictable behaviour? To the extent that Construction Co. entered into an 
agreement with FinOp Ltd on the basis of the principle of a business contract - i.e., a 
letter of intent - as opposed to a contract proper, they depended on FinOp Ltd's 
predictable behaviour. However, the Project Manager expressed reservations about the 
certainty of this predictability had things gone wrong. Indeed doubts regarding the 
predictability of FinOp Ltd's behaviour may have provided the incentive for Construction 
Co.'s co-operation.
Did FinOp Ltd employ power-induced predictability? In so far that FinOp Ltd selected 
design and Build as the method of procurement but retained control over design 
development and construction production information, it may be pertinent to conclude 
that they created impressions of a high discretion role for Construction Co.. This was
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done so as to manipulate the latter into accepting more responsibility than they would 
have done under the traditional method of procurement. Did Construction Co. capitulate? 
They appear to have done so to an extent to try and please FinOp Ltd, but by no means 
totally.
Co-operation of Construction Co. and Services Co.
Did Construction Co. rely on Services Co.? In so far that Services Co. were one of two 
specialist contractors nominated by FinOp Ltd, Construction Co. took a relatively higher 
risk in terms of the cost of services than they would have done had they invited four or 
five tenders. However, they limited this risk by appointing the M&E Advisor to oversee 
the tender process and the services installation. Therefore they did not rely on Services 
Co. entirely. Did Services Co. rely on Construction Co.? They did so on a few occasions, 
one of which regarded the omission of onerous conditions, by Construction Co., on the 
Design Warranty FinOp Ltd. required of Services Co.. This reliance, though having the 
appearance of calculated risk, did not reflect trust because it was not based on the other 
conditions necessary for calculated trust. It was based, rather, on Services Co.'s lack of 
options.
Did Construction Co. depend on Services Co.'s predictable behaviour? Despite entering 
into an agreement with Services Co. that was supported by Bond, collateral and penalty 
clauses, Construction Co. appointed the M&E Advisor to monitor Services Co.'s work 
and to reduce the uncertainty associated with it. Therefore Construction Co. did not 
appear to depend on Services Co.'s predictable behaviour because they lacked the 
specialist knowledge required to ensure Services Co.'s compliance with the contract. Did 
Services Co. depend on Construction Co.'s predictable behaviour? They entered into an
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agreement with Construction Co. based on a letter of intent, because they would not have 
been appointed otherwise. Therefore it is difficult to know whether they co-operated 
because they chose to or because they had to.
Did Construction Co. employ power-induced predictability? Construction Co. appointed 
Services Co. to design and install the services and specialist refrigeration on the basis of 
their nomination and price. Thus, Services Co.'s high discretion role was the outcome of 
circumstance rather than a reflection of trust, or fear of illwill resulting from prescription, 
or an impression created by Construction Co. to manipulate Services Co. into co- 
operation. Did Services Co. capitulate? Services Co. capitulated both to FinOp Ltd's 
unanticipated requirements and to the risks Construction Co. apportioned to them.
4.3.2 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
The operational framework, comprising the communication channels, information flow 
routes and decision-making processes, was set up by the Project Manager. It both 
influenced and was influenced by the organisational representatives' interpersonal 
relations and interactions. The complexity of the framework demanded speedy production 
of information by Construction Co.'s design team to ensure its timely approval and 
progress to subsequent stages of information production and translation into construction. 
Failure to meet this demand, particularly by Design Associates, placed strains upon the 
relations between the architects responsible and the Project Manager, between the latter 
and the Interfacing Project Manager, between the architects and their counterparts in 
FinOp Ltd's design team, and between the Site Manager and the Foremen of Services 
Co.'s subcontractors. This led to Construction Co.'s design team members taking short 
cuts and sending information directly to their counterparts in FinOp Ltd's design team, or
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bypassing the approval system and sending information directly to the specialist and trade 
contractors on site, thus aggravating the already strained relations referred to previously.
This sub-section assesses the impact of the Project Manager and the Site Manager on the 
interpersonal relations at the services installation/construction interface within the 
operational framework. To do so, their respective leadership of the design team and the 
construction group, the way in which they motivated the design team members and the 
specialist and trade contractors, the extent to which the design team and the construction 
group participated in decision-making, and the success or otherwise of the formation of 
design team and the construction group into teams are considered.
The leadership behaviours
Chapter 2 related leadership to the combination of leader's style and situational factors. 
Therefore depending on whether the leader has an authoritarian or democratic style, 
he/she may adopt various degrees of task or relationship behaviour. This stylistic 
behaviour needs to match the situational factors of leader-member relations, task 
structure, leader's position power, and maturity of the group or team, in order to result in 
an appropriate overall leadership behaviour capable of influencing the group or team 
members (see Section 2.3: 32-7). The relationship of leader's style and situational factors 
to leadership behaviour is demonstrated in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Factors influencing leadership behaviour
The Project Manager's leadership behaviour towards the design team members 
corresponded to the 'selling' category presented in Figure 4.9. That is, high levels of 
directive and relationship behaviour which is appropriate for low/moderate level of team 
experience in carrying out the type of task. By virtue of his responsibility and role, the 
Project Manager placed a high emphasis upon team members' tasks and maintained a two 
way communication with them throughout the project. He therefore adopted a high 
task/high relationship leadership style. The history of Design Associates' and Structures 
Associates' relationship with Construction Co. manifested itself as the corresponding 
organisational representatives' willingness to follow the Project Manager's guidance and 
instructions. Furthermore, the schedule of information required from the team members 
(see flow of design information, above) prescribed the structure of their tasks, whilst the 
authority of the Project Manager to influence their selection on future projects provided
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the incentive for their co-operation. However, despite these co-operation promoting 
factors, the resource limitations of Design Associates and Services Co. hampered their 
production efforts. Thus the Project Manager's leadership behaviour had limited impact 
upon influencing the design team members' inputs.
The Site Manager adopted two types of leadership behaviour towards the specialist and 
trade contractors corresponding to the 'telling' and the 'delegating' categories in Figure 
4.9. When the trades required high levels of direction and conveyed low levels of 
capability or experience in carrying out their tasks, the Site Manager provided them with 
prescriptive guidance (see Co-ordination and control of inputs, above). When the trades 
were willing and capable of carrying out their tasks with low levels of direction and 
support, the Site Manager provided limited guidance and let them get on with their work. 
One of the observed problems associated with telling behaviour related to the 
unwillingness of Services Co.'s subcontractors' Foremen to follow the Site Manager's 
lead owing to the low level of authority they ascribed to him. Thus the Site Manager too 
had problems with influencing the trade contractors' inputs.
Motivation of project participants
Chapter 2 discussed two categories of factors for motivation: Control mechanisms 
corresponding to the motivator's sources of power, and manifested as reward and 
punishment; and fulfilment of individual values relating to motivatee's attitudes to work 
and demonstrated as job satisfaction (see Section 2.3: 32-7). These motivational factors 
are demonstrated in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Types and theoretical bases of motivation
TYPE OF 
MOTIVATION
Reward and 
punishment
Job satisfaction
NATURE OF 
MOTIVATION
Control mechanism linked 
to sources of power
Fulfilment of individual 
values linked to attitudes 
to work
THEORETICAL 
BASIS
Reinforcement 
theory
Expectancy theory
Goal-setting theory
Job design theory
Equity theory
Leadership theory
UNDERLYING 
PRINCIPLE
Financial incentives or 
penalties
Reward attached to high 
performance
Goal difficulty leads to high 
levels of performance and 
vice versa
Fulfilment of needs
Fairness of treatment is 
linked to performance levels
Style and situational factors
The Project Manager did not appear capable of motivating Design Associates' 
representatives to produce information more quickly than they did because Design 
Associates lacked the financial incentives to do so (see Design co-ordination and control, 
above), both in terms of low fees and the absence of rewards attached to high 
performance. The high level of difficulty of their goal did not seem to lead to high 
performance probably because it demanded more effort than they could afford or were 
prepared to dedicate to the job. This argument applies, to a degree, to Services Co. and 
their representatives, although the penalty clauses in Services Co.'s contract created the 
push for the extra effort that was provided towards the end of the project. It is anticipated 
that the design team's low level of control over the design development may have 
adversely influenced the fulfilment of the team members' needs and values and their 
perception of the fairness with which they were treated by FinOp Ltd.
The financial incentives and penalties did not appear to have been adequate motivators for 
some of the specialist and trade contractors, in particular, Services Co. and their 
subcontractors. This view is reinforced by Services Co.'s Project Engineer's perception of
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not having been treated fairly (see Services Co.'s selection, above), and is conveyed by 
the shortfalls in resourcing the services information production.
Participation in decision-making
Chapter 2 defined participation in decision-making as the involvement of subordinates or 
group members in decision-making and control processes to secure their commitment and 
ascribed its achievement through collective problem-solving (see Section 2.3: 36). This 
section considers the extent to which design team and construction group members were 
involved in decision-making processes and the consequences of this for their interpersonal 
relations.
Although the Project Manager had the ultimate authority in decision-making within 
Construction Co.'s design team organisation, all team members participated in design 
decisions that were generally discussed in design co-ordination meetings (see Decision- 
making processes under Managing project design, above). This process appeared to 
strengthen the team members' commitment to the project objectives and secure their 
overall co-operation.
The construction related decision-making was delegated to the Site Manager, and the Site 
Supervisors, although the Project Manager made the major decisions with financial and 
programme implications (see Decision-making processes under Managing the 
construction of facility, above). In addition to this formal decision-making structure, the 
trade contractors' foremen were occasionally involved in solving the problems 
encountered during the construction process. For example, Services Co.'s subcontractors' 
Foremen tended to resolve installation problems, and clashes between the services and
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constructional elements on site in consultation with the Site Manager. This informal 
participation in decision-making constituted the premise for the co-operation of Services 
Co.'s subcontractors.
Team building
Chapter 2 identified the criteria for team building as group characteristics, nature of the 
task, and the environment in which the group functioned, and discussed the conditions on 
which they depended (see Section 2.3: 37-8). These criteria and conditions are presented 
in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: The criteria and conditions for team building
TEAM BUILDING CRITERIA
Group characteristics
Nature of the task
Group environment
CONDITIONS ON WHICH TEAM BUILDING DEPENDS
Group size
Member characteristics
Individual objectives
Group development stage
Structure of the task
Significance of the task
Leader's position power
Intergroup relations
Group's physical location
Determines diversity of talent, 
skills, knowledge, individuals' 
participation
Determines homogeneity and 
satisfaction, or heterogeneity and 
conflict
Determine hidden agendas, 
diversity of objectives, lack of 
trust
Forming, storming, norming, 
performing
Determines allocation of task 
related roles
Determines level of group 
members' commitment
Determines his/her effectiveness
Determine group members' 
compatibility
Determines level of members' 
interaction
To assess the effectiveness of the design team, their team building criteria are examined. 
The size of the team, whilst allowing for the required diversity of skills and knowledge,
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facilitated the participation of individuals in problem-solving and decision taking. The 
compatibility of members' characteristics and their willingness to follow the Project 
Manager gave rise to a fairly homogenous team which by and large avoided overt conflict. 
Individuals' objectives, though diverse and manifest in terms of the resources allocated to 
the project, were nonetheless reconciled on the strength of fighting the common enemy, 
FinOp Ltd and their design team. Although the forming, storming, and norming phases of 
the design team development had taken place prior to the commencement of the 
investigation, it is anticipated that they lay the foundation for a reasonably effective team 
in terms of members' collaboration. However they could not enforce the required level of 
team member's performance. The nature of the task, in terms both of structure - the 
division of execution and control between Construction Co.'s and FinOp Ltd's design 
teams, respectively - and significance - disproportionate rewards for the level of effort 
required, seems to have acted as a demotivator or a disincentive particularly for Design 
Associates and Services Co.. The Project Manager's position power has already been 
discussed. The team members' compatibility and physical proximity had a positive 
influence upon their communication and interaction.
The construction group did not appear to act as a team and were not encouraged to do so 
by any efforts on the part of Construction Co.'s management team to forge them into a 
team.
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4.4 CONFLICT
The previous section established the existence of power disparity in the interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties and identified the power strategies implemented by 
each party in order to achieve their aims. It moreover demonstrated that despite the 
seemingly collaborative nature of the design team members' interpersonal relations, 
Design Associates and Services Co. failed to deliver their inputs on time. This section 
examines the implications of power disparity and power strategies for the emergence of 
both overt and covert conflict in the participants' interorganisational and interpersonal 
relations. It then goes on to examine the emergence of conflict in the building production 
process and the way it was handled and/or resolved.
4.4.1 CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGAMSATIONAL CONFLICT
Chapter 2 defined conflict as any divergence of interests, objectives, or priorities between 
individuals, groups, or organisations; or nonconformance to requirements of a task, 
activity, or process (Gardiner and Simmons, 1992: 111). It moreover identified two forms 
of conflict, functional or creative; and dysfunctional and destructive. The former, arises 
from competition between the contracting parties and when managed is claimed to 
increase the parties' potential for success (Smith, 1992: 29, 30). The latter, emanates from 
non-resolution of functional conflict and leads to animosity or disagreements limiting the 
parties' potential for success (Stephenson, 1996: 27).
Based on the above definition, both forms of conflict occurred in the interorganisational 
relations of FinOp Ltd and Construction Co., and the latter and Services Co.. They may 
be attributed to the contractual framework, the building project environment, the project
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coalition structure, culture and technology, and low levels of trust in the parties exchange 
relations.
Conflict attributed to contractual framework
Although FinOp Ltd selected the design and build method of procurement, they 
implemented it as a traditional method (see Chapter 2: 61-4). That is, rather than allowing 
Construction Co. to organise the design development and information production 
activities under the Interfacing Project Manager's supervision, FinOp Ltd and their design 
team restrained Construction Co.'s activities by their stringent control mechanisms. This 
led to dysfunctional conflict between FinOp Ltd and Construction Co., and between their 
respective design teams. Conflict was manifest in the form of objections by FinOp Ltd' 
design team to design decisions of Construction Co.'s design team, and delayed response 
by the latter to those objections.
Conflict attributed to building project environment
FinOp Ltd's requirement to lower the construction cost of the facility together with 
intense competition in the industry, prompted Construction Co. to engage in a cost 
cutting exercise to their own detriment. This gave rise to creative conflict between the 
parties which resulted in a more economical facility for FinOp Ltd and gave Construction 
Co. a competitive advantage that secured them the contract. A similar argument may be 
applied to creative conflict arising between Construction Co., who demanded a lower 
tender price from Services Co., and the latter, who cut costs to achieve it.
The outcome of the cost cutting exercise was limitation of resources allocated to the 
project by Construction Co., the most significant aspect of which was elimination of a
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design co-ordinator. This was contrary to the requirements of the project, representing 
conflictual behaviour on the part of Construction Co., and led to problems concerning co- 
ordination of construction with the services, thus causing a degree of dysfunctional 
conflict between Construction Co. and Services Co.'s subcontractors.
The reductions in Services Co.'s tender price and installation programme resulted in 
under-resourcing of the installation design, and selection of cheaper, less durable materials 
and components for the installation. The under-resourced design process slowed down 
the information production and threatened to delay the construction works. Lowering the 
specification of the installation will probably increase the maintenance cost of the 
installation and lower the life cycle of the facility. Therefore reductions in Services Co.'s 
tender price led to conflictual behaviour on the part of Services Co..
Conflict attributed to project coalition structure
The Cold Store project coalition had a hierarchical structure of subcontracting relations, 
discussed in the previous section, which denied the Project Manager the power to make 
decisions according to need and disallowed the consultants and Services Co. to decide 
based on their expertise. This created discord between FinOp Ltd's and Construction 
Co.'s representatives. The discord manifested itself in the 500 or so queries raised by 
FinOp Ltd's design team members, and their unwillingness to approve information. It was 
moreover evident in late production of information by Construction Co.'s design team 
members, which could not always be approved prior to construction.
Ironically the subcontracting relation of Services Co. to Construction Co. did not 
necessarily empower the Project Manager to make services related decisions according to
163
need, either. Services Co. could not keep the mechanical installation within programme 
and the Project Manager could not do much about it other than raise the issue of delays at 
every site meeting, query the reasons for the delays, and praise the progress of the rest of 
the installation. Thus conflict between him and Services Co.'s Project Engineer tended to 
be covert rather than overt. Construction Co. were dependent on Services Co. not only 
for the services installation, but also for timely completion of the works. The Project 
Manager was aware of Services Co.'s financial difficulties and suspected that financial 
threats would not achieve the desired outcome.
The hierarchical structure created communication problems between Construction Co.'s 
design team and the construction group and, in conjunction with the slow rate of 
information production, gave rise to conflict between the Site Manager and the trade 
contractors' foremen. At times, conflict was creative and led to joint problem-solving, 
discussed in the previous section. At other times, it was dysfunctional and was manifested 
in comments like: 'consultants' drawings are set aside almost as soon as they are received 
because they do not bear any resemblance to the way the building is constructed or the 
services are installed (Electric Co.'s Foreman, see Decision-making processes).
Conflict attributed to project coalition culture
The culture of Construction Co.'s design team organisation appeared to convey the 
features of a smoothly functioning team, in terms of members' collaborative effort and 
few incidences of threats. For example, Construction Co. warned Services Co. of 
withholding payment if certain milestones were not achieved on no more than one or two 
occasions. However, failure of design team members and the Project Manger to undertake 
minuted actions and to produce information assigned to them within the time allocated
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was a common occurrence. It is anticipated that no participant was satisfied with their 
organisation's engagement criteria and probably felt coerced into accepting them owing to 
the competitive pressures of the industry that have already been discussed.
Although the observations conducted did not include the meetings between FinOp Ltd 
and Construction Co., impressions of the nature of these meetings were gleaned from 
discussions between the design team members and the Project Manager. Accordingly, 
there appeared to be a sharp division between the two organisations and between their 
respective design teams which created distinct notions of 'us' and 'them' as far as the 
Project Manager and Construction Co.'s design team members were concerned. This gave 
rise to destructive conflicts of interests, value conflicts, and relationship conflicts between 
the aforementioned organisations. It is anticipated, however, that this division 
strengthened the cohesion of Construction Co.'s design team despite the poor 
performance of Design Associates and Services Co..
The one area where the Project Manager, with the aid of Construction Co.'s management 
team, decidedly directed the concerted effort of the construction group, was site safety 
and observation of Health and Safety regulations. This effort was allegedly successful as 
no reportable injuries were recorded.
Conflict attributed to project coalition technology
The design team members produced their information on different software packages that 
were not compatible. Therefore readily accessible computerised information of one team 
member, was not available to the other for co-ordination purposes. The conversion of 
computerised information to compatible form did not take place until mid-way in the
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project life cycle. The absence of co-ordinating measures, be they electronic or in the 
guise of a design co-ordinator, created data conflicts. The site conditions at times 
necessitated deviations from the design information. These deviations were communicated 
to the design team members and had to be approved by FinOp Ltd's design team, via the 
formal communication structure. If approval took long, or if deviations from the design 
required urgent action, they were carried out prior to being incorporated in the 
information production systems, creating conflicts between the design information and the 
constructed form. This, in turn, caused conflicts of relationship between the trades' 
foremen and the Site Manager - who was seen as the link between the site and the design 
team, between the construction group and Construction Co.'s design team and between 
FinOp Ltd and Construction Co..
Low trust in project participants' exchange relations
Examination of the contracting parties' seemingly trust based co-operation, presented in 
the previous section, indicates that the parties' exchange relations did not incorporate 
trust as reliability or calculated risk. FinOp Ltd's monitoring mechanism was put in place 
because they did not know Construction Co. and the nature of the risk they presented, 
and did not feel they could rely on them. In a similar vein, Construction Co.'s monitor - 
the M&E Advisor - was appointed because Services Co. was not known to Construction 
Co. and because the latter lacked knowledge of services. Services Co., in turn, appeared 
to rely on Construction Co. because they had no other choice.
The parties' exchange relations did not incorporate trust as predictability, based on the 
risk reducing mechanism of the contract. The punitive legal sanctions in Construction 
Co.'s and Services Co.'s contracts were used to ensure conformance to the contract
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documents and to prevent the companies from behaving opportunistically. Furthermore, 
they were used to reduce risk by passing it on to the subordinate party in the relationship. 
Therefore the sanctions did not prevent opportunistic behaviour by Construction Co. and 
Services Co.; did not eliminate Construction Co.'s fear of unpredictable behaviour by 
FinOp Ltd; and disguised Services Co.'s lack of choice with the appearance of decided 
choice.
FinOp Ltd conveyed impressions of trusting Construction Co. by appointing them on the 
basis of a design and build procurement method and behaving in a manner suited to the 
traditional method. Construction Co. both capitulated to and resisted FinOp Ltd 
depending on circumstance. Services Co., however, mostly capitulated.
4.4.2 OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
Creative and dysfunctional conflict characterised the operations of the project, the 
interpersonal relations of FinOp Ltd and Construction Co., and those of the latter and 
Services Co.. Manifestations of conflict may be attributed to latent conflict at brief 
preparation, design and construction stages, and the project management and control 
systems implemented.
Latent conflict at brief preparation stage
Although the brief preparation stage was not included in the investigation, the inductive 
use of the evidence collected during the later stages pointed to the emergence of latent 
conflict amongst the three elements of physical form of the facility, its construction cost, 
and construction period. The physical form of the facility, conceived by Design Co. and 
Structure Co., had aesthetic qualities that the consultants and FinOp Ltd valued and
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wished to retain. The cost at which Construction Co. offered to build the facility was 
much higher than Finance Co. were prepared to allocate to the project. The date by which 
Operation Co. required the facility to be handed over was too short for the construction 
work involved.
Latent conflict at design stage
The contradictions amongst the physical form of the facility, its construction cost, and 
construction period, were reconciled in the following way. Construction Co.'s design 
team members collaborated to simplify the facility's structure and construction. 
Construction Co. saved costs by lowering the specification of drainage and eliminating a 
member of site staff. They moreover overlapped activities to shorten the programme. 
FinOp Ltd's design team members were unhappy with the simplifications in design which 
they considered as lowering the aesthetic quality of the facility. The Project Manager and 
Construction Co.'s design team members, regarded the facility as basically a 'shed', and 
thought that it ought to reflect its function and be treated as a shed. Thus extensive 
negotiations ensued regarding the design issues, the nature of which may be summarised 
in the Project Manager's comment: '[FinOp Ltd] are paying for a Ford and expecting a 
Rolls Royce'.
Latent conflict at construction stage
The design changes initiated by FinOp Ltd were generally considered by Services Co.'s 
Project Engineer willingly. However, when these designs were discussed at site level with 
Services Co.'s subcontractors, they were not received as positively. Because on the one 
hand, the full implications of the changes were not always clear to the Project Engineer,
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and on the other, the progress of the installation at times implied dismantling some parts 
of the installation in order to accommodate the changes.
Conflict arising from project management and control systems
The Project Manager succeeded in creating and maintaining a cohesive design team that 
collaborated smoothly and harmoniously. As far as could be detected during the 
investigation, he moreover succeeded in leading a united site management team. The only 
management related conflict arose from the Project Manager's relationship with the 
Interfacing Project Manager, the nature of which has already been discussed.
The control system implemented by FinOp Ltd was ineffective as far as achieving their 
project goals and objectives were concerned. The control of design inputs was ineffective 
as far as the production of timely and accurate design information was concerned. The 
information flow and monitoring mechanisms proved inefficient in reducing uncertainty 
throughout the project. The control of construction inputs was only effective as far as 
achievement of site safety requirements was concerned. It was ineffective terms of 
attaining Construction Co.'s project targets. The project overran its budget and was 
completed 11 weeks later than scheduled. The design and
4.4.3 MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
Chapter 2 related the management of conflict to project planning and response to conflict 
(see p. 74-5). Project planning was linked to risk management, carried out through the 
three phases of identification, analysis, and response to risk (Lewis, Cheetham and Carter, 
1992: 80-1). Response to conflict was categorised as passive and active similar to 
negotiations. The criteria are presented in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Criteria governing management of conflict
PROJECT 
PLANNING
RESPONSE TO 
CONFLICT
RISK 
MANAGEMENT
PASSIVE 
RESPONSE
ACTIVE 
RESPONSE
Risk 
identification
Risk analysis
Response to 
risk
Conflict 
denial
Conflict 
avoidance
Capitulation
Aggressive 
response
Creative 
response
Risks that present most serious threat to 
project success
Quantification of effects of anticipated risk
Avoiding, reducing. retaining. or 
transferring risk
Withdrawal of co-operation
Shallow commitment to project goals
Suppression of conflict
Domination of weaker party: 
  
Stifling future initiative
Distributive bargaining: 
  
Withdrawal of co-operation
Compromise: 
  
Over inflation of future demands
Integrative bargaining: 
  
Co-operative and joint problem solving
Based on the above Table, Construction Co.'s risk management was wanting. They did 
not identity the most serious risks like the roof. Their quantification of the effects of 
anticipated risk was substantially reduced during the bargaining process at tender stage. 
Their response to risk was to retain or transfer it to the trade contractors. The Project 
Manager's response to conflict between Construction Co. and FinOp Ltd appeared to be 
co-operative at the start of the bargaining process. However, as FinOp Ltd's demands 
grew, he tended to compromise, at best, or withdraw co-operation, at worst. On 
occasions, for example in the case of the roof, he capitulated. The Project Manager's 
response to conflict between Construction Co. and Services Co., based on the 
observations, tended to be creative and co-operative, and compromising.
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Services Co.'s risk management had shortcomings too. They did not identify the extent of 
some risks well enough. For example, they did not anticipate the implications of cutting 
down their installation programme by almost a quarter. Their contingencies were seriously 
reduced, if not eliminated, during the bargaining process at tender stage. They tried to 
reduce their design risk by keeping the design of the mechanical installation in-house, 
which according to the Project Manager proved to be a mistake. They tried to avoid some 
of their risk by refusing to pay for them at the end of the contract, according to the 
Project Manager, but failed to succeed. The response of Services Co.'s Project Engineer 
to conflict between Services Co. and Construction Co., based on the observations, tended 
to be either creative and co-operative, or passive and capitulative.
4.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided The Cold Store project scenario to facilitate the interpretation 
of the project participants' interorganisational and interpersonal relations, to link them to 
the occurrence of conflict, and to interpret the impact of conflict handling and resolution 
methods on the performance of project participants.
Section 4.2, presented a descriptive account of the organisations participating in the 
project, the engagement criteria of the design team members, the main contractor, the 
M&E contractor, and the conception, history, design and construction of the facility. The 
account established the nature of the main contracting organisation in terms of size and
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financial strength. The engagement criteria of the design team members indicated on- 
going interorganisational relationships between the client and its design team members 
and between the main contractor and its design team members, except for the M&E 
contractor. The engagement criteria of the main contractor imparted the onerous and 
punitive nature of their conditions of engagement, which were passed on to the M&E 
contractor through the imposition of similar conditions in their engagement criteria. The 
conception, history, design and construction of the facility described the processes and 
procedures involved in the production of the facility. They moreover created a sense of 
the functional complexity and interdependence of these processes, which contradicted 
their fragmented organisation.
Section 4.3, interpreted the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria 
for the parties' relations, as establishing a hierarchy of subcontracting relations. These 
relations were indicated to give rise to power disparity and various forms of power 
strategies, rather than trust, in the interorganisational relations of the client, the main 
contractor and the M&E contractor. This section moreover interpreted the Project 
Manager's and the Site Manager's leadership, motivation, participation, and team building 
strategies as reasonably effective in achieving collaboration within the main contractors' 
design team and between the main contractor's site personnel and those of the M&E 
contractor, respectively. However, these strategies were found to be ineffective in 
enforcing or enhancing the participants' performance.
Section 4.4, traced the occurrence of conflict in contractual and interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties, and in operational and interpersonal relations of the 
project participants. Conflict was attributed to the contractual framework and the
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stringent control mechanisms imposed by the client. The bargaining process emanating 
from the competitive conditions in the building project environment was indicated to give 
rise to creative conflict at the start of the project and to create the conditions for 
dysfunctional conflict. The project coalition structure, by denying the Project Manager 
and the main contractor's design team members the power to make decisions according to 
need and based on expertise, respectively, created dysfunctional conflict between the main 
contractor's and the client's representatives. The project coalition culture reflected the 
divisions between the client and its design team and the main contractor and its design 
team. This division reinforced the relations between the Project Manager and the design 
team members. The inadequate technological methods of information production and 
dissemination were used to political advantage by the main contractor and exacerbated the 
conflict between the Project Manager and the Interfacing Project Manager.
Conflict arose amongst the three elements of physical form, construction cost and 
construction period of the facility at the brief preparation stage. It reflected divergence 
between the client's conceptual expectations and the main contractor's conceptual 
interpretations at the design stage. It was the outcome of divergent perspectives as well as 
the inconveniences caused by design changes at the construction stage. The project 
management and control systems gave rise to conflict between client's and the main 
contractor's representatives because they did not secure the latter's compliance and failed 
to achieve the client's goals and objectives. The management of conflict was found to be 
wanting in terms of risk assessment. It proved inadequate in terms of handling conflict and 
limited in terms of enforcing or enhancing the performance of the M&E contractor.
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY 2: THE CULTURAL CENTRE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the second example of the construction project coalitions selected 
for in depth, longitudinal study of the main and mechanical and electrical (M&E) 
contractors' behaviour, building production management processes, and interpersonal 
relations and interactions of the contracting organisations' representatives. The design and 
build (D&B) method of procurement implemented to realise this project constitutes its 
common characteristic with the previous one. The Japanese ownership of both the client 
and the main contracting organisations, on the other hand, creates the potential for 
contrasting the coalitions' management processes with those of the previous case.
A descriptive account of the main participants' characteristics, their engagement 
procedures, and the properties of the project is provided as the context for events, 
processes and interactions being investigated. The contractual and operational 
frameworks, which govern the main and M&E contractors' interorganisational and 
interpersonal relations, respectively, are then considered. This is followed by identification 
of the salient features of these relations and of the building production management 
processes. Subsequently the impact of the main contractor's management processes on
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the performance of the M&E contractor is examined. The chapter comprises four 
sections:
Section 5.2, provides outline profiles of the main participants; sets out the pre-contract 
processes establishing the roles and responsibilities of the design team, the main and the 
M&E contractors; and describes the conception, history, design and construction of the 
project.
Section 5.3, examines the nature of the project participants' interorganisational relations 
arising from the contractual framework; and assesses the nature of their representatives' 
interpersonal relations vis-a-vis the operational framework.
Section 5.4, identifies conflict as a dominant feature of the relations discussed in the 
previous section. It establishes the types and manifestations of conflict and considers the 
management processes implemented to handle or resolve conflict and their impact upon 
the behaviour and performance of the main and the M&E contractors.
5.2 CONTEXT
This section provides a brief description of organisational characteristics of the client, the 
design team, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor. It defines the selection 
processes, the appointment criteria, and the roles and responsibilities of the design team
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members, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor. It then recounts a precis of the 
project's conception, history, design development and construction process.
5.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS 
Client organisation
The Client organisation was a Japanese educational establishment (Japcol) who own the 
lease of the development under investigation, for a period of six years. At the end of this 
period, the building reverts back to an English educational establishment (Encoll) who are 
the landowners. The relationship between Encoll and Japcol was rather complex. In return 
for financing the extension to Encoll's educational establishment, which is not included in 
this investigation, Japcol was given the lease of the plot of land adjacent to Encoll's 
buildings for six years to build and operate a cultural centre.
The design team
The design team comprised an architectural firm (Architect Co.), a structural engineering 
firm (Structure Ltd), a services consulting firm (Services Design Ltd), an audio/visual 
consulting firm (AV Ltd), and an acoustics consulting firm (Acoustics Ltd). The team 
consulted with the Design Co-ordinator, who was Japanese, and the Project Manager, 
who was English. The latter two, in turn, consulted with the in-house M&E engineer 
(INME) and the in-house quantity surveyor (INQS). The Project Manager consulted with 
the Senior Project Manager, who was Japanese. The design team was organised as shown 
in Figure 5.1. The solid links represent lines of influence arising from the team member's 
position and role within the organisation.
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Figure 5.1: Organisation of design team
Main Contracting organisation
The main contracting organisation (Japan Construction) is a limited company and one of 
the two regional headquarters of its Parent, a leading Japanese international corporation 
established in 1840, which offers design, engineering and construction services in over 40 
countries. Japan Construction has been operating in the UK since 1986 and undertakes a 
broad range of projects including business parks, corporate headquarters, research and 
development facilities, educational buildings, cultural centres and golf clubs. It has long- 
established experience in design and construction procurement, claims to place great 
emphasis upon quality in both design and construction, and has long-term 'dedication to 
its clients'. The latter policy is characteristic of Japanese contractual relations and 
featured prominently in the development of the project coalition's organisational 
framework.
M&E Contracting organisation
The M&E Contracting organisation (UK Services), is a limited company formed in the 
1950s in Norwich as a branch of a London company. It has been owned by a number of
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organisations since 1987 and has folded up three times. Since the beginning of 1995 it has 
been owned by the board of directors and has become totally independent. The size of the 
company has changed very little. There are 20-30 directly employed staff and operatives 
at a 1:1 ratio because a lot of work is subcontracted. The company has a mechanical 
engineering history, although an electrical engineering department was added recently by 
taking over an electrical engineering contracting firm.
UK Services provides building services in a wide range of refurbishment and new build 
works in both public and private sectors. Examples include work carried out for the MoD, 
in prisons, food companies in the process food industry, hospitals, schools, and offices. 
Work is obtained either on the basis of past experience with clients, or through main 
contractors. The company relies on the breadth of opportunities in the building services 
market rather than targeting a niche or specialist area within the market. The Technical 
Director attributed this policy to the limited nature of the building services market in East 
Anglia. At the time of writing the company's turnover is around £3 Million achieved 
through a large volume of work. The Technical Director considered this amount to be too 
low and stated the aim of the company as 'looking to increase the turnover at a possible 
20% per annum to a more comfortable sum of £5 Million'.
Until two years ago the company would not have considered recruiting self-employed 
operatives. However, since then, due to the precarious nature of incoming projects, low 
turnover and reduced profits a number of them have been engaged either independently or 
through agencies. At the time of writing the company employed six labour-only 
subcontractors through an agency. The company's policy of training school leavers was 
abandoned a number of years ago and has not been reinstated. The only training course
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that they send their operatives on is the 'Gas Safety1 course which is a mandatory legal 
requirement.
Construction group
The construction group comprised Japan Construction's management team and the 
specialist and trade Contractors. The former consisted of the Senior Project Manager, the 
Project Manager, INME, a Site Manager, INQS, two Architectural Technicians, a Site 
Foreman, and a Control Engineer. The organisation of the construction group is presented 
in Figure 5.5. The solid links represent the lines of influence arising from the group 
members' position and role within the organisation.
Figure 5.2: Organisation of Construction Group
5.2.2 ENGAGEMENT OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS
To establish the nature of the relationship between Japan Construction and UK Services,
their respective selection processes, appointment criteria and roles and responsibilities
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were investigated and are described at some length in this sub-section. Observations 
indicated that the parties' relationship was significantly influenced by the procurement 
method, Japan Construction's relations with their design team and UK services relations 
with members of the construction group. Therefore outlines of the procurement method, 
the engagement criteria of design team members and those of construction group 
members are also provided here.
Procurement method
As discussed in Chapter 2, design and build is the common method of procuring projects 
in Japan. Therefore Japanese clients merely exercise choice in selecting main contractors, 
not procurement methods. The former tend to communicate with the main contractor 
directly rather than through an agent as is the case in the UK. Japanese main contractors 
implement the D&B method in its pure form (Masterman, 1992: 60), i.e., they have an in- 
house core of design, management and construction expertise that they draw upon as the 
need arises. However, owing to UK's different business environment, Japan Construction 
have adapted their procurement policy and, depending on circumstance, operate the 
integrated form of D&B (Masterman, 1992: 61), i.e., they buy in different types of 
expertise whenever necessary. That is what they did on this project. The implementation 
of integrated D&B proved inappropriate because Architect Co.'s objectives of producing 
a high quality building of high specification diverged from Japan Construction's cost 
conscious approach to building production.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of design team members
Japan Construction had varying relationships with their design team members. Some were 
selected, based on previous working relationships, others were selected on the basis of
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recommendations. All were appointed as service providing firms through a competitive 
fee bidding process. The Senior Project Manager, the Project Manager, INME and INQS 
were employees of Japan Construction.
The Senior Project Manager liaised between Japan Construction and Japcol and 
supervised the Project Manager. The Project Manager provided the link between the 
design team and Japan Construction, and between the former and the construction group. 
He was responsible for the design team's and the construction group's performance as 
well as the consequences of their performance. The Design Co-ordinator co-ordinated the 
consultants' design inputs. INME controlled Services Design Ltd's design input and 
supervised the installation works carried out by UK Services. INQS measured and valued 
the work undertaken by the specialist and trade contractors.
Architect Co. were a reputable, award winning architectural practice who had worked 
with Japan Construction before and approached the latter based on their previous 
knowledge of them. Japan Construction engaged Architect Co. both because the latter 
had effectively initiated the project, and because their price was lower than that of Japan 
Construction's in-house design department. The Project Manager and the architects in 
charge had not worked together before and, based on the evidence of their acrimonious 
relationship during the course of the contract, are not likely to do so again. Architect Co. 
were responsible for the scheme design and production of base details, according to the 
Project Architect, and were to leave the specialist and final construction details to the 
trade contractors. They, moreover, were the design team leaders, according to the Project 
Manager, in the sense that they had to produce the design drawings before other 
Consultants could add their information to them.
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Structure Ltd were engaged based on Architect Co.'s recommendation who had worked 
with them previously. Architect Co. reckoned that Structure Ltd 'had a sense for aesthetic 
quality and appeal of structures'. Structure Ltd were responsible for the overall structural 
design of the building and detailing of structural members. Japan Construction selected 
Services Design Ltd on the basis of their previous experience, the experience of the 
personnel who were to be involved with the project and the price they submitted. As far 
as Services Design Ltd knew, they were not in competition with any other consultant. 
Services Design Ltd were responsible for outline design and specification/ sizing of 
services, feeding services information to Architect Co. and other consultants, monitoring 
services installation and commissioning, and assisting in handover procedures. They, 
moreover, acted as lighting consultants for the general lighting of the building. AV Ltd 
were engaged based on Architect Co.'s recommendation who were aware of the latter's 
reputation. AV Ltd were responsible for the provision of specialist services like the 
loudspeaker system, the design of stage lighting, the projectors and the dimming 
equipment. Acoustics Ltd were engaged based on Architect Co.'s recommendation. They 
were responsible for consultation on specialist features like the acoustic screens.
The Design Team members' conditions of appointment documents were specific to Japan 
Construction and were based upon the standard Conditions of Appointment published by 
the team members' corresponding professional bodies. Architect Co.'s conditions of 
appointment, for example, were an amplification of those of the RIB A in the sense that 
the type and the number of drawings had been scheduled in detail and agreed to by both 
Architect Co.'s Project Architect and the Project Manager. The nature of Japan 
Construction's relationship with their design team members is summarised in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Japan Construction's relationship with design team members
DESIGN TEAM 
MEMBER
Senior Project 
Manager
Project Manager
Design Co-ordinator
INME
INQS
Architect Co.'s 
Project Architect
Structure Ltd
Services Design Ltd's 
Project Engineer
AVLtd
Acoustics Ltd
ORGANISATION 
OF ORIGIN
Japan Construction
Japan Construction
Japan Construction
Japan Construction
Japan Construction
Architect Co.
Structure Ltd
Services Design 
Ltd
AVLtd
Acoustics Ltd
NATURE OF 
ENGAGEMENT
Appointment of individual
Appointment of individual
Appointment of individual
Appointment of individual
Appointment of individual
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Selection and appointment 
of firm
Selection and appointment 
of firm
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
JAPAN CONSTRUCTION
Employee of Japan 
Construction
Employee of Japan 
Construction
Employee of Japan 
Construction
Employee of Japan 
Construction
Employee of Japan 
Construction
Previous work experience 
with Japan Construction
Recommended by Architect 
Co.
Previous work experience 
with Japan Construction
Recommended by Architect 
Co.
Recommended by Architect 
Co.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of Japan Construction 
Japan Construction's selection
Because Japan Construction approached Japcol about the development (phase 1) which 
led to this project (phase 2) (discussed in the next sub-section), their selection was based 
on the submission of a cost break down document for undertaking the project design, 
construction and management. Owing to their unfamiliarity with the UK construction 
market, Japcol required Japan Construction to have their construction cost estimate 
checked by an external firm of cost consultants. Consequently Japan Construction decided 
to engage the External Quantity Surveyor (EQS Co.) to provide cost planning and tender 
arrangement services. EQS Co. estimated the cost of the works at just over £9 Million; 
phase 1 costing around £4 Million, and phase 2, around £5 Million.
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Japan Construction prepared their cost breakdown based on EQS Co.'s estimate and 
submitted it to Japcol. Shortly after this submission, the specialist and trade contractors, 
who had been invited to tender, returned their tender prices for the works, the sum total 
of the lowest of which far exceeded EQS Co.'s estimate - those for phase 2 works 
amounted to £8 Million; 60% higher than the estimate. Consequently Japan Construction 
suspected an error in EQS Co.'s quantity surveillance, demanded to see the Bill of 
Quantities based on which the latter prepared their estimate and notified Japcol of the 
error. EQS Co. failed to submit their Bill of Quantities [most probably because they had 
not prepared one; that is why they made substantial omissions resulting in a grossly 
underestimated cost of the works] and refused to accept negligence claiming that Japan 
Construction should have incorporated a reasonable contingency sum in their cost 
breakdown. Japcol refused to acknowledge the error and insisted that Japan Construction 
ought to honour their price in the 'Japanese tradition of doing business', claimed the 
Project Manager. Thus Japan Construction were coerced into standing by their price, for 
reasons of securing their good long-term relationship with Japcol.
Subsequently, Japan Construction fired EQS Co., attempted to lower the cost of phase 1 
works through negotiations with the specialist and trade contractors selected, and held 
discussions with Japcol during the course of these works - which spanned a year - to try 
to renegotiate a bigger budget for phase 2. As phase 1 works progressed, it became 
increasingly difficult to procure them within the budget and delays began to occur. This 
phase was completed three months late and far exceeded its original price. Therefore prior 
to the start of phase 2, Japan Construction submitted a revised cost breakdown for the 
works in this phase, prepared by their INQS, and managed to secure Japcol's consent, in 
principle, to a larger budget. The latter, which constituted the contract budget, comprised
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INQS's financial analysis plus Japan Construction's mark-up minus the amount negotiated 
by Japcol.
Japan Construction established the contract programme through project analysis in terms 
of the logical sequence of events, which made up the construction phases. They allocated 
time slots to each operation contained in every construction phase subject to 
contingencies. They provided financial cover against unforeseen risks and uncertainties by 
means of a contingency sum, which was a percentage of the contract value. This sum was 
divided on the basis of the cost plan, which contained a breakdown of the project into 
itemised materials and elements, and was distributed so that each of the latter was covered 
by a contingency amount.
Japan Construction's conditions of appointment, roles and responsibilities
Japan Construction entered into a contract with Japcol that was tailor-made to suit the 
Master Agreement between the latter and Encoll. It was adapted from the Design and 
Build Standard form - albeit the latter was no longer recognisable - and was developed to 
ensure that the buildings' appearance, and any changes that may occur during the course 
of design and construction, were agreed to by both Japcol and Encoll. Japan 
Construction's conditions of appointment, as set out by this contract, constituted their 
roles and responsibilities and stipulated their system of payment. According to these 
conditions, Japan Construction were responsible for the design and construction of the 
works described in the contract documents and the overall construction product within a 
fixed lump-sum price and a period of 15 months. They were to provide a direct Design 
Warranty to Encoll, with whom they did not have a contract. They were moreover to
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require the provision of direct Warranties to both Japcol and Encoll by their trade 
contractors as part of the latter's conditions of appointment.
Japan Construction's payment system was based upon the achievement of milestones or 
work stages rewarded by a percentage of the contract sum - a partly Japanese system. 
Variations or savings were added to or subtracted from the following milestone payment. 
The onerous nature of these conditions is partly encapsulated in Japan Construction's 
responsibility for design and construction of the works within a fixed lump-sum price; and 
partly contained in the payment system. The works described in the contract documents 
were based on Architect Co.'s outline design - the only information available at the time 
of preparing the cost breakdown. This information lacked details providing clues as to 
how the building was to be constructed. As a result, the complexity of constructing some 
of the details had not even been envisaged let alone costed. Therefore commitment to a 
fixed price for an unknown entity put Japan Construction at a considerable financial risk. 
The payment system, on the other hand, implied that if the works were delayed by the 
trade contractors for reasons beyond Japan Construction's control, the latter would still 
not be paid. The Project Manager stated that the payment system was passed on to UK 
Services and other trade contractors.
Selection and appointment of construction group
The specialist and trade contractors were largely selected through tender processes and 
based on their prices, however, in certain cases their quality of work and speed of delivery 
took precedence over their price. One such example of trade contractor selection is 
provided in respect of UK Services.
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Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of UK Services 
UK Services' selection
INQS included Five M&E contractors on the tender list for the services works package. 
Services Design Ltd nominated two of them based the contractors' previous performance 
and work with the former. The Project Manager chose two from Japan Construction's 
'Register of Subcontractors', who had performed well on previous jobs, and another 
based on their performance on Phase 1. The Project Manager claimed that services 
contractors were given four weeks to tender. UK Services claimed they were given a 
week. INQS controlled and conducted the tender process.
UK Services' tender documents contained Services Design Ltd's mechanical, electrical and 
public health drawings and specifications as well as Japan Construction's enquiry package. 
The latter contained the basic conditions under which UK Services were expected to 
operate including the contract programme, the time-scale involved, access to the works, 
instructions issued by Japan Construction, variations and Liquidated and Ascertained 
damages recoverable in case of delay. The tender documents required services contractors 
to provide a lump-sum tender price, their programme of installation, their Method 
Statements and the trades they were proposing to sub-let. For ease of comparison, the 
tender prices was required to broken down into priced items of component systems, for 
example, gas supply system, water supply system, heating system, etc.
UK Services' Estimating department prepared their tender submission. They calculated the 
tender price by measuring the quantity of materials and plant required off the drawings; 
pricing them in association with suppliers and based on their prices and on Services 
Design Ltd's specification; and adding to this price the estimated labour costs involved
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with installation and commissioning. The tender sum breakdown included the price for the 
supply of each service system - though not their quantity - so as to provide a basis for 
calculation of variations.
Following UK Services' tender submission, the Project Manager tried to renegotiate their 
tender price through a bargaining process with the technical director that went on for six 
weeks. By the end of this period, the technical director had offered savings that amounted 
to nearly half of UK Services' tender price. Subsequently the Project Manager selected 
UK Services two weeks later. He attributed the selection to UK Services' quality of work 
on phase 1, which took precedence over their unsatisfactory organisation of services 
installation. He further stated that UK Services attempted to rectify their organisation 
problems on phase 2 by replacing their Project Engineer. UK Services' technical director 
ascribed their selection to the Project Manager's belief that they were capable of 
overcoming the shortcomings they were likely to encounter during the execution of the 
project. Whatever UK Services' selection was principally based on, it was not their price 
because their price was not the lowest.
UK Services' conditions of appointment, roles and responsibilities
Japan Construction appointed UK Services on the basis of a letter of intent. The 
conditions contained in the letter constituted UK Services' roles and responsibilities and 
stipulated their system of payment. According to these conditions, UK Services were to 
enter into a contract with Japan Construction that was a substantially altered version of 
the Domestic Sub-Contract Standard Form of Contract, adapted to suit the Master 
Agreement between Japcol and Encoll - UK Services considered this form of contract 
specific to Japan Construction. They were to provide, install and commission the
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mechanical, electrical and public health services required on the project for the lump-sum 
fixed price agreed to and in accordance with Japan Construction's terms of contract, in 
particular, the preliminaries. They were responsible for co-ordinating these services with 
one another and with the building, and for conforming to instructions issued by Japan 
Construction. They were liable for Liquidated and Ascertained damages of £10,000 per 
week. They had to provide a direct Warranty to Japcol on request, that is when the latter 
demanded it. In addition to the above conditions, Japan Construction required UK 
Services to have an office on site. This requirement was communicated to the latter 
verbally.
5.2.3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Project conception and history
The project, which from this point onward is referred to as The Cultural Centre1, was 
conceived serendipitously. Encoll, a well-known college in a long-established English 
university, commissioned Architect Co. to design the existing college building in the early 
1960's. Shortage of funds at the time prevented the construction of the college entrance. 
Architect Co. kept in touch with Encoll throughout the ensuing period - carrying out 
small jobs as the need for them arose. In 1992, Encoll's Bursar, with the aid of a partner in 
Architect Co., identified the requirement for college accommodation and a new entrance. 
However, as Encoll lacked the requisite finance to carry out the works, both Architect 
Co. and the Bursar looked for possible sponsors.
Architect Co. had previously worked with Japan Construction and were aware of their 
developing capability. They therefore approached the latter with the development 
proposal for additions to Encoll's existing college building. Japan Construction
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subsequently sought potential sponsors in Japan one of whom, Japcol, showed interest in 
a partnership with Encoll. Japcol agreed to finance the project conditional upon being 
leased a plot of land to build a cultural centre, which they considered beneficial to their 
business. Thus the contact between the two colleges was established through Japan 
Construction.
Japan Construction formulated and prepared Japcol's requirements, in conjunction with 
the latter, in their headquarters in Japan. They obtained Japcol's approval of the drawings, 
the finishes schedule and the outline of building services in design meetings in Japan and 
produced them in Britain.
The Cultural Centre comprises two blocks. One block, contains facilities for Japanese 
cultural functions and educational purposes; the other, provides residential 
accommodation and associated facilities for students studying at the centre or delegates 
attending the functions. It has a total area of 3,520 metre squares (approximately) and 
consists of:
A five storey rotunda, of approximately 1,600 metre square overall floor area, 
accommodating a general purpose conference/lecture theatre providing multiple uses 
ranging from teaching to banqueting, a lecture theatre, a dividable space capable of 
providing up to four individual lecture rooms, a dining room, and a plant room. 
A two storey link, of approximately 220 metre square overall floor area, containing 
the entrance lobby, conference reception and display area, a computer room, an 
archive store, and ancillary spaces.
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A residential block, joined by the two storey link to the rotunda, of approximately 
1,700 metre square overall floor area, housing 27 study bedrooms, a 3 room flat, a 
Tatami room (Japanese tea-room), a library, a kitchen, a dining room, an 
administrative office, a launderette, and a switchroom.
The development had an initial contract value of approximately £6 Million. The overall 
constructional cost of the building remained within the initial tender budget upon 
completion, however, the contract sum increased by 45% due to changes in JapcoPs 
requirements and subsequent variations. The construction works began in April 1995, 
were scheduled for completion by the end of March 1996, and were completed by the end 
of August 1996.
The services installation had an initial contract value of around £640,000 and cost around 
£725,000. The installation began at the end of May 1995 and was due for completion by 
mid-January 1996. The mechanical services were installed by the end of June 1996 and 
the installation of electrical services was finally completed at the end of July 1996.
Managing project design 
Statutory approvals
The Project Manager explained that the building design was subject to restrictions 
imposed by planners. The original proposed height of the building had to be reduced by 
four metres owing to the building's location within a conservation area. For financial 
reasons, Japcol were not prepared to lose one of the floors, therefore, Japan Construction 
had to reduce the floor to floor height of each storey by a metre instead. This had far
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reaching consequences in terms of space availability for accommodation of services and 
their future maintenance.
Design development
At the scheme design stage, when Japan Construction discovered the error in their tender 
price, they made a number of changes to Japcol's brief in terms of reducing the overall 
size and lowering the specification of the project so as to save costs. Therefore a lot of re- 
design took place. Architect Co. claimed that from this stage onwards they had to 
produce at least one cheaper alternative at every design stage that followed. They were 
told, by Japan Construction, that Japanese Clients expected alternative designs as a matter 
of course. The changes in Japcol's brief gave rise to changes in the design programme; the 
latter had to be squeezed so as to keep the contract completion date constant. This 
implied that no lead-in time was allowed for the production of design details. Therefore, 
as soon as a construction work package was available to start on site, as per the 
programme of works, the corresponding detail design drawings had to be produced. The 
procurement method, as far as Architect Co. were concerned, effectively changed into 
fast track.
According to the Project Manager, there were few concept design variations, that is, 
additional work carried out outside the scope of the original contract within the same time 
frame. Variations that did occur were of three categories. One category was attributable 
to Japcol, for instance, the addition of audio/visual equipment fit out package, computer 
telephone wiring, and the furniture. The other, was brought about by difficulties 
associated with constructability of building details that occurred on site. The third 
category resulted from refinements by designers, particularly Architects Co., which
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allegedly constituted 90% of design changes. The Project Manager explained that the 
alterations initiated by both Japan Construction and Japcol were necessary and to some 
extent unavoidable owing to the way the project was organised. However, the way these 
alterations were managed in terms of revisions made to the existing information, 
generation of new information and transmission of information within the design team and 
construction group was ineffective and as far as the Project Manager was concerned, 
unsatisfactory.
Architect Co. attributed the delays in revision of existing, and generation of new 
information to abortive work resulting from the production of alternative designs 
discussed previously. A/V Ltd's representative, however, was of the opinion that 
Architect Co. made inadequate use of the available technology. He claimed that the 
drawings were revised manually on drawing boards rather than on computer terminals, 
which equalled the boards in number, in Architect Co.'s offices. He accounted for this by 
the fact that the architects in charge of the project belonged to the older generation who 
felt more comfortable with drawing boards and less so with computers. The quality of 
Architect Co.'s computer generated drawings indicated that they must have had problems 
either with the software package they used or with the technician operating it. The Project 
Manager believed that Architect Co. were simply incapable of carrying out their duties 
and responsibilities. That probably explains why he engaged an Architectural Technician 
half-way through the project design and stopped communicating with Architect Co. 
altogether.
Variations of construction details were largely caused by UK Services' inability to carry 
out their installation within the limited space available and the considerable joggling of
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services that this gave rise to. The Project manager attributed the spatial problem to 
Architect Co.'s refusal to allocate more space to services despite the Services Design 
Ltd's persistent demands 1 . He claimed that it was easier to explain the problems caused 
by inadequate space to Japcol at the construction stage than to demand extra space from 
Architect Co. at the design stage!! He did, however, qualify this statement by 
acknowledging that the production of co-ordination drawings by UK Services would have 
greatly alleviated the problems. These variations added two months to the programme of 
works.
Variations of design details through refinements were a consequence of time restrictions 
that hindered the natural evolution of the design process, on the one hand; and Architect 
Co.'s desire to produce an award winning building, on the other.
The design development process was marred by constant battles between Architect Co. 
and Japan Construction that contradicted the very essence of D&B procurement method. 
Japan Construction's endeavours to reduce the cost of the project were vehemently 
opposed by Architect Co.'s determination to produce an architectural gem and their 
inflexibility to compromise. The Design Co-ordinator described an instance of this in 
relation to phase 1. The design of the entrance, which had been developed over a six 
months period, was about to be approved by Encoll when Architect Co. suddenly 
produced an aesthetically superior design of greater cost - that they had not yet 
communicated to Japan Construction - in a design meeting with Encoll. The latter were 
fascinated by the new design and approved it. To avoid delays to the programme, Japan
1. Architects Co.'s obstinacy regarding this issue gave rise to a great deal of tension between them and 
Services Design Ltd in design Co-ordination meetings.
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Construction paid for the extra construction cost of the new design but banned Architect 
Co. from future design meetings.
Services design
Japcol's brief established the scope of the services required. Architect Co.'s Project 
Architect claimed that they integrated these services in their scheme design by allocating 
space to them and ensuring that they co-ordinated and visually blended in with the 
building design. The Project Manager and Services Design Ltd found Architect Co.'s 
spatial allowance for the accommodation of services inadequate. Services Design Ltd's 
Project Engineer explained that they had to experiment with a number of design layouts in 
their attempts to fit the services within the allocated space. It is fair to comment that the 
schematic design of the services by Services Design Ltd was not managed effectively. The 
latter were appointed later than Architect Co., therefore the important communication and 
liaison between the two, which was crucial for the planning of adequate space for 
services, did not take place. This had the added disadvantage of putting the two 
consultants at loggerheads throughout the design process. Furthermore, Services Design 
Ltd underestimated the scope and the complexity of the services. They made design 
mistakes at the expense of UK Services which the latter had to rectify at the installation 
stage.
The detail design of services was initially based on the schematics produced by Services 
Design Ltd, however, these proved inaccurate and incapable of being developed into a 
functional system, according to UK Services' Project Engineer. The constructed plant 
room dimensions, for example, were much smaller that those conveyed on the drawings 
resulting in a re-design of the services layout within this room over a one week period.
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The incorrect drainage design caused considerable problems both in terms of the drainage 
function and its co-ordination with the building construction, and took numerous weeks 
to resolve. There were major problems with the design of electrical services too. Some of 
these related to Japcol's additional works, referred to previously; others were caused by 
UK Services1 mistakes regarding the flooring system. The latter had designed the wiring 
system to pass through the floor whereas the floor was solid. The design problems were 
allegedly compounded by lack of support from either Services Design Ltd or INME.
UK Services did not organise and manage the design of services effectively principally 
because they did not have an agenda for the production of information in terms of the 
quantity and type of drawings required. However, in the absence of a detailed 
specification and comprehensive drawings they moreover underestimated the amount of 
work they had to undertake. Their budgetary limitations, staff shortages, the 
draughtsman's unfamiliarity with the CAD package purchased at the start of the services 
works, as well as the inadequacy of information, further hampered the production of 
design information. UK Services' failure to produce detail design drawings to programme 
led to weekly revisions of the main programme and had a knock on effect on procurement 
and installation of services.
Flow of design information
The flow of design information generally took place in the following way:
The Project Manager produced a design programme containing the type and number 
of drawings required from each team member at the beginning of the project and 
incorporated it into the programme of works.
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Architect Co. produced their design information, sent it to other design team 
members, the Design Co-ordinator, and the Project manager for comments/ approval.
  
The other design team members subsequently produced their design information based 
on Architect Co.'s information and sent them to the latter to co-ordinate with the 
building design and to the Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager for 
comments/approval.
  
The Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager checked and commented upon the 
design information and returned it to corresponding team members for revision.
  
The design team members sent their revised design information to the Design Co- 
ordinator and the Project Manager.
  
The Project Manager then sent the revised design information to Japcol through the 
Senior Project Manager.
Information relating to design variations required by Japcol flowed from the latter to the 
Senior Project Manager, by the latter to the Project Manager and through him to the 
design team. That relating to design alterations initiated by Architect Co. flowed from the 
latter to other team members, the Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager. The 
discrepancies discovered by team members were either notified by them to Architect Co. 
and the Design Co-ordinator or raised in design co-ordination meetings. The flow routes 
for information relating to building design, alterations and revisions are presented in 
Figure 5.3. The black flow route represents information sent by the design team members 
to the Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager; the blue flow route represents that 
sent by Japcol; and the pink flow route represents comments made and revisions required 
by the Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager. The dashed line represents informal 
communication.
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Figure 5.3: Building design information flow route
The flow of services design information was complicated too. UK Services' Project 
Engineer explained that they sent their installation drawings to INME for comments, who 
then sent them to Services Design Ltd for comments. UK Services revised their drawings 
in accordance with the comments received from INME and Services Design Ltd and sent 
them back to INME for approval. He moreover explained that UK Services oversaw the 
production of working drawings by their subcontractors and co-ordinated their inputs 
within the services package. The subcontractors produced their fabrication drawings from 
UK Services' installation drawings and specifications, sent them to the latter for 
comments, revised their drawings in accordance with the comments received and sent 
them back for approval. Once UK Services had approved the subcontractors' drawings, 
they would send them to Japan Construction for approval.
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When queries arose involving services design matters, UK Services issued them on 
Information Request Forms to Japan Construction who, in turn, sent them to Services 
Design Ltd for comments. The latter included their comments on the form and sent them 
back to UK Services through the Project Manager. In urgent cases, Services Design Ltd 
sent a copy of the form containing their comments directly to UK Services.
The flow routes for information relating to services fabrication, installation and variation 
are presented in Figure 5.4. The blue flow route represents changes in Japcol's services 
requirements initiated by them. The black flow route represents information sent by UK 
Services to Services Design Ltd through Japan Construction. The green flow route 
represents queries raised by UK Services' subcontractors. The pink flow route represents 
comments made and revisions required by Services Design Ltd. The dashed line 
represents informal communication between UK Services and Services Design Ltd.
Figure 5.4: Services installation information flow route
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The flow of information was subject to communication within the design team, and 
between UK Services and INME and Services Design Ltd. It was also subject to decision- 
making processes by the design team members, and by INME and Services Design Ltd in 
the case of services.
Communication
The design team communicated with one another both formally through letters, drawing 
approvals and design meetings in team members' offices, and informally by means of 
telephone and facsimile. They met formally with the Project Manager and the Design Co- 
ordinator, at design co-ordination meetings on site, and communicated with them 
informally by telephone and facsimile in the interim period. The formal mode of 
communication seemed primarily to serve the purpose of recording information 
generation and transfer. The informal mode of communication, though useful and indeed 
necessary when an urgent answer or decision was required, always needed confirmation 
by means of the formal method to secure the communicating parties' liability or their seal 
of approval.
Owing to the problems associated with Architect Co.'s information production, the 
Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager often provided feedback to the other team 
members' queries. They moreover facilitated the members' communication with one 
another at design co-ordination meetings particularly when individuals' frustration 
impeded their constructive comments and productive discussions. The Design Co- 
ordinator and Project Manager were the only channels of communication between the 
design team and Japcol.
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It is easy to imagine the difficulties experienced by UK Services' Project Engineer as the 
communication channel between Japan Construction and services subcontractors. He was 
inundated with paperwork in the form of drawings or queries. The situation deteriorated 
when INME left half way through the contract, as obtaining approval from Services 
Design Ltd, through the Project Manager, became more difficult and prolonged. It is no 
wonder that the services drawings could not be produced on time!
Decision-making processes
In the context of this project, Architect Co. appeared to make their design decisions based 
solely upon aesthetic judgements and oblivious of either the cost implications of these 
decisions or indeed the chain of consequences they gave rise to. This premise contradicted 
the Project Manager's cost-conscious approach and disregarded other team members' 
requirements. It more often than not resulted in the Project Manager's modification or 
outright rejection of the decision and led to disputes between him and Architect Co.'s 
Project Architect, which in turn slowed down the decision-making process.
Design co-ordination and control
Design co-ordination and control took place through meetings held at irregular intervals 
between Japan Construction and the design team and chaired by the Project Manager. The 
Design Co-ordination meetings provided a forum for identification of problems, attention 
to queries raised by team members and consideration of potential solutions and 
comments. In response to the discussions, the Project Manager and the Design Co- 
ordinator recommended courses of action to each member. The meetings were moreover 
utilised to monitor the progress of information production by team members.
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Architect Co. were slow in the production of information and delayed the production of 
information by other team members. This weakness in leadership on the part of Architect 
Co. created acrimony between them and the Project Manager as well as other team 
members in design co-ordination meetings. Furthermore, information flow proved 
problematic and was ineffective. Very often in design co-ordination meetings, the team 
members seemed either not to have received updated information or not to have 
incorporated them in the production of their own information. They blamed this 
incoherence of information on the numerous design changes that had taken place and their 
inability to keep up with them. It is fair to assume that Architect Co.'s design changes had 
de-motivating effects upon the other team members. Architect Co.'s reasons for delays in 
the revision and production of information have already been discussed under design 
development, above.
In the Japanese tradition of D&B procurement, the onus of design co-ordination rests 
with the main contractor. Therefore in theory Japan Construction were responsible for co- 
ordinating the various design inputs, a task that was allocated to the Design Co-ordinator. 
However, one of the most prominent features of the project that often presented itself in 
the meetings was inadequate and, on occasions, non-existent design co-ordination. This 
was particularly manifest in the clashes between the structural elements and services. The 
Project Manager attributed the shortcoming to limitations imposed by both the budget and 
the business environment. He explained that the provision of a comprehensive design co- 
ordination service, similar to that provided in Japan, would have their price 
uncompetitive. He did, however, admit that compromise on the provision of this service 
was short-sighted and gave rise to 99% of the problems on site.
The Project Manager, identified two major problems with the co-ordination and control of 
design information, quality control of the design process and monitoring and enforcement 
of information production. He attributed the former problem to Architect Co. not 
quantifying their design proposal in terms of what scale drawings they intended to 
produce, how much detail each was meant to convey, and what each was meant to 
indicate. He related the latter problem to lack of control on his and the Design Co- 
ordinator's part. He moreover asserted that Architect Co. were conceptual designers with 
'no head for details'. To these problems a third can be added involving the reactive and 
ineffective co-ordination of design inputs, discussed earlier.
The Project Manager stated that better control of information could have had significant 
benefits. 'Mistakes were made that should not have been made. Drawings were not sent 
to the right people; records were not kept, full impact of changes, in terms of the chain of 
consequences, were not anticipated, and problems were not foreseen. Moreover, the 
systems for the transfer of information were not integrated.' The latter comment refers to 
the three separate systems of information transfer within the design team, within the 
construction group and between these two entities, through the Information Request 
system. The Project Manager's solution to the problem of control was utilisation of pre- 
fabricated and thus pre-designed components.
Managing project construction 
Planning the construction works
Prior to the commencement of construction, Japan Construction set out their aims and 
objectives in terms of time, cost, quality and safety; established their goals and targets; 
planned the construction works by mobilising the key specialist and trade contractors they
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had already selected and selected those outstanding. Japan Construction's aims were to 
compensate for the losses incurred in phase 1 by getting the job done sooner than the 
contract completion date (end of June 1996), that is, by the end of March 1996; to carry 
out the works cheaper than the price they negotiated with Japcol; to achieve a high level 
of quality and workmanship in terms of the materials and finishes specified by Architect 
Co.; and to avoid accidents on site - a company safety policy.
To finish the job sooner than programmed, Japan Construction established a target 
programme through project analysis in an ideal situation with no contingencies. That is, 
the logical sequence of events carried out through smooth operations and on a reasonable 
resourcing level - avoiding over-manning to accomplish tasks. In other words, the target 
programme was an optimistic schedule of executing the works; and the trade contractors 
were required to fit their works within it as a condition of their selection. To carry out the 
works cheaper than priced, Japan Construction took a certain percentage off INQS's 
financial analysis of the project - reflecting the latter's market value - to arrive at the target 
budget. They then either selected those trade contractors whose prices matched the target 
work package estimates, or negotiated down the trades' prices to the levels of the latter.
To achieve a high level of quality, particularly in relation to key elements of the work, 
Japan Construction gave priority in their selection of trade contractors to those whom 
they considered capable of delivering good quality work within time rather than to the 
lowest tenders. This was especially the case towards the end of the contract when time 
became of the essence. The trades thus selected were then negotiated with in an effort to 
lower their price. For example, the Concrete Frame trade contractor was selected because 
of their satisfactory performance on phase 1, despite being more expensive than their
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competitors. To avoid accidents on site, Japan Construction established a site-specific 
safety plan for the works which was targeted to site operations and provided guidance on 
material storage and circulation about the site, obtaining permits to work, etc. The Site 
Manager supervised the site safety policy enforcement.
Although Japan Construction had obtained Japcol's approval to the new negotiated 
contract budget in principle, they did not have their commitment and therefore effectively 
started the works at risk.
The Project Manager explained that it was their company philosophy to plan the works at 
stages corresponding to imminent tasks, near future tasks and overall tasks represented by 
fortnightly programmes, monthly programmes and the overall programme. When 
execution of a programmed task was hampered by some reason, another task - belonging 
to a later stage in the programme - that could be performed was brought forward to 
replace it and thus the works were re-programmed. Towards the end of the project the 
programming was reduced to schedules, action plans and individual tasks corresponding 
to snagging lists, issued on a daily basis. To accommodate the change in the scope of the 
works and in some cases to recover lost time where a trade contractor had been in delay, 
the construction programme was revised many times over the construction period. The 
works were by and large complete by the end of June 1996, although there were some 
outstanding items like the leaking roof as well as some aspects of the services system that 
required attention past that date.
According to the Project Manager, variations in building production were not substantial 
in terms of person-hours, however, they caused considerable delays in co-ordination by
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holding up other trades. The original design underestimated the complexity of 
construction, therefore, building construction cost more than anticipated in the target 
budget. INQS attributed the increase in the contract sum to the additional fixtures and 
fittings required by Japcol.
Flow of production Information
The design team produced the building production information in a similar way to the 
production of building design information. In an attempt to speed up the production of 
information, a few months into the contract period Japan Construction engaged a 
technician to produce the necessary construction information on site. In practice, the 
Technician did not prove any more efficient than Architect Co., according to the Project 
Manager. The flow of production information during the construction process generally 
took place in the following way:
The design team sent the production information to the Project Manager who
checked, commented upon and returned it for revision.
The design team revised and returned the information to the Project Manager who
sent it to UK Services and other trade contractors through UK Services' Project
Engineer and the Site Manager respectively.
When queries relating to discrepancies between the production information and the
construction works arose on site, UK Services' or other trade contractors' foremen
recorded them on Information Request Forms, sent them back along the flow route to
the design team who, in turn, provided their answers on the same sheets and
forwarded them to the former through the Project Manager. To speed up the process,
UK Services' Project Engineer sent the queries direct to Services Design Ltd.
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The flow routes for information relating to building construction and that requested by 
trade contractors are presented in Figure 5.5. The black flow route represents information 
sent by the design team; the blue flow route represents that sent by Japcol; and the green 
flow route represents the queries raised on site. The dashed lines represent informal or 
direct communication which by passes the stipulated information flow route.
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Figure 5.5: Building construction information flow route
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At the start of the services installation, UK Services wrote their queries on odd pieces of 
paper rather than on the Forms Japan Construction provided. This created administration 
problems for the latter and led to hours of discussion in site meetings. In time, UK 
Services became accustomed to the Information Request system and the problem was 
overcome. The long delays in Japan Construction's response to each query were never 
overcome. The Project Manager admitted to problems with dissemination of information 
as well as with inefficient management of time because of the poor quality of production 
information. The dissemination of information was problematic for two reasons. Because 
information was recorded on paper, volumes of paper built up over time with the increase 
in the number of queries and clogged up the communication channels through which 
information had to travel for contractual reasons. Moreover, due to commercial pressures 
the consultants had limited human resources to devote to projects. This meant that 
individuals involved with the project were overloaded both in terms of the number of 
projects they had to attend to as well as the amount of work each demanded. It is no 
wonder that the quality of their information was 'poor', and their productivity, low.
Communication
The modes of communication within the design team remained the same at construction 
stage as they were at design stage. Japan Construction moved the Design Co-ordinator to 
another project. Further channels of communication, comprising the Site Manager, UK 
Services' Project Engineer and other trades' foremen, became operational to facilitate the 
flow of information between the design team and construction group.
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Decision-making processes
The decision-making processes were largely delegated to the management team members 
in accordance with the authority that their job descriptions allocated to them. All the 
decisions that involved significant financial implications were made in Japan and were 
communicated to the management team through the Senior Project Manager. The Project 
Manager was ultimately responsible for all the decisions made on site that affected the 
performance of the trade contractors as he was responsible for the construction group's 
performance as well as the consequences of their performance. The Site Manager was 
authorised to make every day decisions, like builders' work and day work, that involved 
relatively minor cost implications, decisions regarding safety, alternative construction 
details on site - subject to the Project manager's confirmation - and alternative time 
targets. The other management team members merely carried out the decisions that the 
Site Manager made. Apparently the Senior Project Manager did suggest that the Site 
Management team members be given the opportunity of being creative - in the Japanese 
tradition of management. However, when this idea was put into practice it did not prove 
productive. Therefore the Project Manager and the Site Manager decided that it was 
quicker to make decisions and ask the management team members to carry them out than 
to devolve the decision-making process.
The building production was initially organised around the building works programme. 
However, half way through the contract, when problems associated with complexities of 
the services and the limited space available for their accommodation surfaced, the Site 
Manager reprogrammed the works and planned them around the services. He stated that 
this direction should have been adopted at the start of the works. The damage was already 
done. Towards the end of the project the most characteristic feature of the works was
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their unfinished state portraying a piecemeal approach to their execution. A serious 
symptom of the approach was the extra work it gave rise to. For example, the delay in the 
kitchen extract's installation meant that rather than fitting it in the kitchen wall as the latter 
was being constructed, a new hole had to be made in the kitchen wall - after its 
construction - to accommodate the kitchen extract connection and then the area around 
the hole had to be made good. Or, the Steelworkers' failure to put up the steelworks on 
time had led to ducts sitting idle on site and having their installation fall behind 
programme when they could have been connected up.
Co-ordination and control of production inputs
Co-ordination of operations took place through structured co-ordination meetings held 
weekly between the Site Manager and the trades' project engineers or foremen. The site 
meetings between the Site Manager and UK Services' Project Engineer involved 
discussion of problems that frequently related to spatial restrictions, progress of the 
works, labour resources and safety issues. In response to these problems the Site Manager 
suggested solutions or recommended a course of action. In addition to structured co- 
ordination meetings, there were unstructured meetings held as the need for them arose, 
involving the Site Manager answering the queries raised by trade contractors. The Site 
Manager associated the frequency of these meetings with the complexity of the 
contractors' tasks. To ensure effective interaction between the trades, the Site Manager 
was strict about tidiness, cleanliness and completion of jobs and monitored the trades' 
performance closely.
According to the Project Manager and the Site Manager, the payment system and the 
embarrassment of not finishing on time were motivators in their own right. The former
claimed that it was to the contractors' advantage to finish sooner than scheduled, to get 
paid sooner and to save on overheads. The latter claimed that there was a good 
relationship between Japan Construction and the trade contractors. The trades knew they 
had to perform. Japan Construction paid them well, on-time and regularly. In case of poor 
performance financial pressures, such as refusing payment, were used as threats. In the 
case of poor performance by labour-only subcontractors the threats included warnings 
that others would be employed to complete the task.
Despite good relations and use of threats problems with enforcement of trade contractors 
and getting them to complete their tasks occurred. The Project Manager explained that 
those trades who lacked the will or the resources to finish their jobs knew that engaging 
others to finish their work would cost Japan Construction more and would therefore not 
be the first option of the latter. Japan Construction knew that if the trades were in 
financial difficulty not paying them would make them go under and would not achieve 
anything. On the other hand if Japan Construction did pay them the probability existed 
that the trades might try to finish the work on other sites where they had not been paid for 
yet. Thus motivation of trades was not an easy problem to resolve. Neither was the issue 
of trades' productivity. The Site Manager stated that although he monitored the trade 
contractors' productivity levels, he did not have much control over them. 'Sometimes 
people's pride does not allow them to take the management team's suggestions regarding 
productivity improvements on board' (the Site Manager).
The Site Manager arranged safety inductions, carried out at intervals on site, when the 
works began. At their pre-contract meetings, the specialist and trade contractors were 
informed of their safety requirements, including submission of method statements and risk
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assessments. The Site Manager monitored the observation of Health and Safety 
Regulations by the trade contractors, on a day-to-day basis, and reported deviations to the 
foremen or the project engineers concerned requiring conformance. One trade 
contractor's operative lost a day's pay due to lack of conformance with safety 
requirements.
The Project Manager emphasised the importance of the shift in the balance of power 
between pre-contract and post-contract phases. In the former phase, Japan Construction 
was the dominant party owing to the power vested in them by the selection procedure and 
the conditions of appointment of trade contractors. In the latter phase, the trade 
contractors became the dominant parties because they were in charge of the construction 
process and the success of the project depended on their performance and their 
contribution in terms of the product and the services supplied.
Services installation: organisation, co-ordination and control of services inputs
UK Services' need for greater volumes of work to enable them to make sufficient profits 
to carry on their business, lay behind their endeavour to secure this contract. Their 
objective, at the time of offering the discount on their tender price, was to cover their 
costs and make a small profit through variations, which their experience on phase 1 and 
their perceived shortcomings of the project deemed inevitable.
UK Services' ultimate goal at the start of the services installation was effective 
management, or at least, more effective management of the installation compared to that 
achieved on phase 1. This was manifest in their replacement of the Project Engineer 
responsible for overseeing the works on site. Their start date was end of May 1995, four
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days after their selection during which period they had to familiarise themselves with the 
site and set up their site office. The commencement of services installation was 
programmed as four weeks after this date. In other words, UK Services had four weeks 
within which to produce detail design and fabrication drawings, to obtain approval and to 
organise the installation works. Their completion date, set by Japan Construction, was 
mid-January 1996; however, as the construction works were extended this date moved 
back to the end of March 1996.
Although UK Services' contingency provisions were bargained away during the tender 
price negotiations, their bulk figures for the supply of services systems provided them 
with some recourse to recover their costs when omissions made by Services Design Ltd 
or Japcol enabled them to claim for extras.
UK Services subdivided the services works into electrical, mechanical, and public health 
installations. Their newly-formed in-house electrical department supplied most of the 
electrical services, which were fixed by their labour-only subcontractors (Electrical 
LOSC), except for the electrical controls which they sublet to a supply-and-fix firm 
(Electric Control). The manufacture of mechanical ductwork was sublet, by UK Services, 
to a supply-and-fix firm (Ducting Co.) who also supplied ductwork associated equipment 
and controls. The ductwork insulation was sublet to a supply-and-fix firm (Insulation 
Co.); and chlorination, to a specialist (Chlorinate Co.). UK Services supplied the public 
health services, comprising plumbing and drainage, themselves and sublet their installation 
to two labour-only subcontractors (Public Health LOSC), engaged specifically for this 
job. They moreover sublet the commissioning of the services to a specialist firm
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(Commission Co.). The subcontractors operated under the supervision and control of UK 
Services.
UK Services' management team controlled the services installation. The team comprised: 
the Project Engineer, responsible for overseeing the installation of services and resolving 
the day-to-day problems on site by liaising with Services Design Ltd; and the Foreman, 
responsible for supervising the subcontractors, answering their queries on a day-to-day 
basis, and reporting problems to the Project Engineer. The organisation of services 
installation is represented in Figure 5.6. The links represent lines of influence arising from 
the team member's position and role within the organisation.
Figure 5.6: Organisation of services works package
UK Services had problems with deliveries and installation because they delayed the 
production of design information and because they did not have enough operatives nor 
did they pay them well, according to the Project Manager. They had problems with co- 
ordination of mechanical and electrical elements owing to their lack of experience, on the 
one hand, and the dearth of co-ordination drawings, on the other. They moreover had 
problems with co-ordination of services with the building primarily due to lack of space.
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These problems were the major sources of delay in the installation of services, although 
the variations introduced by Japan Construction in response to Japcol's additional 
requirements contributed to them.
The services tender sum, according to INQS, fluctuated constantly from the early stages 
in the design process and was 'up-specified' and 'down-specified' throughout the 
construction process. This, coupled with Japcol's changing requirements, led to increases 
of £25,000 to the cost of mechanical services, and £60,000 to the cost of electrical 
services.
Services commissioning
Most of the services systems were commissioned satisfactorily. However, the air system 
indicated a ten percent loss of air volume between intake and outlet. The Project Manager 
attributed this problems to incorrect installation of the air conditioning controls. UK 
Services attributed it to the increased resistance of the system effected by the numerous 
bends that had to be applied to air ducts, because of the confined spaces through which 
they had to travel. Service Design Ltd rejected this claim but the Ductwork Specialist 
engaged by Japan Construction to act as independent adviser upheld it.
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5.3 CONTRACTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
This section interprets the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria for 
the nature of the parties' relations by establishing whether these relations express power 
disparity and power strategies or various forms of trust. It then goes on to interpret the 
impact of the Project Manager's and the Site Manager's leadership, motivation of 
participants, involvement of participants in decision-making and their formation into a 
team, on the participants' interactions.
5.3.1 CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS
The interorganisational relations emanating from the contractual framework of the main 
project participants being investigated here, may be considered as a hierarchy of 
contracting and subcontracting relations. Japcol let the design, construction and project 
management functions to Japan Construction. Japan Construction sublet the design 
functions to the consultants, and the detail design, manufacture, installation and 
commissioning of the services to UK Services. The latter sublet the manufacture, 
installation and commissioning of electrical and mechanical services to subcontractors, 
and the installation of public health services to labour-only subcontractors. This 
hierarchical relationship is represented in Figure 5.7, and is explored below under 
subcontracting relations.
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Figure 5.7: Participant organisations' contractual relations in The Cultural Centre
Subcontracting relations
Based on the nature of subcontracting relations, defined as subcontractors' relative 
independence from or dependence on the main contractor by virtue of their control over 
the four phases of work process (Druker and Macallan, 1995: 53, based on Chaillou, 
1977; see Chapter 2: 66-7; Chapter 4: Figure 4.8), the consultants were semi-dependent 
upon Japan Construction (indicated as hatched area in red on Figure 5.8). Japan 
Construction provided the link with the client and their requirements, and organised the 
construction works and building production, whilst the consultants exercised control over 
the concept and design processes. UK Services, too, were semi-dependent upon Japan 
Construction who provided the link with Services Design Ltd. Although UK Services 
were in charge of detail design, organisation of installation and production of services,
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they had no control over concept and outline design of services (indicated as hatched area 
in blue on Figure 5.8). Furthermore, by virtue of subletting the production, installation 
and commissioning of services, it may be fair to conclude that they were relatively 
dependent upon their subcontractors and operatives.
Figure 5.8: Dimensions of subcontracting relations in the Cultural Centre
Power disparity
To examine the existence of power in the relationships between the contracting parties, 
power disparity is established based on the definition of power as a field offeree between 
domination and resistance, or authority and illegitimate resistance (Pfeffer, 1981: 2-3; 
Clegg, 1989: 208; Fox, 1974: 98-9; Chapter 2: 16-17; Chapter 4: Table 4.3).
Japcol exercised power over Japan Construction by getting them to stand by their 
erroneous cost breakdown at the commencement of phase 1, which led to a protracted 
process of negotiations between the two parties for around a year, resulting in substantial
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time and cost overruns on this phase. Japan Construction consented because they 
depended on Japcol. On the one hand, they wanted to preserve their thirty plus years 
relationship with Japcol, and on the other, they hoped that the natural course of events 
would prove Japcol wrong and convince them of the need to increase the contract budget. 
Japan Construction, in turn, exercised power over UK Services by substantially reducing 
their tender price and lead in period through negotiations, appointing them on the basis of 
a letter of intent, and getting them to redesign the services layout. UK Services consented 
because they operated in a competitive market and required the contract as a means of 
increasing their turnover. Therefore power disparity characterised the relations between 
the contracting parties being investigated. However, the nature of power relations 
changed during the project life cycle.
In the relation between Japcol and Japan Construction, the former dominated, on the 
strength of their position as funders of the project as well as a long standing client of 
Japcol. Japan Construction attempted to resist this domination by reducing the overall 
size and lowering the specification of the project, and by negotiating over the financial 
implications of variations. Lowering the specification of the project entailed requiring 
Architect Co. to produce a cheaper alternative at every design stage. This requirement 
had two implications for Architect Co.. On the one hand, it doubled their information 
production work load, squeezed their design programme, and left them with brief lead in 
periods for the production of design details prior to trade contractors' commencement on 
site. On the other, it lowered the quality of the building that they wished to design. 
Therefore Architect Co. had an inherent tendency to resist Japan Construction's 
requirements by either arguing over the design changes they were required to undertake, 
or not producing them on time. Thus Japan Construction's resistance to Japcol's
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domination was hampered by their lack of discretion in the use of their knowledge. Based 
on Table 4.3 (Chapter 4), the nature of power relations between Japcol and Japan 
Construction was domination and resistance (Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 626; Fox, 1977; 
Friedman, 1977: Chapter 6), rather than authority and illegitimate resistance (Pfeffer, 
1981: 4-6; Mintzberg, 1991(b): 372 ).
In the relation between Japan Construction and UK Services, the former both dominated 
the latter, by virtue of the contractual terms they had imposed upon them, and depended 
on their knowledge and discretion in the use of that knowledge. UK Services' resistance 
to Japan Construction was lowered by their lack of control over services concept design, 
on the one hand, and Japan Construction's role in acting as the link between UK Services 
and Services Design Ltd, on the other. Based on Table 4.3 (Chapter 4), the nature of 
power relations between Japan Construction and UK Services was domination and 
resistance (Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 626; Fox, 1977; Friedman, 1977: Chapter 6), rather 
than authority and illegitimate resistance (Pfeffer, 1981: 4-6; Mintzberg, 1991(b): 372 ).
Power strategy
The examination of power strategies implemented by the parties is based upon the two 
definitions of conflict prevention, and defeat of conflict identified in Chapter 2 (pp. 18-19) 
and referred to in Chapter 4. The former strategy may involve responsible autonomy or 
direct control (Friedman, 1977: 6-7); the latter, comprises resistance through acquisition, 
development, and use of power (Pfeffer, 1981: 7).
Japcol appeared to have implemented both strategies of conflict prevention and defeat of 
conflict. By requiring Japan Construction to have their cost estimate checked by an
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external firm of cost consultants, Japcol used indirect control to limit Japan 
Construction's discretion over the contract budget. Once the cost of the works had been 
established in Japcol's favour, they granted Japan Construction discretion over the 
execution of the works. When Japan Construction informed Japcol of the error in the 
calculation of their cost breakdown, the latter resisted acknowledging the error and used 
their position power to assert their interest by stating that Japan Construction ought to 
honour their price in the 'Japanese tradition of doing business'. The time and cost overrun 
in phase 1 of the development provided Japan Construction with some bargaining power 
for negotiating a larger budget for phase 2.
In their relationship with UK Services, Japan Construction granted the latter discretion 
over their work whilst requiring them to have a drawing office on site and supervising 
their information production and installation through INME. UK Services used their 
power of discretion to act in their own interest when allocating resources to the project, 
when producing information, and when specifying materials and components.
The implications of the contracting parties' power strategies for the emergence, handling, 
and resolution of conflict are discussed in the next section. Having established power 
disparity in the parties' interorganisational relations and their strategies for its use, 
attention is now focused on examining whether trust featured in these relations and if so, 
in what form and to what extent.
Trust-based co-operation
To examine whether the contracting parties co-operated on the basis of trust as reliability, 
predictability or power-induced predictability, the nature of their co-operation is
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scrutinised on the basis of a few simple questions and the information provided in the 
Table 4.4 (see Chapter 4).
Co-operation ofjapcol and Japan Construction
Did Japcol rely on Japan Construction? JapcoFs indirect control mechanism over the 
estimation of Japan Construction's contract cost on phase 1, coupled with their refusal to 
modify the contract sum subsequent to the discovery of EQS Co.'s error, indicated 
Japcol's reluctance to take a calculated risk by relying on Japan Construction's claims. 
This was in spite of Japcol's expectation of their on-going relationship and repeated 
exchanges with Japan Construction. It was possibly a result of their inability to constantly 
monitor Japan Construction and consult with them face to face. Japcol's approval of a 
bigger budget at the commencement of phase 2 works indicated their willingness to rely 
on Japan Construction and accept a calculated risk after they had observed the evidence 
of poor performance on phase 1. Did Japan Construction rely on Japcol? They certainly 
took risks by undertaking the works on phase 1 within an unrealistic budget, by starting 
the works on phase 2 based on Japcol's verbal commitment to a larger budget, and by 
committing themselves to a fixed price for an unknown entity. These risks may have been 
based on Japan Construction's expectation of their on-going relationship with Japcol; they 
may, on the other hand, have been based on Japan Construction's fear of jeopardising 
their thirty year plus relationship with Japcol. In other words, they may have been based 
either on trust or on fear.
Did Japcol depend on Japan Construction's predictable behaviour? Japcol were aware of 
Japan Construction's capabilities and standards of performance based on their previous 
working experience with the latter. They reinforced this knowledge by the business
contract they entered into with Japan Construction, which in turn was supported by 
design warranties and a payment system based on achievement of milestones. They 
moreover put in place mechanisms for the flow of information and monitoring. Therefore 
Japcol appear to have depended on Japan Construction's predictable behaviour. Did 
Japan Construction depend on Japcol's predictable behaviour? To the extent that Japan 
Construction started the works on both phases at risk, they either depended on or hoped 
for Japcol's predictable behaviour of accepting a bigger financial commitment on phase 1, 
and honouring their verbal commitment on phase 2.
Did Japcol employ power-induced predictability? Japcol did not appear to have created 
impressions of a high discretion role for Japan Construction; the latter did have a high 
discretion role in their working relationship with Japcol. Japcol, did however, manipulate 
Japan Construction into co-operation on the basis of EQS Co.'s erroneous cost estimate 
on phase 1 but not on phase 2. Did Japan Construction capitulate? They did so on phase 1 
based on the hope that the poor performance of their specialist and trade contractors 
would convince Japcol of the inadequacy of the contract sum.
Co-operation of Japan Construction and UK Services
Did Japan Construction rely on UK Services? In so far that UK Services' tender price was 
not the cheapest, and their organisation of services installation on phase 1 was not 
satisfactory, Japan Construction took a relatively high risk in letting the services 
installation package on phase 2, to them. However, this risk was not based on the 
expectation of an on-going relationship or other conditions necessary for calculated trust. 
Japan Construction tried to control and limit this risk by putting INME in charge of 
supervising UK Services and by requiring the latter to produce their information on site.
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Therefore Japan Construction did not rely on UK Services entirely. Did UK Services rely 
on Japan Construction? UK Services were aware of the nature of the potential problems, 
based on their experience on phase 1. However, they needed the contract for reasons 
discussed in the previous section and they therefore decided to take a risk. This risk was 
not based on the expectation of an on-going relationship or other conditions necessary for 
calculated trust. It was based, rather, on commercial necessity.
Did Japan Construction depend on UK Services' predictable behaviour? Despite entering 
into an agreement with UK Services that was supported by collateral, design warranties 
and penalty clauses, Japan Construction monitored UK Services' work through INME to 
reduce the uncertainty and therefore the risk associated with it. Therefore Japan 
Construction did not appear to depend on UK Services' predictable behaviour partly 
because they lacked the specialist knowledge required to ensure UK Services' compliance 
with the contract, and partly because they were aware of UK Services' weaknesses. Did 
UK Services depend on Japan Construction's predictable behaviour? They entered into an 
onerous agreement with Japan Construction because they would not have been appointed 
otherwise. Therefore it is difficult to know whether they co-operated because they chose 
to or because they had to.
Did Japan Construction employ power-induced predictability? Japan Construction 
appointed UK Services to detail design and install the services on the basis of their 
reduced price that was achieved through negotiations. In practice, UK Services had to 
redesign the layout of the services before designing the installation. That is their roles and 
responsibilities were expanded within their fixed price contract giving rise to a higher 
discretion role than the one prescribed in the contract documents. Therefore it may be
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concluded that Japan Construction created the impression of a lower discretion role to 
manipulate UK Services into co-operation on a smaller budget. Did UK Services 
capitulate? UK Services capitulated by accepting their enlarged role without committing 
themselves to the larger resources that this demanded.
5.3.2 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
The operational framework, comprising the communication channels, information flow 
routes and decision-making processes, was set up by the Project Manager. It both 
influenced and was influenced by the organisational representatives' interpersonal 
relations and interactions. The complexity of the framework demanded speedy production 
of information by Architect Co. to ensure its timely dissemination to other design team 
members. This would enable the approval of information by the Design Co-ordinator and 
the Project Manager, and its progress to subsequent stages of information production and 
translation into construction, to be carried out in appropriate time. Architect Co.'s failure 
to meet the demand placed strains upon the relations between the architects responsible 
for information production and other design team members, and the former and the 
Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager. It moreover strained the relations between 
the Project Manager and UK Services' Project Engineer and the Site Manager and the 
Foremen of specialist and trade contractors. Consequently Services Design Ltd's Project 
Engineer gradually withdrew his co-operation and passed on the responsibility for design 
of services layout to UK Services' Project Engineer. The Project Manager's 
dissatisfaction with Architect Co.'s performance culminated in the exclusion of the latter 
from the project and the engagement of an architectural technician to produce the rest of 
the information required.
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This sub-section assesses the impact of the Project Manager and the Site Manager on the 
interpersonal relations at the services installation/construction interface within the 
operational framework. To do so, their respective leadership of the design team and the 
construction group, the way in which they motivated the design team members and the 
specialist and trade contractors, the extent to which the design team and the construction 
group participated in decision-making, and the success or otherwise of the formation of 
the design team and the construction group into teams are considered.
The leadership behaviours
Based on the contingency theory of leadership and its relationship to leadership behaviour 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3: 32-7), the Project Manager's leadership 
behaviour towards the design team members corresponded to the 'telling' category 
presented in Figure 4.9. That is, high level of directive and low level of relationship 
behaviour which is appropriate for low level of group/team maturity. By virtue of his 
responsibility and role, the Project Manager placed a high emphasis upon team members' 
tasks and expressed limited support and encouragement to them throughout the project. 
He therefore adopted a high task/low relationship leadership style. The unwillingness of 
Architect Co.'s Project Architect, and the increasing reluctance of Services Design Ltd's 
Project Engineer to follow the Project Manager's guidance and instructions were 
decidedly manifest during the design development and early construction stages. These 
behaviours may be ascribed partly to the divergent objectives of the representatives' 
respective organisations, partly to absence of an established working relationship between 
these organisations, and partly to the clash of representatives' personalities. Consequently, 
despite the prescribed structure of their tasks and the authority of the Project Manager to 
influence their selection on future projects, the above design team members could not be
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motivated to co-operate. Their lack of co-operation had a demotivating effect upon the 
other team members and delayed the production of information by the latter. Therefore 
the Project Manager's leadership behaviour, though theoretically appropriate to the 
situation, failed to positively influence the inputs of the design team members.
The Site Manager's leadership behaviour towards the specialist and trade contractors 
corresponded to the 'telling' and the 'delegating' categories in Figure 4.9. When the 
trades required high levels of direction necessitated either by the project complexities or 
by their failure to meet the Health and Safety regulations, the Site Manager provided them 
with prescriptive guidance or instructions (see Co-ordination and control of production 
inputs, above). When the trades were willing and capable of carrying out their tasks with 
low levels of direction and support, the Site Manager provided limited guidance and let 
them get on with their work. One of the problems associated with telling behaviour 
related to the unwillingness of trade contractors' foremen to follow the Site Manager's 
lead or suggestions owing to the low level of authority they ascribed to him. Thus the Site 
Manager had problems with influencing the trade contractors' inputs.
Motivation of project participants
The Project Manager's success or otherwise to motivate the design team members is 
examined in relation to the effectiveness of the motivational strategies implemented. The 
latter include control mechanisms corresponding to the motivator's sources of power, and 
manifested as reward and punishment; and fulfilment of individual values relating to 
motivatee's attitudes to work and demonstrated as job satisfaction (see Section 2.3: 32-7; 
Table 4.5).
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The Project Manager did not appear capable of motivating Architect Co. to produce 
information more quickly than they did because the latter did not want to produce cheaper 
alternative designs. They wanted to design an award winning building of high aesthetic 
quality in keeping with their organisation's award winning track record. Their designs 
constantly evolved because they were striving for perfection. In this strive they were 
uncompromising and unaccommodating because it would lead them to rewards that far 
exceeded the fees they were to receive for their services. Consequently they alienated 
others, particularly Services Design Ltd's Project Engineer, who could not or were not 
prepared to keep in pace with the design changes and who felt their needs were being 
ignored. That is why the Project Manager could not motivate Services Design Ltd's 
Project Engineer to co-operate. The latter probably felt that the rewards his company 
received did not justify the level of effort they were required to put in and that, in relation 
to Architect Co., they were being unfairly treated.
Lack of co-operation on the part of Services Design Ltd's Project Engineer had 
repercussions for the motivation of UK Services' Project Engineer and their site staff. 
Observations indicated that the high level of difficulty of UK Services' task coupled with 
limited support offered by Services Design Ltd's Project Engineer lowered UK Services' 
level of performance. This was probably attributed to the level of required effort for the 
task far exceeding that which UK Services were prepared to dedicate to the job, and to 
their perception of being unfairly treated. The financial incentives and penalties did not 
appear to have been adequate motivators for some of the other specialist and trade 
contractors either (see Co-ordination and control of production inputs, above).
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Participation in decision-making
To assess the level of participation of design team and construction group members in 
decision-making, the extent of their involvement in decision-making and control processes 
through collective problem-solving is examined (see Chapter 2: 36). As is the 
consequences of this involvement for their interpersonal relations.
The design co-ordination meetings, where collective problem-solving could potentially 
have taken place, were dominated by disagreements, arguments and apportionment of 
blame amongst the design team members and between them and the Design Co-ordinator 
or the Project Manager. The divergent objectives of the organisations involved coupled 
with discrepancies amongst the information produced often constituted the causes of the 
problems. In this climate the guidance, directions and at times instructions of the Design 
Co-ordinator and the Project Manager, although superficially agreed to, went unheeded. 
Therefore the Project Manager's ultimate authority in decision-making could not address 
the team members' lack of commitment to project objectives and secure their 
collaboration (see Decision-making processes and Design co-ordination and control under 
Managing project design, above).
The construction related decision-making was largely delegated to the Site Manager 
although the latter consulted with the Project Manager in relation to major decisions. The 
devolvement of decision-making further down the management team hierarchy was 
abandoned shortly after its introduction because of control problems (see Decision- 
making processes under Managing project construction, above). The decision-making 
related to services installation and co-ordination with the construction works was 
delegated to UK Services. In the light of the services design problems discussed
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previously, this responsibility proved to be onerous. Therefore UK Services' involvement 
in problem-solving was reluctant and, to a degree, constituted enforced co-operation.
Team building
To assess the effectiveness of the design team, their team building criteria in terms of the 
team characteristics, nature of the task, the environment in which the team functioned, 
and the conditions on which their effectiveness depended are examined (see Section 2.3: 
37-8; Chapter 4: Table 4.6). The size of the team, whilst allowing for the required 
diversity of skills and knowledge, was too big to facilitate the participation of individuals 
in problem-solving and decision taking. The incompatibility of members' characteristics 
and their unwillingness to follow the Project Manager's lead gave rise to a heterogeneous 
team which was dominated by overt conflict. The individuals' diverse objectives were 
manifest in their unco-operative approach to problem-solving, and in the absence of 
reconciliation, gave rise to in fighting amongst the team members. The forming phase had 
taken place prior to the commencement of the investigation. It seemed that the members 
did not move far beyond the storming phase throughout the design development stage. 
Therefore the norming and performing phases did not follow on smoothly and did not 
result in an effective collaborative team. The nature of the task, in terms of the allocation 
of task associated roles to members, was ambiguous; the significance of the task, in terms 
of rewards for the level of effort required, was greater for some, like Architect Co., than 
others. The Project Manager's position power had little influence upon the team 
members. The dispersed physical locations of the team members' organisations had a 
negative impact upon their communication and interaction; this was reflected in their 
reluctance to attend design co-ordination meetings on site.
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The construction group did not appear to act as a team and were not encouraged to do so 
by any efforts on the part of Japan Construction's management team to forge them into a 
team.
5.4 CONFLICT
The previous section established the existence of power disparity in the interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties and identified the power strategies implemented by 
each party in order to achieve their aims. It moreover demonstrated the uncollaborative 
nature of the design team members' interpersonal relations and discussed the reasons for 
design team members' failure to deliver their inputs on time. This section examines the 
implications of power disparity and power strategies for the emergence of both overt and 
covert conflict in the participants' interorganisational and interpersonal relations. It then 
goes on to examine the emergence of conflict in the building production process and the 
way it was handled and/or resolved.
5.4.1 CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT
The occurrence of conflict in the interorganisational relations of the contracting parties is 
investigated based on the definition and forms of conflict, discussed in Chapter 2 and 
referred to in Chapter 4. Thus conflict is considered as any divergence of interests, 
objectives, or priorities between individuals, groups, or organisations; or non- 
conformance to requirements of a task, activity, or process (Gardiner and Simmons,
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1992: 111). Manifestations of conflict are regarded as functional or creative; and 
dysfunctional or destructive (Smith, 1992: 29, 30; Stephenson, 1996: 27). According to 
these definitions, both forms of conflict were observed in the interorganisational relations 
of Japcol and Japan Construction, the design team members, and Japan Construction and 
UK Services. They may be attributed to the contractual framework, the building project 
environment, the project coalition structure, culture and technology, and low levels of 
trust in the parties exchange relations.
Conflict attributed to contractual framework
The integrated form of D&B implemented by Japan Construction gave rise to poor 
teamwork arising from poor communication amongst design team members, design 
uncertainty attributed to design changes, and disagreements amongst design team 
members and between them and the Design Co-ordinator and the Project Manager. There 
was ineffective co-ordination of design inputs too despite the presence of the Design Co- 
ordinator. Therefore the integrated D&B procurement method resulted in dysfunctional 
conflicts of interest within the design team organisation (see Chapter 2: 61-4). Japcol 
wished to have their four storey building condensed into a three storey space. Japan 
Construction wished to simplify the construction to save costs and improve their profit 
margins. Architect Co. wished to design an award winning scheme of high aesthetic 
quality, oblivious of cost and sacrificing functional requirements for dictates of form. The 
other design team members wished to accommodate their requirements in a practical and 
convenient way. Conflict was manifest as unco-operative behaviour discussed in the 
previous section.
232
The divisions between the services design and installation processes gave rise to poor 
communication between Services Design Ltd and UK Services. The discrepancy between 
spatial dimensions contained in the design information and those measured by UK 
Services within the constructed spaces created data conflicts the resolution of which was 
left to the discretion of UK Services. The execution of this task, which fell outside the 
scope of UK Services' responsibilities, created relationship conflicts between Services 
Design Ltd and UK Services and between the latter and Japan Construction. This conflict 
was manifested as delays in the production of services design drawings to programme, by 
UK Services, which was contrary to project requirements.
Conflict attributed to building project environment
The negotiations between Japcol and Japan Construction over the contract cost during 
phase 1, coupled with planning restrictions on the height of the building contained in 
phase 2, gave Japan Construction the impetus to engage in a cost cutting exercise 
involving the reduction of the overall size and lowering the specification of the project. 
This amounted to creative conflict between the parties which may have benefited both 
Japcol and Japan Construction, by providing the former with a four storey building as per 
the original brief, and saved on construction costs for the latter.
The cost cutting exercise, which needed to be led by the Project Manager and 
implemented by Architect Co. in conjunction with the other design team members, failed 
to succeed mainly due to conflictual behaviours of Architect Co. and Services Design Ltd 
discussed in the previous sections. These conflictual behaviours led to problems 
concerning the co-ordination of construction with the services, thus causing dysfunctional 
conflict between Japan Construction and UK Services.
It is doubtful as to whether the negotiations between Japan Construction and UK Services 
gave rise to creative conflict. The negotiations went on for weeks and resulted in a 
considerable reduction in UK Services' tender price, which led to under-resourcing of the 
installation process. This in turn slowed down the information production and had a 
knock on effect on both the installation of services and the main construction programme, 
thus contradicting the requirements of the project. Therefore the reductions in UK 
Services' tender price led to conflictual behaviour on the part of UK Services.
Conflict attributed to project coalition structure
The Cultural Centre project coalition had a hierarchical structure of subcontracting 
relations, discussed in the previous section. Within this hierarchy, the design team did not 
function smoothly and creatively. This was attributed to low levels of mutual adjustment 
amongst the team members - particularly Architect Co. and Services Design Ltd, caused 
in part by the ineffectiveness of the Design Co-ordinator's and the Project Manager's 
liaison functions. The lack of subsequent co-operation within the design team denied the 
Project Manager the power to make design decisions according to need and prevented the 
consultants making decisions based on their expertise. This created discord between Japan 
Construction and Architect Co. and the former and Services Design Ltd. The discord 
manifested itself in Japan Construction engaging Architectural Technician 3, half way 
through the contract, to produce the construction information, and delaying the payment 
of Services Design Ltd's invoice for fees.
The subcontracting relation of UK Services to Japan Construction did not necessarily 
empower the Project Manager to make services related decisions according to need, 
either. Although UK Services were coerced into broadening the range of their
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responsibilities, they could not keep their information production and installation within 
programme and the Project Manager could not do much about it. INME's efforts in 
structuring and itemising the types of drawings UK Services needed to produce to 
facilitate the installation went unheeded. The Project Manager raised the issue of delays at 
every site meeting, queried the reasons for the delays, and praised the progress that was 
made. Thus conflict between him and UK Services' Project Engineer tended to be covert 
rather than overt. Japan Construction were dependent on UK Services not only for the 
services installation, but also for timely completion of the works. The Project Manager 
was aware of UK Services' resource problems and suspected that financial threats would 
not achieve the desired outcome.
The hierarchical structure in conjunction with the design team's collaboration problems 
created communication difficulties between the design team and the construction group. 
These difficulties, coupled with the slow rate of information production, gave rise to 
conflict between the Site Manager and the trade contractors' foremen. At times, conflict 
was creative and led to joint problem-solving, at other times, it was dysfunctional and led 
to delays discussed in relation to UK Services' installation in the previous section.
Conflict attributed to project coalition culture
The culture of the design team organisation was conflictual because the design team 
members were not appointed at the same time at the beginning of the design process. 
Therefore they did not have the opportunity of contributing to the design, based on their 
expertise and requirements. Architect Co., as the first design team member, pursued their 
goals and interests independently and irrespective of those of others. The Project 
Manager's inability to convince Architect Co. to compromise is conveyed in his remark:
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'... it was easier to explain the problems caused by inadequate space to Japcol at the 
construction stage than to demand extra space from Architect Co. at the design stage!!' 
(see Design development, above). That is why a collaborative team effort never got 
established. Instead, apportionment of blame is what characterised the design co- 
ordination meetings.
The culture of the services installation organisation was conflictual too, based on the 
observations and the Project Manager's comments. Failure of UK Services to undertake 
minuted actions and to produce information assigned to them within the time allocated 
was a common occurrence. As were their problems with deliveries and operatives. UK 
Services were obviously not satisfied with their engagement criteria and felt coerced into 
accepting them owing to the competitive pressures of the industry that have already been 
discussed.
Production quality and site safety were the only areas where the Project Manager, with 
the aid of Japan Construction's management team, decidedly directed the concerted 
efforts of the construction group. Production quality was incorporated in Japan 
Construction's philosophy of demanding 100 percent, in terms of materials, finishes and 
workmanship, from their specialist and trade contractors, and formed an important criteria 
in the selection of the latter (see Selection and appointment of construction group). Site 
safety was reflected in the creation, maintenance and enforcement of the site specific 
safety plan (see Co-ordination and control of production inputs).
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Conflict attributed to project coalition technology
The design team members produced their information electronically and transferred it 
largely in hard copy format by mail or courier and occasionally, to speed up the process, 
on floppy discs. Therefore readily accessible computerised information of one team 
member, was not generally available to the other for co-ordination purposes. That is why 
the Design co-ordinator could not carry out his task of design co-ordination effectively. 
Thus data conflicts occurred. The site conditions often necessitated deviations from the 
design information. These deviations were communicated to the design team members 
and had to be approved by them, via the formal communication structure. If approval 
took long, or if deviations from the design required urgent action, they were carried out 
prior to being incorporated in the information production systems, creating conflicts 
between the design information and the constructed form. This, in turn, caused conflicts 
of relationship between the trades' foremen and the Site Manager - who was seen as the 
link between the site and the design team, and between the construction group and the 
design team.
Low trust in project participants' exchange relations
Examination of the contracting parties' seemingly trust based co-operation, presented in 
the previous section, indicates that the parties' exchange relations may have incorporated 
trust as reliability or calculated risk to a degree. Japcol implemented a cost control 
mechanism over Japan Construction's proposed activities prior to commencement of 
phase 1 because the risk of building in the UK construction market was unknown to them. 
Their inability to consult with and monitor Japan Construction regularly made their thirty 
years plus relationship with the latter inadequate collateral for relying on the latter's cost 
breakdown unquestioningly. However, once they had acquired some experience of
construction during phase 1, Japcol were more prepared to take heed of Japan 
Construction's claims. Japan Construction's selection of UK Services on phase 2, on the 
other hand, was based on their knowledge of UK Services' strengths and weaknesses. 
The quality of UK Services' installation, which constituted their strength, outweighed 
their weaknesses discussed in the previous section. However, it did not provide Japan 
Construction with the grounds for trusting or relying on UK Services, as the presence of 
INME and UK Services site drawing office testify.
Japan Construction's onerous payment system was used to ensure their conformance to 
the contract documents. Thus Japcol depended on Japan Construction's predictable 
behaviour. Japan Construction, on the other hand, could only hope for Japcol's 
predictable behaviour in the absence of a written agreement to their financial commitment 
at the start of phase 2. Japan Construction imposed punitive legal sanctions on UK 
Services to ensure their conformance to the contract documents. These punitive measures 
were supported by direct supervision indicating Japan Construction's lack of dependence 
on UK Services' predictable behaviour. Therefore the onerous payment systems and legal 
sanctions were used to reduce risk by passing it on to the subordinate party in the 
relationship. They did not prevent opportunistic behaviour by Japan Construction and UK 
Services; did not eliminate Japan Construction's fear of unpredictable behaviour by FinOp 
Ltd; and disguised UK Services' lack of choice with the appearance of decided choice.
Although Japcol manipulated Japan Construction into co-operation only on phase 1, the 
repercussions of this manipulation reverberated throughout phase 2. One example is 
provided by Japan Construction's manipulation of UK Services into accepting a higher 
discretion role than the one they had tendered and were appointed for. Therefore Japan
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Construction's capitulation to Japcol resulted in their manipulation of their specialist and 
trade contractors including UK Services. UK Services capitulated to Japan Construction 
by accepting the roles but they did not resource their installation adequately.
5.4.2 OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
Creative and dysfunctional conflict characterised the operations of the project, the 
interpersonal relations of Japan Construction and the design team members, and those of 
the former and UK Services. Manifestations of conflict may be attributed to latent conflict 
at the brief preparation, design and construction stages, and the project management and 
control systems implemented.
Latent conflict at brief preparation stage
Although the brief preparation stage was not included in the investigation, the inductive 
use of the evidence collected during the later stages pointed to the emergence of latent 
conflict amongst the four elements of physical form of the facility, its function, 
construction cost, and construction period. The physical form of the facility incorporated 
a four storey rotunda, which the planners required to be reduced to a three storey building 
and Japcol required to be maintained as a four storey building. The multi-functional nature 
of the rotunda required substantial suspended ceiling space for the accommodation of 
services, which the height reduction would take away. Japan Construction's target cost 
necessitated a reduction in the overall size of the building which contradicted Japcol's 
wishes and the services' spatial requirements. Their target programme required smooth 
operations unhindered by surprises or delays, which the achievement of the target cost 
was not likely to facilitate.
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Latent conflict at design stage
The contradictions amongst the physical form of the facility, its function, construction 
cost, and construction period, were handled in the following way. The Project Manager 
required Architect Co.'s Project Architect to squeeze the four storey rotunda into a three 
storey high building by reducing the floor to ceiling height of each level. This reduced the 
available space for the accommodation of services demanded by the multi-functional 
nature of the building and gave rise to the redesign of services layout by Services Design 
Ltd. The redesign of services layout created overlaps in Services Design Ltd's and 
Architect Co.'s technical and spatial requirements, respectively, that were never resolved 
as part of the design process (Baden Hellard, 1992: 38; 47), thus giving rise to 
relationship conflicts between the organisations' representatives.
Latent conflict at construction stage
The problems associated with constructability of design details constituted one of the 
sources of conflict between the Project Manager and Architect Co.'s Project Architect. 
The discrepancies between the design information and the built form gave rise to further 
redesigns of services layout, the responsibility for which was assigned to UK Services, 
and comprised a source of conflict between UK Services' Project Engineer and the 
Project Manager. The complications associated with the redesigns were increased by 
conflictual changes in Japcol's services requirements and contributed to the slow 
production of services installation information. Delays in the production of installation 
information had a knock on effect on the main construction programme, on the one hand, 
and resulted in reworks, on the other. They constituted the source of conflict between the 
services installation and building construction, which according to the Site Manager 
should have formed the basis for the construction programme.
Conflict arising from project management and control systems
The Project Manager did not succeed in creating a cohesive design team that collaborated 
through joint problem solving. However, as far as could be gathered during the 
investigation, he succeeded in leading a united site management team even if he did 
abandon the Senior Project Manager's initiative regarding devolved decision-making to 
lower ranks of the team.
The control of design inputs was ineffective as far as the production of timely, accurate 
and co-ordinated design information was concerned. The information flow and monitoring 
mechanisms proved inefficient in reducing uncertainty throughout the project partly 
because of the physical separation of Japcol and Japan Construction, and partly because 
of the changes in JapcoFs requirements. The control of construction inputs, in the guise of 
the Site Manager and the Foreman, was effective as far as the achievement of quality and 
site safety objectives were concerned. It was ineffective, however, in terms of achieving 
the cost and time targets set by Japan Construction. The contract sum increased by 45% - 
even if most of this increase was due to changes in Japcol's requirements and subsequent 
variations, and the construction works were completed four months later than scheduled.
5.4.3 MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
To assess Japan Construction's conflict management, their project planning in terms of 
risk management through the three phases of identification, analysis and response to risk 
is examined (Lewis, Cheetham and Carter, 1992: 80-1; see Chapter 2: 74-5; Chapter 4: 
Table 4.7). To assess the impact of Japan Construction's conflict management on the 
performance of project participants, the former's response to conflict, whether passive or 
active, and the type of behaviour this engendered in the participants is examined (Ibid.).
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Japan Construction's risk management proved to have been inadequate. They did not 
foresee the nature and extent of risk posed by the services installation. Although they 
identified contingencies and allocated sums of money to them, changes in the scope of 
works, complexities of the construction process, and delays by trade contractors eroded 
the contingencies and led to target cost and programme being exceeded. Japan 
Construction's response to risk was to either retain it, as in the case of the risk contained 
in Japcol's design changes; or to transfer it, as in the case of the risk contained in the 
services installation design, and reduction of the trade contractors' prices through 
negotiations. The Project Manager's response to conflict between Japan Construction and 
Architect Co. and between the former and Services Design Ltd was to compromise at the 
start of the bargaining process. However, as Architect Co. and Services Design Ltd failed 
to deliver their part of the bargain, Japan Construction withdrew co-operation. Architect 
Co.'s and Services Design Ltd's response to conflict between them and Japan 
Construction was shallow commitment to project goals. The Project Manager's response 
to conflict between Japan Construction and UK Services arising from the enlargement of 
UK Services' responsibilities, tended to be dominating at the start of the installation. 
However, as the oscillation of Japcol's requirements began, the Project Manager's 
response to conflict became more creative and oriented towards co-operative and joint 
problem solving.
UK Services' risk management had inadequacies too. They did not identify the extent of 
the risks well enough. Their contingencies were seriously reduced during the bargaining 
process at tender stage. They failed to reduce their design risk by producing the required 
design information. They either retained the risk or transferred it to their subcontractors. 
The response of UK Services' Project Engineer to conflict between UK Services and
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operative, or passive and capitulative.
5.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the Cultural Centre project scenario to facilitate the 
interpretation of the project participants' interorganisational and interpersonal relations, to 
link them to the occurrence of conflict, and to interpret the impact of conflict handling 
and resolution methods on the performance of project participants. Section 5.2, presented 
a descriptive account of the organisations participating in the project, the engagement 
criteria of the design team members, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor, and 
the conception, history, design and construction of the facility. Section 5.3, interpreted 
the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria for the parties' relations, in 
terms of establishing power disparity and giving rise to various forms of power strategies, 
rather than trust, in their interorganisational relations. The existence of trust as 
predictability was acknowledged on the part of the client in their relation with the main 
contractor, although the reciprocity of predictability on the part of the main contractor 
remained questionable. Section 5.3 moreover interpreted the Project Manager's and the 
Site Manager's leadership, motivation, participation, and team building strategies as 
theoretically appropriate to the project situation. However, it recognised the 
ineffectiveness of these strategies in achieving collaboration and co-operation within the 
design team, or in enforcing or enhancing the participants' performance.
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Section 5.4, traced the occurrence of conflict in contractual and interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties, and in operational and interpersonal relations of the 
project participants. Conflict was attributed to the contractual framework, the building 
project environment, the project coalition structure, culture and technology, in the former 
relations. It was related to latent conflict at the brief preparation, design and construction 
stages, and to project management and control systems, in the latter relations. This 
section further interpreted the way conflict was managed and the impact this made on the 
performance of the main and the M&E contractors.
244
CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY 3 - THE POLICE STATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the third and final example of the construction project coalitions 
selected for in depth, longitudinal study of the main and mechanical and electrical (M&E) 
contractors' behaviour, building production management processes, and interpersonal 
relations and interactions of the contracting organisations' representatives. The traditional 
method of procurement implemented to realise this project, the large proportion of 
refurbishment works it entails, and the public sector status of the client constitute the 
contrasting characteristics of this case with the previous two. The separation of design 
and construction processes and the consequent separation of the design team from the 
main contracting organisation meant that only limited insight into the design process and 
associated problems was possible. This limitation arose from the focus of research being 
directed at the interface between the main and the M&E contractor.
Similar to the previous cases, a descriptive account of the main participants' 
characteristics, their engagement procedures, and the properties of the project is provided 
as the context for events, processes and interactions being investigated. The contractual 
and operational frameworks, which govern the main and M&E contractors' 
interorganisational and interpersonal relations, respectively, are then considered. This is
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followed by identification of the salient features of these relations and of the building 
production management processes. Subsequently the impact of the main contractor's 
management processes on the performance of the M&E contractor is examined. The 
chapter comprises four sections:
Section 6.2, provides outline profiles of the main participants; sets out the pre-contract 
processes establishing the roles and responsibilities of the design team, the main and the 
M&E contractors; and describes the conception, history, design and construction of the 
project.
Section 6.3, examines the nature of the project participants' interorganisational relations 
arising from the contractual framework; and assesses the nature of their representatives' 
interpersonal relations vis-a-vis the operational framework.
Section 6.4, identifies conflict as a dominant feature of the relations discussed in the 
previous section. It establishes the types and manifestations of conflict and considers the 
management processes implemented to handle or resolve conflict and their impact upon 
the behaviour and performance of the main and the M&E contractors.
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6.2 CONTEXT
This section provides a brief description of organisational characteristics of the client, the 
design team, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor. It defines the selection 
processes, the appointment criteria, and the roles and responsibilities of the design team 
members, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor. It then recounts a precis of the 
project's conception, history, design development and construction process.
6.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS 
Client organisation
The client organisation (City Police), who was the operator and end-user of the project, 
was the civil law and order enforcing body of a metropolitan city. It comprised 190 police 
stations employing over 27,000 police officers, and 17,000 civilian staff. However, the 
project was financed by the Home Office.
The design team
The design team comprised a building design and project management firm (Surveyor 
Co.), a structural consulting firm (Structures), and a services consulting firm (Services 
Associates). The team was led by the Project Administrator who represented Surveyor 
Co. organisation. The latter consulted with three external consulting firms, namely, a 
party wall specialist (PW Co.), a quantity surveyor (QS Ltd), and a claims specialist 
(Claims Co.). He moreover consulted with four City Police in-house consultants, namely, 
the public health engineer (PHE), the Information Technology group (IT Group), the 
security consultant (Security), and the estates branch of City Police (Estates). The design
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team was organised as shown in Figure 6.1. The solid links represent the lines of influence 
arising from the team members' position and role within the organisation.
Figure 6.1: Organisation of design team
Main contracting organisation
The main contracting organisation (Construction Pic) is the UK subsidiary of a large 
international parent company. It is a national contractor and operates through a network 
of eight regional establishments. Construction Pic was established in 1996 as a result of 
the acquisition, by their parent company, of a long-established UK construction group. 
The latter was established in 1810, and the parent company, in 1844. Construction Pic 
operates in a wide spectrum of sectors spanning commercial, government and civic, 
through refurbishment and residential to industrial and civil engineering. They have 
experience in a number of procurement methods including traditional, design and build, 
construction management and private finance initiative. They also form strategic alliances 
with individual clients.
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M&E CONTRACTING ORGANISATION
The M&E contracting organisation (M&E Co.) is a member of one of Europe's largest 
construction groups. It is a national mechanical and electrical engineering contractor and 
operates through a network of 16 regional offices. They operate in the commercial, 
industrial, health and public sectors and offer a range of services from mechanical and 
electrical installations in buildings, through process engineering and energy and 
maintenance technology, to voice, data and video communications. The organisation was 
restructured in January 1997. The resulting management change had repercussions for the 
management of services installation which is discussed below.
Construction group
The construction group comprised Construction Pic's management team and the specialist 
and trade contractors. Construction Pic's management team consisted of the Project 
Manager, the Project Planner, the M&E Co-ordinator, the Works Planner, the quantity 
surveyor (QuanSurv), and the Site Agent. The specialist and trade contractors were 
largely selected through tender processes. The organisation of the construction group is 
presented in Figure 6.2. The solid links represent the lines of influence arising from the 
group members' position and role within the organisation.
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Figure 6.2: Organisation of construction group
6.2.2 ENGAGEMENT OF MAIN PARTICIPANTS
To establish the nature of the relationship between Construction Pic and M&E Co., their 
respective selection processes, appointment criteria and roles and responsibilities were 
investigated and are described in some detail in this sub-section. Observations indicated 
that the parties' relationship was significantly influenced by the procurement method and 
by Construction Pic's relations with City Police and their design team. Therefore outlines 
of the procurement method and the engagement criteria of the design team members are 
also provided here.
Procurement method
City Police adopted the traditional method of procurement as a matter of course. The 
Project Administrator doubted the appropriateness of this choice on the grounds that it
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did not place the onus of services design on M&E Co.. He was of the opinion that a Local 
Authority form of contract would have been a more effective way of administering this 
project. In view of the high proportion of refurbishment work and associated uncertainties 
involved in the project, together with the absence of accurate survey information, the 
traditional procurement method was indeed inappropriate in terms of providing 
inadequate flexibility to negotiate the variations which inevitably arose during the course 
of the project.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of design team members
City Police had varying relationships with their design team members. They selected 
Surveyor Co. principally on the basis of the latter's competitive fees, as well as their past 
experience and eight years plus working relationship with City Police. Surveyor Co.'s 
responsibilities included designing the spatial configurations, producing the construction 
information, managing the project at construction stage, making recommendations for the 
approval of extensions of time and claims to the Home Office and administering the 
contract. They were moreover responsible for allocating the team members' design tasks, 
through the production of a schedule of information indicating interaction on various 
tasks by each member, and co-ordinating the consultants' inputs at design stage. Surveyor 
Co. had no input into either recommending or selecting any of the other design team 
members.
Services Associates had carried out commissions for City Police on four previous 
occasions. They were therefore known to the latter and were considered to have sufficient 
resources and expertise to carry out the commission on this project. They were one of 
three firms invited to tender for the outline design of services and were selected on the
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basis of their competitive fee. Services Associates' responsibilities included outline design 
and specification of the mechanical and electrical services - excluding the 
telecommunications and security systems which were designed by City Police themselves - 
and supervision of the services installation.
According to the Project Administrator, because City Police were a public body and 
accountable for their expenditure, their decision regarding the selection of the design team 
members was carefully considered prior to the members' appointment and no negotiations 
followed their selection. City Police appointed the design team members on the basis of 
their own 'Consultant Briefing Document and Conditions of Appointment'. These 
conditions, according to the Project Administrator's claims, were more elaborate and 
more onerous than the standard Conditions of Appointment published by professional 
bodies. For example, Services Associates had to provide a Warranty which guaranteed 
that the services installation was carried out in accordance with City Police's 
requirements.
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of Construction Pic 
Construction Pic's selection
Construction Pic's selection involved two stages of prequalification and tender. During 
the first stage, Surveyor Co., City Police and QS Ltd interviewed six main contractors 
chosen on the basis of their previous experience, and selected four to submit tenders. The 
main contractors were given approximately ten weeks to prepare a tender price based on 
the tender documents containing drawings, specifications, bill of quantities, performance 
specification, services requirements and the form of contract to be entered into with City 
Police.
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Construction Pic's tender submission comprised a priced bill of quantities, a programme 
of works, Method Statements for carrying out the construction works, Health and Safety 
provisions, and their Quality Assurance (QA) system. They prepared their programme of 
works on the basis of the bill of quantities. The latter provided bulk figures for the amount 
of work contained in every stage of the works. These figures, together with Construction 
Pic's production rates for various elements of the works as well as their experience, 
determined the duration of work phases.
To arrive at the tender price, the cost of carrying out each element of the bill of quantities 
was either based on the trade contractors' quotes, or estimated on the basis of the human 
hours involved - as determined for the programme - and Construction Pic's hourly rates. 
The overhead, the profit and the contingency sum were then added to the total of these 
costs.
Construction Pic's conditions of appointment, roles and responsibilities
Four to six weeks after their tender submission, Construction Pic were selected on the 
basis of their low price. No negotiations took place with City Police beyond this point. 
The latter engaged Construction Pic on the basis of a letter of intent. Nine months after 
their appointment, Construction Pic entered into the JCT Standard Form of Building 
Contract with Design Supplement and Amendments, 1980 with City Police.
Construction Pic's conditions of appointment, set out in their letter of intent, constituted 
their roles and responsibilities and stipulated their system of payment. According to these 
conditions, Construction Pic were responsible for the refurbishment and construction of 
the new works described in the contract documents within a fixed lump-sum price and a
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76 weeks period. They were to provide a Performance Bond to City Police. They were 
moreover to require the provision of direct Design Warranties to City Police by their 
trade contractors responsible for design, as part of the latter's conditions of appointment. 
The Works Planner considered the design aspects of the contract onerous.
Construction Pic's payment system was based upon monthly valuations carried out by QS 
Ltd. Variations or savings were added to or subtracted from the following valuation. The 
onerous nature of these conditions was partly attributed to Construction Pic's 
responsibility for construction of the works within a fixed lump-sum price; and partly 
attributed to the payment system. The works described in the contract documents 
contained high levels of uncertainty associated with the unknown conditions of the 
existing building, the true extent of which was only revealed during construction. 
Therefore commitment to a fixed price for an unknown entity placed Construction Pic at 
considerable financial risk. The nature of the payment system added further financial 
burdens because delays by trade contractors, or for reasons beyond Construction Pic's 
control, still resulted in non payment. Construction Pic passed on the payment system to 
M&E Co. and other trade contractors.
Selection and appointment of construction group
The specialist and trade contractors were largely selected through tender processes and 
based on their prices. One example of trade contractor selection is provided with regard 
to M&E Co..
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Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of M&E Co. 
M&E Co. 's selection
Services Associates named a selected panel of M&E contractors from which Construction 
Pic invited six organisations to a pre-tender interview. Two M&E contractors were then 
selected to tender for the services installation on this project, one of which was M&E Co.. 
The M&E contractors were given six weeks to tender. Their tender documents contained 
services drawings, specifications, bill of quantities for public health services but not the 
mechanical and electrical services, the contract programme, performance specification, 
Liquidated and Ascertained damages recoverable in case of delay and the form of contract 
to be entered into with Construction Pic. QuanSurv controlled and conducted the tender 
process.
M&E Co.'s tender submission comprised price breakdowns for the mechanical and 
electrical services and the priced bill of quantities for the public health services, their 
programme of works, labour histograms, and materials and equipment procurement 
schedule. Their tender price was based on measurements taken off the drawings and the 
specification document. Following M&E Co.'s tender submission, Construction Pic 
negotiated a lower price with them prior to their selection. Two weeks after the 
submission of their tender, M&E Co. were selected. M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer 
attributed their selection to a combination of their low tender price and their capability.
M&E Co. 's conditions of appointment, roles and responsibilities
Construction Pic appointed M&E Co. on the basis of a letter of intent which specified 
M&E Co.'s roles and responsibilities and established their system of payment. According 
to the conditions contained in the letter, M&E Co. were to enter into a JCT Standard
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Form of Building Contract with Amendments, 1980: Dom/2 with Construction Pic. They 
were to design certain aspects of the services, such as the fire alarms and the generator. 
They were to provide, install and commission the mechanical, electrical and public health 
services in accordance with the contract documents, for the lump-sum fixed price agreed 
within a 49 weeks period. They were to be responsible for co-ordinating these services 
with one another and with the building, and for conforming to instructions issued by 
Construction Pic. Finally, they were to provide a direct Warranty to City Police. M&E 
Co. entered into a contract with Construction Pic six months after their appointment.
According to M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer, the specification document was onerous. 
It comprised clauses extracted from the National Engineering Specification that were put 
together poorly, and constituted vague and contradictory descriptions of procedures and 
performance criteria. The vagueness of the document implied that the clauses were open 
to interpretation, which meant that 'City Police won every time they demanded 
conformance' (M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer).
6.2.3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Project conception and history
The project was instigated by City Police's need for a new police station around 5 or 6 
years ago. They originally intended to demolish the existing premises, to sell the site and 
to relocate. However, alternative location could not be found. Moreover, the cost of re- 
development proved far in excess of the available funds. Therefore City Police decided to 
part-refurbish and part-extend their existing premises. During the gestation period of the 
project, City Police's requirements were established fairly comprehensively. The 
corporate nature of City Police and the standardisation of the criteria on which their
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requirements were based, aided the brief preparation process. However, the funding 
limitations imposed restrictions on the realisation of their requirements. The Home Office 
grants funding on the area use basis, that is, each area designated in the 'Technical 
Requirements' handbook - produced by City Police - is allocated £X/m sq. Therefore, any 
additional funds can only be granted upon approval of revised user requirements by the 
Home Office.
The Police Station comprises major refurbishment of an existing five storey block and a 
new build extension. The refurbishment covers two thirds of the total floor area of the 
building. The new build consists of a nine storey high extension in the original light well 
and a new sixth floor level constructed on the roof. It covers one third of the total floor 
area of the building. The accommodation comprises: offices, interview rooms, IT section, 
administration, training facilities, kitchen, canteen, sector rooms, secure areas, 
male/female cells, detention suites, locker rooms, storage, a plant room, a parade room 
and a gymnasium.
The development had an initial contract value of £6.5 Million and cost in excess of £8.6 
Million upon completion. The construction works began in April 1995 and were 
scheduled for completion in 76 weeks, that is, in November 1996. However, completion 
did not take place until October 1997. At the time of writing, Construction Pic had started 
arbitration proceedings against City Police.
The services installation had an initial contract value of around £2.2 Million and cost 
around £4.5 Million upon completion. The installation began in July 1995 and was 
scheduled for completion in 49 weeks, that is, in June 1996. However, the completion of
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installation took place in October 1997. At the time of writing M&E Co. had started 
arbitration proceedings against Construction Pic.
Managing project design 
Statutory approval
The Project Administrator explained that the design proposal was subject to planning 
restrictions, therefore City Police's spatial requirements could not be realised in full. The 
two-storey extension on top of the building had to be reduced to a single-storey due to 
the building's location within a conservation area. This omission led to the need for some 
redesign at the scheme design stage, which was postponed, owing to budget limitations, 
until the period leading up to the issue of tender documents to prospective main 
contractors.
Design development
The nature of the refurbishment and new build design development is not known 
comprehensively, because direct observation on this project was limited to the site 
meetings between Construction Pic and M&E Co.. However, the discussion with the 
Project Administrator and the inductive use of information provided by the observations 
have shed some light on the way project design developed. City Police's briefing 
document comprised space zoning, space allocation to various operations and activities, 
and specification of technical requirements. Owing to time and budget limitations referred 
to previously, the building enabling works contract comprising a survey of the building, 
was foregone. This function was instead passed on to Construction Pic and, particularly, 
to M&E Co. through incorporation of clauses in their performance specification 
documents.
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The delay in the redesign of the top storey extension resulting from planning restrictions, 
together with City Police's desire to have the building operational by the original 
completion date, posed restrictions on the design programme. Thus the re- design was 
carried out in parallel with the detail design of the project and the construction of the 
works. This led to some replanning when the works started on site. The detail design 
stage included some minor revisions to City Police's requirements. However, most of the 
revisions arose from the installation and co-ordination of services discussed below.
Services design
City Police's brief established the scope of the services required. Surveyor Co., in liaison 
with Services Associates, agreed suitable plant locations and plant co-ordination 
requirements and tried to ensure that sufficient riser cores were allowed for the 
distribution of services. Services Associates designed the services layout in accordance 
with the technical requirements contained in the brief and the spatial dimensions indicated 
on Surveyor Co.'s drawings. It is understood that the time restrictions imposed by City 
Police's design programme limited the thoroughness with which Services Associates 
designed the services both in terms of layout and sizing of components, according to 
Services Associates' Site Engineer.
M&E Co. initially based their detail design on the schematics produced by Services 
Associates. However, when they surveyed the building in order to produce the co- 
ordination drawings they discovered the inaccuracy of the schematics and the need for 
redesigning both the services layouts and the sizing of the components. In other words, 
they discovered the true extent of their responsibility under the contract and the fact that
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their price did not allow for this expansion in responsibility, nor did the contingency sums 
allow any financial cover for the resources required to undertake the redesign.
M&E Co. initially attempted to resist the redesign by requesting design information from 
Services Associates. This gave rise to weeks and eventually months of delay in the 
production of design information because Services Associates were reluctant to alter the 
contract drawings. Their warranty to City Police implied that any alterations to the 
contract had to be applied for by Services Associates in the form of an easement which 
had to go through appropriate channels and departments in City Police. Delays in the 
production of services installation information alarmed Construction Pic. Therefore the 
M&E Co-ordinator encouraged M&E Co.'s Project Engineer to proceed with the 
redesign of services, in the first instance, to prevent delays to the project, and then to 
recover the extra expense involved through the claims procedure outlined in the contract. 
The latter part of this course of action was not supported by the Project Manager and the 
Project Planner who pointed out that M&E Co.'s responsibility for the redesign of 
services was spelt out in the services brief and documentation.
M&E Co.'s refusal to acknowledge their contractual responsibility, which denied them the 
possibility of recovering the extra costs of redesign, led to managing director level 
meetings between M&E Co. and Construction Pic. Following this meeting M&E Co. 
accepted to redesign and re-size the services components technically but not in spirit. That 
is, they maintained the resource level originally allocated to the information production 
task and refused to increase it. Consequently, the combination of inadequate resources 
and scant information hampered the production of installation information, led to regular
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revisions of the main and services programmes and delayed the procurement of the works 
and installation of services.
Flow of design information
The flow of design information generally took place in the following manner:
  Surveyor Co. produced the design information, sent it to the design team members, the 
external consultants involved, City Police and their in-house consultants.
  The other design team members subsequently produced their design information based 
on Surveyor Co.'s information and sent them to the latter to co-ordinate with the 
building design and to comment upon/approve.
  The latter checked and commented upon the design information and returned it to the 
corresponding team members for revision.
  The design team members sent their revised design information to Surveyor Co..
  The latter then sent the revised design information to City Police and their in-house 
consultants.
Information relating to design variations required by City Police flowed from the latter to 
the in-house consultants, the Project Administrator, and through him to the design team. 
The flow routes for information relating to building design, alterations and revisions are 
presented in Figure 6.3. The black flow route represents information sent by the design 
team to the Project Administrator; the blue flow route represents that sent by City Police; 
and the pink flow route represents comments made and revisions required by the Project 
Administrator.
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Figure 6.3: Building design information flow route
The flow of services design information was much more convoluted. At the start of the 
services installation, M&E Co. sent their installation drawings to Services Associates, 
with the ambiguous areas of design clearly marked, and requested clarification. The latter 
provided answers to the minor queries slowly, over a period of weeks, and inefficiently. 
Services Associates' Site Engineer, who occasionally attended the site progress meetings 
with a client representative, did not know how many queries had been answered and how 
many were outstanding. Services Associates refused to resolve the major queries relating 
to the services layout or component sizes and pressed M&E Co. to propose solutions 
themselves. M&E Co. declined to do so and increased the number of queries directed at 
Services Associates. Four months after the back and forth game between M&E Co. and 
Services Associates, and following a director level meeting between the former and 
Construction Pic regarding the slow production of services information, M&E Co. 
accepted to redesign the services.
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M&E Co. sent their installation drawings to Services Associates for comments. The latter 
sent the drawings back with comments. M&E Co. revised the drawings in accordance 
with the comments and sent them to Services Associates for approval. Often, Services 
Associates made further comments before approving the drawings, therefore the process 
of back and forth was repeated at least twice before drawing approval was granted. M&E 
Co. then issued the approved drawings to Construction Pic for the purpose of co- 
ordination with construction works, and to their subcontractors for fabrication. The 
information flow for each drawing took several weeks. The delay was attributed to the 
slow process of query resolution as well as M&E Co.'s limited resources. Sometimes the 
queries took longer to get to the person concerned in Services Associates' organisation, 
sometimes they got lost in the post and never reached their destination, sometimes they 
were inadequately answered and had to be sent back for elaboration and clarification.
M&E Co. oversaw the production of working drawings by their subcontractors and co- 
ordinated their inputs within the services package. The subcontractors produced their 
fabrication drawings from M&E Co.'s installation drawings and specification, sent them 
to the latter for comments, revised their drawings in accordance with the comments 
received and sent them back for approval. Once M&E Co. had approved their 
subcontractors' drawings, they would send them to Services Associates for approval.
The flow routes for information relating to services fabrication, installation and variation 
are presented in Figure 6.4. The blue flow route represents changes in City Police's 
services requirements initiated by them. The black flow route represents information sent 
by M&E Co. to Services Associates through Construction Pic. The green flow route 
represents queries raised by M&E Co.'s Subcontractors. The pink flow route represents
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comments made and revisions required by Services Associates. The dashed lines represent 
informal communication between M&E Co. and Services Associates.
Figure 6.4: Services design information flow route
In view of the problems discussed above, it is easy to imagine the complications arising in 
the information flow as a result of queries raised by M&E Co.'s subcontractors. The flow 
of design information was subject to communication within the design team, between 
them and City Police, between the design team and Construction Pic, between the latter 
and M&E Co., and between M&E Co. and Services Associates. It was also subject to 
decision-making processes by the design team members, by Construction Pic, and by 
M&E Co., in the case of services.
Communication
The design team communicated with one another principally through correspondence and 
regular design team or management meetings. Although the informal modes of
communication like telephone and facsimile were not ruled out, the complex structure of 
the coalition and the numerous consultants involved necessitated the formal mode of 
communication as a means of recording information production and dissemination. The 
monthly management meetings provided the forum at which general policy and 
management issues relating to the project were discussed.
In the light of the problems associated with services design, information production and 
dissemination, it is not hard to visualise the difficulties experienced by M&E Co.'s Project 
Engineer as the communication channel between M&E Co. and Services Associates, and 
the latter and M&E Co.'s subcontractors. On the one hand, he was instructed by his 
company's managing director to negotiate over the scope of M&E Co.'s roles and 
responsibilities; on the other, his performance was restricted by his limited resources and 
the myriad of paperwork in the form of drawings and queries. A year into the contract the 
Project Engineer was moved to another project and was replaced by a part time Project 
Engineer.
Decision-making processes
The design related decision-making processes appeared to be closely governed by City 
Police and the restrictive conditions imposed by their requirements. They were moreover 
subject to the financial limitations posed by the Home Office. The design decisions were 
therefore made top down rather than bottom up or laterally amongst the team members.
Design co-ordination and control
Design co-ordination and control took place through design meetings, held once a month, 
at one of the team members' offices and chaired by the Project Administrator. The design
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meetings provided the opportunity for the team members to discuss ongoing design 
matters and queries, and to comment on or resolve the problems identified.
Managing project construction 
Planning the construction works
Prior to commencement of the works, Construction Pic set out their aims and objectives 
in terms of time, cost, quality and safety; established their goals and targets; and planned 
the construction works. Construction Pic's aims were to finish on time and within budget, 
to achieve good quality work, to have as few accidents on site as possible, and to retain 
good public relations with City Police. To achieve these aims, Construction Pic elaborated 
the programme of works to include detailed activities and their corresponding durations, 
in the first instance. They then tried to obtain the lowest possible tender prices for the 
work packages through negotiations prior to selection of trades in order to improve the 
margin they had allowed against the job. Furthermore, they deployed a rigorous health 
and safety policy throughout the project life cycle.
In order to secure the contract, Construction Pic incorporated a very small contingency 
sum in their tender price which proved to be totally inadequate in relation to the risks 
associated with the refurbishment portion of the project. The refurbishment works 
presented too many surprises as the work progressed, particularly in so far as the 
installation of the services was concerned, according to the Works Planner.
The works were planned at stages corresponding to near future tasks and overall tasks 
and were represented by monthly programmes and the overall programme. The purpose 
of the monthly programme, in theory, was to allow a degree of flexibility in the execution
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of activities so that delays in one activity could be compensated by early commencement 
of another. However, in reality the delays were so widespread that what little 
compensation could be achieved did not make any real impacts on the overall scheme of 
activities.
Some of the delays were caused by variations initiated by City Police which totalled to 
around 250 by the end of the contract. The Works Planner did not consider these 
excessive in relation to the refurbishment nature of the job. The fundamental delays were 
brought about by M&E Co. in response to the problems presented by the inaccurate 
design of services.
Flow of production information
The design team produced the building production information in a similar way to the 
production of design information. The flow of production information during the 
construction process generally took place in the following way:
Surveyor Co. produced the production information, sent it to the design team
members, the external consultants involved, City Police and their in-house consultants.
The design team sent their production information to the Project Administrator who
checked, commented upon and returned it for revision.
The design team revised the information and sent it to the Project Administrator, who
sent it to City Police and the Project Manager.
Upon receipt of the information, the Project manager sent it to M&E Co. and other
specialist and trade contractors through their Project Engineers.
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When queries relating to discrepancies between the production information and the 
construction works or services installation arose on site, M&E Co.'s or other trades' 
foremen recorded them on specific forms, sent them along the flow route to the design 
team who, in turn, provided their answers on the same sheets and forwarded them to 
the former through the Project Manager. Because the survey data on the basis of 
which the design team produced their construction information was inaccurate and the 
queries were numerous, Construction Pic's M&E Co-ordinator advised M&E Co.'s 
Mechanical, Electrical and Public Health Engineers to send their queries direct to 
Services Associates in order to speed up the process.
The problem with the above query system was that one complex query could and did hold 
up the answers to the others included on the same form. Therefore M&E Co. were 
advised to send each query on a separate form. This proliferated the amount of paperwork 
going through the system and soon clogged it up. Nine months before the end of the 
project - when observations ended - there were around 600 queries relating to 
installations. Furthermore, the flow routes proved too long. There were occasions during 
site meetings when M&E Co.'s staff would complain that their queries had not been 
answered; whilst Services Associates' Site Engineer would claim that the answers were 
sent back a while ago and were in Construction Pic's system! The flow routes for 
information relating to building construction and that requested by trade contractors are 
presented in Figure 6.5. The black flow route represents information sent by the design 
team; the blue flow route represents that sent by City Police; and the green flow route 
represents the queries raised on site. The dashed lines represent informal or direct 
communication which by passes the stipulated information flow route.
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Figure 6.5: Building construction information flow route
Communication
The modes of communication within the design team remained the same at the 
construction stage as they were at the design stage. The modes of communication within 
the construction group were similar to those in the design team. They comprised
269
correspondence and regular progress meetings, held every fortnight, with the key trades, 
like M&E Co., as well as telephone and facsimile. Owing to the complexity of the 
construction problem and the services installation as well as the enormous risks involved 
with the works, the emphasis of the communication was on the formal methods as a 
means of recording information production and dissemination and allocating liability. The 
construction group communicated with the design team and through them with City 
Police by correspondence and at the monthly management meetings.
Further channels of communication, comprising the Site Agent, M&E Co.'s and other 
trades' foremen, became operational to facilitate the flow of information between the 
design team and construction group, and between Construction Pic and the trades. 
However, reliance upon and adherence to formal means of communication in conjunction 
with the frequent revisions made to construction works' and services installation's 
programmes, led to poor understanding and awareness on the parts of both Construction 
Pic and M&E Co. of each other's operational activities. This was often manifest in site 
meetings when arguments ensued regarding both parties wanting to work in the same 
rooms at the same time! The Contracts Manager, who attended site meetings from time to 
time, expressed concern on one occasion that Construction Pic and M&E Co. did not 
work together as a team in spite of working two doors away along the corridor.
Evidence of poor communication within Construction Pic's management team was also 
observed. For instance, the Project Manager seemed unaware of the progress of all 
aspects of the works when relevant problems were brought to his attention by M&E Co.'s 
Engineers. On occasions, he appeared uncertain about which programme of works was
being implemented by admitting that he had worked to so many programmes he did not 
know which the current one was.
Decision-making processes
The decision-making processes were largely delegated to the management team members 
in accordance with the authority that their job descriptions allocated to them. The 
decisions that involved financial implications were communicated to City Police, through 
the Project Administrator, for approval before implementation. The Site Manager was 
authorised to make every day decisions that involved relatively minor cost implications, as 
well as those regarding safety, alternative construction details and time targets. The 
Project Manager was ultimately responsible for all the decisions made on site. However, 
the Works Planner was of the opinion that he lacked adequate experience to manage the 
works successfully. That is why a contracts manager visited the site and attended the site 
meetings on a monthly basis to monitor the progress of the works.
The devolution of decision-making was extended down to M&E Co. in relation to the 
redesign of services. This was an authority that M&E Co. did not want and never fully 
accepted or committed to. Subsequently, the services redesign became the Achilles heel of 
the project. It led to delays in the services installation and the main works programmes 
and a piecemeal approach to both services installation and construction and refurbishment 
works. It resulted in excessive amounts of extra work arising from out of sequence 
working, poor co-ordination and poor workmanship. For example, holes had to be cut in 
finished and painted walls for ductwork. Radiators had to be installed in rooms within two 
weeks when they had not even been ordered. Ductwork, fan coil units, etc. had to be 
repaired or changed because they had been damaged by being left in spaces where
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construction work was going on, or by having their protective covers removed. The 
financial consequences of the redesign were of such magnitude that M&E Co.'s Project 
Engineer threatened to leave the site, on one occasion, and refused to distribute all the 15 
copies of drawings to the project participants on a number of occasions.
Co-ordination and control of production inputs
Co-ordination of services installation and construction operations took place through 
structured co-ordination meetings held fortnightly between Construction Pic's M&E Co- 
ordinator, Project Planner, Project Manager, and occasionally Contracts Manager, and 
M&E Co.'s Project, Mechanical, Electrical and Public Health Engineers. These meetings 
were chaired by the M&E Co-ordinator. They involved discussion of services installation 
problems which frequently related to poor design information, spatial restrictions, 
progress of the works, labour resources and safety issues. In response to these problems 
the M&E Co-ordinator and others from Construction Pic suggested solutions and 
recommended a course of action to M&E Co.'s Project Engineer and others. In addition 
to structured co-ordination meetings, there were unstructured meetings held as the need 
for them arose, involving the Site Agent and the trade contractors' foremen. The 
frequency of these meetings was associated with the complexity of the trades' tasks. For 
example, about three months before the observations ended the site meetings between the 
Site Agent and M&E Co.'s mechanical and electrical Foremen had become a regular 
occurrence.
The participants' discussions in site meetings presented evidence of poor interaction 
between Construction Pic's trades and operatives and M&E Co.'s subcontractors and 
operatives. For example, M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer often complained about ducts
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being damaged because Construction Pic's operatives treaded on them or fan coil units 
being damaged because the operatives used them as supports to stand on, and so on. The 
discussions moreover provided examples of the Site Agent's and the Project Manager's 
shortcomings in enforcing tidiness, cleanliness and close monitoring of the trades' 
performance as the above examples portray.
There was no evidence of positive motivators implemented by Construction Pic to prompt 
M&E Co. into action. On occasions the M&E Co-ordinator attempted to bring M&E 
Co.'s Project Engineer on side. He did so by encouraging the latter to prepare and submit 
claims for extra costs, or by requesting him to produce information indicating variations 
between Services Associates' design drawings and the existing site conditions as 'bullets 
that he [the M&E Co-ordinator] could fire back at City Police's representative in 
management meetings'. However, these tactics did not produce results because what 
M&E Co. wanted was additional rewards for the additional responsibilities that were 
imposed on them. Construction Pic had made it clear on a number of occasions and in no 
uncertain terms that additional rewards were not forthcoming. Therefore M&E Co. 
demonstrated their demotivation by under resourcing the installation and declaring their 
preparedness to argue their case against Construction Pic in court because, they claimed, 
they could not justify their losses to their directors and shareholders.
Construction Pic's policy of involving the managing directors of trade contractors when 
the latter do not perform, did not appear to work in the case of M&E Co. because the 
decision to resist acceleration of the installation was made at director level. Indeed there 
were occasions when M&E Co.'s Project Engineer claimed that 'his hands were tied 
behind his back', that he could not hire additional labour because that would amount to
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'acceleration5 and acceleration had become a 'political issue', and that he worked for 
M&E Co. and had to do what he was told.
In addition to M&E Co.'s poor performance resulting from labour shortages and other 
management shortfalls discussed below, their productivity levels were adversely affected 
by Construction Pic's poor performance. For example, in one of the site meetings, M&E 
Co.'s Electrical Engineer complained that his welders were only 50% productive due to 
fluctuating power on the floor they were working. The Project Manager's response was 
that power had been provided for one welder only as per the initial estimate when the site 
was set up. Another example was provided by the same Engineer complaining that every 
time he brings his operatives on site they get interrupted by construction works. In actual 
fact there was glaring evidence of neither Construction Pic nor M&E Co. working to any 
programme. The latter openly admitted that they deliberately worked in an ad hoc basis so 
they could not be tied contractually.
The Site Agent arranged safety inductions on site at intervals corresponding to the 
commencement of trade contractors' work packages. At their pre-contract meetings the 
specialist and trade contractors were informed of their safety requirements, including 
submission of method statements and risk assessments. The Site Manager monitored the 
observation of Health and Safety Regulations by the trade contractors, on a day-to-day 
basis, and reported deviations to the foremen or the project engineers or to the Project 
Manager. The Project Manager's overzealous enforcement of these regulations 
manifested itself as the sacking of one of M&E Co.'s laggers. This caused considerable 
arguments between the Project Manager and M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer. 
Apparently the Site Agent's warning to the lagger in question, with regard to wearing his
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hard hat, had gone unheeded because in the lagger's view the Site Agent was not 
authorised to instruct him. Therefore the sacking of the lagger had as much to do with not 
observing safety requirements as not paying attention to Construction Pic's site staff. 
M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer argued that the warning should have been given through 
M&E Co.'s Foreman rather than directly to the lagger.
Services installation: organisation, co-ordination and control of services inputs
M&E Co.'s aims were to execute the installation within the time allocated in their letter of 
intent, to the tender price agreed with Construction Pic, to the standards specified in the 
contract documents and safely. They moreover aimed to improve their profit margin by 
subcontracting the installation as packages and including a bonus system on labour. To 
ensure a high level of quality, they implemented Quality Assurance (QA) and Total 
Management Systems (TMS) on their procedures. However, as the project unfolded, the 
unforeseen events took place and the extra costs built up, M&E Co.'s aims, goals and 
targets were obviated and their focus shifted towards cost cutting and reducing their 
losses to the detriment of the installation and the project as a whole.
M&E Co. subdivided the services works into electrical, mechanical and public health 
installations. They carried out the ductwork, the plantwork, the controls, the insulations 
and the commissioning in-house because they had the capability and the resources. They 
sublet the remaining portions of the installation to ten mechanical subcontractors, ten 
electrical subcontractors and two plumbing subcontractors. Each of these subcontractors 
was selected through a competitive tender process involving three subcontractors. 
Therefore, the Mechanical Engineer, who organised the tender process, had to evaluate 
66 tenders in order to select 22 subcontractors. The organisation of services installation is
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represented in Figure 6.6. The links represent lines of influence arising from the team 
members' position and role within the organisation.
Figure 6.6: Organisation of services works package
The Mechanical Engineer claimed that they had problems with their subcontractors, which 
were attributable, on the one hand, to Construction Pic dictating the order in which the 
installation was carried out, and on the other, to M&E Co.'s financial problems with 
Construction Pic. Based on the observations, M&E Co. had managerial problems too. 
The full time Project Engineer was replaced with a part time engineer after a year, who 
was in turn removed from the project after about six months and not replaced. Thus the 
Mechanical Engineer had to both manage the installation, and deal with queries and 
paperwork. According to him, the management problems they experienced could have 
been improved by more resources and the devolvement of managerial role more evenly 
amongst the engineers involved.
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Services commissioning
According to Construction Pic's Works Planner, the services system was commissioned 
satisfactorily and met City Police's requirements. This probably explains why City Police 
accepted all the problems experienced by M&E Co. that were attributable to services 
design, as alleged by M&E Co.'s Mechanical Engineer.
6.3 CONTRACTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
This section interprets the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria for 
the nature of their relations by establishing whether these relations express power 
disparity and power strategies or various forms of trust. It then goes on to interpret the 
impact of the Project Manager's and the Site Agent's leadership, motivation of 
participants, involvement of participants in decision-making and their formation into a 
team, on the participants' interactions.
6.3.1 CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS
The interorganisational relations emanating from the contractual framework of the main 
project participants being investigated here, may be considered as a hierarchy of 
contracting and subcontracting relations. City Police let the design functions to the 
consultants and the project management to Surveyor Co.. They let the construction and 
refurbishment works to Construction Pic. The latter sublet the detail design, manufacture, 
installation and commissioning of the services to M&E Co.. M&E Co., carried out a
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portion of the installation in house and sublet the remaining portions to subcontractors, 
and the installation of public health services to labour-only subcontractors. This 
hierarchical relationship is represented in Figure 6.7, and is explored below under 
subcontracting relations.
Figure 6.7: Participant organisations' contractual relations in The Police Station
Subcontracting relations
Based on the nature of subcontracting relations, defined as subcontractors' relative 
independence from or dependence on the main contractor by virtue of their control over 
the four phases of work process (Druker and Macallan, 1995: 53, based on Chaillou, 
1977; see Chapter 2: 66-7; Chapter 4: Figure 4.8), M&E Co. were semi-dependent upon 
Construction Pic who provided an indirect link with Services Associates. Although M&E
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Co. were in charge of detail design, organisation of installation and production of 
services, they had no control over concept and outline design of services (indicated as 
hatched area in blue on Figure 6.8). Furthermore, by virtue of subletting portions of 
production and installation of services, they were relatively dependent upon their 
subcontractors and operatives.
Figure 6.8: Dimensions of subcontracting relations in the Police Station
Power disparity
To examine the existence of power in the relationships between the contracting parties, 
power disparity is established based on the definition of power as a field offeree between 
domination and resistance, or authority and illegitimate resistance (Pfeffer, 1981: 2-3; 
Clegg, 1989: 208; Fox, 1974: 98-9; Chapter 2: 16-17; Chapter 4: Table 4.3).
City Police exercised power over Construction Pic by getting them to accept a number of 
onerous conditions including the design conditions in the absence of enabling works, a
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lump-sum fixed price paid at monthly intervals based on evaluation of work carried out, 
and appointment on the basis of a letter of intent. Construction Pic consented because 
they were in a subordinate position. They operated in a buyers market and as well as 
requiring the work to stay in business, they hoped to obtain further contracts from City 
Police. Construction Pic, in turn, exercised power over M&E Co. by requiring them to 
accept a reduced tender price through negotiations, appointing them on the basis of a 
letter of intent, and getting them to redesign the services layout. M&E Co. consented for 
the same reasons that Construction Pic had consented to City Police. Therefore power 
disparity characterised the relations between the contracting parties being investigated. 
However, the nature of power relations changed during the project life cycle.
In the relation between City Police and Construction Pic, the former dominated, on the 
strength of their position as flinders of the project and on the basis of the wording of their 
specification document. Construction Pic tended to resist this domination by arguing that 
design changes constituted variations to the contract and by negotiating over their 
financial implications. Thus their resistance was based on their knowledge and their 
discretion in the use of that knowledge. In the relation between Construction Pic and 
M&E Co., Construction Pic's domination was curbed by their relative dependence on 
M&E Co.'s knowledge and by M&E Co.'s resistance based on their discretion in the use 
of their knowledge. M&E Co.'s resistance to Construction Pic's domination, on the other 
hand, was limited by their lack of control over services concept design and by 
Construction Pic's indirect link with Services Associates. Therefore, based on Table 4.3 
(Chapter 4), the nature of power relations between the contracting parties was domination 
and resistance (Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 626; Fox, 1977; Friedman, 1977: Chapter 
rather than authority and illegitimate resistance (Pfeffer, 1981: 4-6; Mintzberg, 1991(b): 
372).
Power strategy
The examination of power strategies implemented by the parties is based upon the two 
definitions of conflict prevention, and defeat of conflict identified in Chapter 2 (pp. 18-19) 
and referred to in Chapter 4. The former strategy may involve responsible autonomy or 
direct control (Friedman, 1977: 6-7); the latter, comprises resistance through acquisition, 
development, and use of power (PfefFer, 1981: 7).
The contracting parties employed differing power strategies to achieve their aims. City 
Police used direct control to scrutinise Construction Pic's actions. By relying on the 
vague clauses incorporated in the contract documents, City Police limited Construction 
Pic's discretion over interpretation of the contract thus weakening their attempts at 
bargaining. However, the extensive nature of the changes in both building and services 
design provided Construction Pic with some bargaining power for negotiations on the 
basis of variations. Although the financial outcomes of these negotiations are not known, 
they could not have fulfilled Construction Pic's expectations thus prompting them to take 
legal action.
In their relationship with M&E Co., Construction Pic appeared to allow the former 
discretion over their work whilst supervising their information production and installation 
through the M&E Co-ordinator. In reality, Construction Pic adopted a contractual 
approach in passing on the onus of building survey to M&E Co., thus limiting their 
discretion over the installation of services and their ability to make a profit. In response,
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M&E Co. used their power of discretion to act in their own interest when allocating 
resources to the project, when producing information, and when specifying materials and 
components.
The implications of the contracting parties' power strategies for the emergence, handling, 
and resolution or rather lack of resolution of conflict are elaborated in the next section. 
Having established the existence of power in the parties' interorganisational relations and 
their strategies for its use, attention is now focused on examining whether trust featured in 
these relations and if so, in what form and to what extent.
Trust-based co-operation
To examine whether the contracting parties co-operated on the basis of trust as reliability, 
predictability or power-induced predictability, the nature of their co-operation is 
scrutinised on the basis of a few simple questions and the information provided in the 
Table 4.4 (see Chapter 4).
Co-operation of City Police and Construction Pic
Did City Police rely on Construction Pic? They appear to have taken a calculated risk by 
appointing Construction Pic to undertake the project. However, this risk was not based 
on the expectation of an on-going relationship, repeated exchanges, or co-operation 
within a network formed around common interests. It involved high transaction costs 
associated with constant monitoring and consultation by the Project Administrator and 
Services Associates' Site Engineer. Therefore it is doubtful as to whether the risk taken 
reflected City Police's reliability on Construction Pic. Did Construction Pic rely on City 
Police? They certainly took risks by accepting the onerous design responsibilities included
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in the contract documents and by committing themselves to a fixed price for an unknown 
entity. These risks may have been based on the potential for future work from City Police; 
they may, on the other hand, have been based on the commercial necessities of accepting 
the contract. In any case, they were not based on the conditions necessary for the 
development of calculative trust.
Did City Police depend on Construction Pic's predictable behaviour? City Police entered 
into a business contract with Construction Pic that was supported by bonds, collateral and 
penalty clauses. However, the quality and flow of information and the monitoring 
mechanisms were so ineffective as to result in uncertainty being compounded throughout 
the project rather than reduced. This led to unpredictable behaviour by Construction Pic 
who were unable to organise and manage the works in accordance with the programme. 
Therefore City Police could not depend on Construction Pic's predictable behaviour. Did 
Construction Pic depend on City Police's predictable behaviour? To the extent that 
Construction Pic entered into an agreement with City Police on the basis of a letter of 
intent, they appear to have either depended on or hoped for the latter's predictable 
behaviour. As the events unfolded, Construction Pic's hope for City Police's predictable 
behaviour most definitely took precedence.
Did City Police employ power-induced predictability? In so far that City Police selected 
the traditional method as the mode of procurement whilst imposing design responsibilities 
on Construction Pic, it is pertinent to conclude that they created impressions of a low 
discretion role for the latter. This was done so as to manipulate Construction Pic into 
accepting more responsibility for the same rewards. Did Construction Pic capitulate? 
They appeared to do so during the course of the contract by passing on most of the
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responsibility to M&E Co.. However, at the end of the contract they seem to have had a 
change of tactic by deciding to take legal action against City Police.
Co-operation of Construction Pic and M&E Co.
Did Construction Pic rely on M&E Co.? In so far that Construction Pic did not have 
experience of working with M&E Co., they seem to have accepted the risk in the latter's 
performance by appointing them. However, the M&E Co-ordinator's supervision of M&E 
Co.'s work and the absence of other conditions necessary for calculated risk in the 
relationship indicate that Construction Pic's acceptance of risk did not manifest their 
reliability on M&E Co.. Did M&E Co. rely on Construction Pic? Although M&E Co. 
accepted a high risk by reducing their tender price on a refurbishment contract, they did 
so because they needed the contract for reasons discussed in the previous section. This 
risk was not based on the expectation of an on-going relationship or other conditions 
necessary for calculated trust. It was based, rather, on commercial necessity.
Did Construction Pic depend on M&E Co.'s predictable behaviour? Despite entering into 
an agreement with M&E Co. that was supported by Bond, Warranty and penalty clauses, 
and monitoring their work on a regular basis to reduce the uncertainty associated with it, 
M&E Co. behaved unpredictably by refusing to co-operate. Therefore Construction Pic 
could not depend on M&E Co.'s predictable behaviour. Did M&E Co. depend on 
Construction Pic's predictable behaviour? They entered into an agreement with 
Construction Pic based on a letter of intent, because they would not have been appointed 
otherwise. However, during the course of the contract Construction Pic's failure to 
behave supportively of M&E Co. led to the withdrawal of the latter's co-operation.
284
Therefore whether M&E Co. depended on Construction Pic's predictable behaviour at the 
start of the project or not, they certainly did not do so as the project progressed.
Did Construction Pic employ power-induced predictability? Construction Pic appointed 
M&E Co. to detail design and install the services on the basis of their reduced price that 
was achieved through negotiations. In practice, M&E Co. had to redesign the layout of 
the services and resize the components as part of the installation design in order to make 
them fit within the available spaces. That is, their roles and responsibilities were expanded 
within their fixed price contract giving rise to a higher discretion role than the one 
prescribed in the contract documents. Therefore it may be concluded that Construction 
Pic created the impression of a lower discretion role to manipulate M&E Co. into co- 
operation on a smaller budget. Did M&E Co. capitulate? M&E Co. capitulated in so far 
as conceding to the provision of the services required of them by the client based on the 
interpretations of the specification document. However, they did not commit themselves 
to the larger resources that this provision demanded.
6.3.2 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
The operational framework, comprising the communication channels, information flow 
routes and decision-making processes, was set up by the Project Manager in consultation 
with the Project Planner. It both influenced and was influenced by the organisational 
representatives' interpersonal relations and interactions. The complexity of the framework 
demanded speedy production of design information by M&E Co. and its timely approval 
by Services Associates. This would enable the dissemination of design information to 
M&E Co.'s subcontractors, their production of fabrication drawings and manufacture of 
services components to take place in appropriate time. It would moreover enable
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Construction Pic to either incorporate services installation within their programme of 
works or plan the works around the services installation. M&E Co.'s failure to meet the 
information production demand created tensions between M&E Co.'s Project staff and 
Construction Pic's Project staff, and between the latter and the Project Administrator as 
well as City Police's representative. Services Associates' failure to respond to M&E Co.'s 
queries and approve their information within stipulated or reasonable periods of time, 
placed strains upon the relations between M&E Co.'s Project staff, and Services 
Associates' Site Engineer.
The quality of information and the discrepancy between the drawings and the existing 
building created installation problems for the operatives of M&E Co.'s subcontractors. 
These problems, together with the financial difficulties that M&E Co. encountered, 
strained their relations with some of their subcontractors and operatives and led to the 
latter's contracts being terminated during the installation. Thus M&E Co.'s productivity 
problems, which began during the design of the services, were perpetuated during the 
installation phase.
This sub-section assesses the impact of the M&E Co-ordinator and the Project Manager 
on the interpersonal relations at the services installation/construction interface within the 
operational framework. To do so, their respective leadership of M&E Co.'s project staff 
at the levels of services design and installation, the way in which these staff were 
motivated, the extent to which they participated in decision-making, and the success or 
otherwise of the formation of M&E Co.'s and Construction Pic's project staff into a team, 
are considered.
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The leadership behaviours
Based on the contingency theory of leadership and its relationship to leadership behaviour 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3: 32-7), the M&E Co-ordinator's leadership 
behaviour towards M&E Co.'s project staff, at the level of services design, corresponded 
to aspects of both 'telling' and 'selling' categories presented in Figure 4.9. This means 
that he had a high level of task orientation and used both high and low levels of 
relationship behaviour towards M&E Co.'s project staff, under different circumstances, in 
his efforts to secure their co-operation. By virtue of his role and responsibilities, the M&E 
Co-ordinator placed great emphasis upon M&E Co.'s prescribed tasks. To encourage 
M&E Co.'s project staff to carry out these tasks, the M&E Co-ordinator maintained two 
way communication with the former throughout the project and conveyed support when 
they complained about the quality of services design information or Services Associates' 
attitudes. However, when M&E Co.'s project staff failed to carry out their tasks, the 
M&E Co-ordinator withdrew his support and adopted a more directive attitude focusing 
on M&E Co.'s performance rather than the reasons for their performance.
Both strategies failed to produce results mainly because M&E Co.'s project staff were 
unwilling to follow the M&E Co-ordinator's guidance or instructions because his position 
power did not grant him high authority with respect to M&E Co.'s project staff. The 
latter had obligations to their managing director and their shareholders which evidently 
superseded their obligations to Construction Pic and the Police Station project, as M&E 
Co.'s Project Engineer spelt out on more than one occasion (see Co-ordination and 
control of production inputs, above).
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The Project Manager's leadership behaviour towards M&E Co.'s project staff, at the level 
of services installation, corresponded to the combination of 'telling' and 'delegating' 
categories in Figure 4.9. When M&E Co.'s project staff required high levels of direction 
necessitated either by the project complexities, or by their failure to meet the Health and 
Safety regulations, the Project Manager attempted to provide them with prescriptive 
guidance or instructions (see Co-ordination and control of production inputs, above). 
There were problems with this leadership behaviour. On the one hand, the Project 
manager was not fully aware of the up-to-date progress of the works, programmed the 
works in an ad hoc way, and did not have extensive knowledge of services installation. On 
the other hand, M&E Co.'s project staff were unwilling to follow the Project Manager's 
instructions owing to the low level of authority they ascribed to him, and because they 
had discretion over the way they carried out their installation. Therefore during the latter 
half of the project, it seemed as though the Project Manager lost control over M&E Co.'s 
installation and, to some extent, over the works in general, leaving M&E Co. to get on 
with their installation as best they could.
Motivation of project participants
The success or otherwise of the M&E Co-ordinator and the Project Manager to motivate 
M&E Co.'s project staff is examined in relation to the effectiveness of the motivational 
strategies implemented. The latter include control mechanisms corresponding to the 
motivator's sources of power, and manifested as reward and punishment; and fulfilment of 
individual values relating to motivatee's attitudes to work and demonstrated as job 
satisfaction (see Section 2.3: 32-7; Table 4.5).
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The M&E Co-ordinator did not appear capable of motivating M&E Co.'s engineers to 
produce information more quickly than they did for two reasons. Firstly, the resources 
that M&E Co. allocated to the project were based on the nature of the task conveyed by 
their contract documents. The magnitude of the increase in the level of difficulty of this 
task merited financial rewards that the M&E Co-ordinator recognised but could not 
award because Construction Pic's contingency sums had not allowed for them. Therefore 
in the absence of such rewards, M&E Co.'s engineers were told by their directors not to 
increase the resources associated with the production of services design information. 
Secondly, in view of the grave unfairness with which M&E Co.'s engineers perceived 
their company to have been treated, they were determined to leave the decision-making 
associated with the services design, as much as possible, to Services Associates. Services 
Associates' reluctance to make design related decisions that were going to change the 
contract documents - for reasons of guarantees they had warranted City Police (see 
Selection, appointment, roles and responsibilities of design team members) - further 
slowed down M&E Co.'s information production and demotivated M&E Co.'s engineers.
In addition to the above reasons, two further developments in the conditions governing 
the works hampered the Project Manager's efforts in motivating M&E Co.'s site staff. 
On the one hand, M&E Co.'s directors by accepting the project as a loss making one, 
appeared resolute to fight their case in the courts rather than concede to Construction Pic 
by accelerating the works and accepting political defeat. In this resolve they were 
uncompromising and unaccommodating either because they believed they could recover 
damages as well as their costs and thus be compensated, or because they hoped that the 
unfairness with which they felt they had been treated would be recognised, or both. On 
the other hand, the haphazard execution of the construction works and installation of
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services, and the frequent clashes that occurred between them (see Co-ordination and 
control of production inputs, above), had demotivating effects on M&E Co.'s 
subcontractors and operatives and other trade contractors and operatives.
Participation in decision-making
To assess the level or lack of participation of M&E Co.'s project staff in decision-making, 
the extent of their involvement in decision-making and control processes through 
collective problem-solving is examined (see Chapter 2: 36). As is the consequences of this 
involvement, or lack of, for their interpersonal relations with Construction Pic's project 
staff.
The site meetings between Construction Pic's and M&E Co.'s project staff, where 
collective problem-solving could potentially have taken place, were dominated by 
disagreements, arguments and apportionment of blame. The divergent objectives of the 
two organisations coupled with discrepancies between the information produced by 
Services Associates and that resulting from M&E Co.'s building survey, often constituted 
the causes of the problems. In this climate the guidance, directions and at times 
instructions of the M&E Co-ordinator and the Project Manager, although superficially 
agreed to, went unheeded. Therefore the Project Manager's ultimate authority in 
decision-making could not address lack of commitment on the part of M&E Co.'s 
engineers to project objectives, and could not secure their collaboration.
The construction related decision-making was largely delegated to the Site Agent 
although the latter consulted with the Project Manager in relation to major decisions. The 
decision-making related to services installation and co-ordination with the construction
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works was delegated to M&E Co., which in the light of the information discrepancy 
referred to above, was onerous. Therefore M&E Co.'s involvement in problem-solving at 
the level of installation was reluctant and enforced by the conditions of their contract.
Team building
To assess the ineffectiveness of the collective efforts of M&E Co.'s and Construction 
Pic's project staff, the reasons relating to why they did not form into a team are 
investigated. This is done by examining the group's characteristics, the nature of the task, 
the environment in which the group functioned, and the conditions on which their 
effectiveness depended (see Section 2.3: 37-8; Chapter 4: Table 4.6).
The size of the group allowed for the required diversity of skills and knowledge. 
However, the nature of the contractual framework, the division of responsibilities and the 
corresponding reward systems hampered the participation of individuals in problem- 
solving and decision taking. The M&E Co-ordinator's attitude reflected his preference for 
a practical, rather than a contractual, approach to project execution through teamwork. 
However, the decision by Construction Pic's directors to tender on very low contingency 
sums in order to obtain the contract, and their strategy of passing on the risks to M&E 
Co., eroded the basis for teamwork and necessitated a contractual approach in the 
absence of M&E Co.'s co-operation. The incompatibility of group members' 
organisational objectives and the unwillingness of M&E Co.'s engineers to follow the 
M&E Co-ordinator's lead gave rise to a heterogeneous group dominated by overt 
conflict. The diversity of objectives was manifest in the group members' unco-operative 
approach to problem-solving, which in the absence of reconciliation, gave rise to in 
fighting between the members of the two organisations. Observations indicated that the
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development of the group did not progress much beyond the storming phase throughout 
the services design and installation stages. Therefore the norming and performing phases 
did not follow on and did not result in a collaborative team.
The nature of the task, in terms of the design, installation and co-ordination of services 
with the building construction and refurbishment works, was ambiguous. The task 
associated roles, particularly those of M&E Co., were not well defined in the contract 
documents and were interpreted on the basis of these documents as the project 
progressed. Therefore the significance of the task, in terms of the level of effort required 
in relation to the rewards allocated, was unclear. The M&E Co-ordinator's and the 
Project Manager's position power had little influence upon M&E Co.'s engineers and site 
staff. The dispersed physical locations of the group members' organisations had a negative 
impact upon their communication and interaction in so far that correspondence and 
drawings had to be sent to the respective headquarters from where they were 
disseminated to site. This created a perfect excuse for information getting lost in the post, 
or not being responded to because it was trapped in the system!
6.4 CONFLICT
The previous section established the existence of power disparity in the interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties and identified the power strategies implemented by 
each party in order to achieve their aims. It moreover demonstrated the uncollaborative
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nature of the interpersonal relations of Construction Pic's and M&E Co.'s project staff 
and discussed the reasons for their failure to deliver their inputs on time. This section 
examines the implications of power disparity and power strategies for the emergence of 
both overt and covert conflict in the participants' interorganisational and interpersonal 
relations. It then goes on to examine the emergence of conflict in the building production 
process and the way it was handled and/or resolved.
6.4.1 CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT
The occurrence of conflict in the interorganisational relations of the contracting parties is 
investigated based on the definition and forms of conflict, discussed in Chapter 2 and 
referred to in Chapter 4. Thus conflict is considered as any divergence of interests, 
objectives, or priorities between individuals, groups, or organisations; or non- 
conformance to requirements of a task, activity, or process (Gardiner and Simmons, 
1992: 111). Manifestations of conflict are regarded as functional or creative; and 
dysfunctional or destructive (Smith, 1992: 29, 30; Stephenson, 1996: 27). Based on these 
definitions, dysfunctional/destructive conflict dominated the interorganisational relations 
of City Police and Construction Pic, and the latter and M&E Co.. This form of conflict 
may be attributed to the contractual framework, the building project environment, the 
project coalition structure, culture and technology, and low or non-existent levels of trust 
in the parties exchange relations.
Conflict attributed to contractual framework
The traditional method of procurement implemented by City Police resulted in poor 
teamwork amongst the project participants due to poor communication, high levels of 
uncertainty, and disagreements. The poor communication was partly attributable to the
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division between services design and installation processes undertaken by Services 
Associates and M&E Co. respectively, and partly attributable to Services Associates' 
unwillingness to resolve design problems, which would constitute changes to the contract. 
This gave rise to relationship conflicts between M&E Co. and Services Associates.
The high levels of uncertainty were associated with the quality of information produced 
by the consultants, particularly Services Associates, and vagueness in the participants' 
responsibilities, particularly M&E Co.'s. The discrepancy between the spatial dimensions 
contained in the design information and those existing, created data conflicts the 
resolution of which was allocated to M&E Co. based on their contract of engagement. 
The execution of this task, which as far as M&E Co. were concerned fell outside the 
scope of their responsibilities, reinforced the relationship conflicts between them and 
Services Associates, and created relationship conflicts between the former and 
Construction Pic. This conflict was manifested as delays in the production of services 
design drawings to programme, by M&E Co., which was contrary to project 
requirements.
Conflict attributed to building project environment
It is anticipated that prior to selecting Construction Pic, City Police negotiated down their 
original tender price. Consequently, Construction Pic reduced the resources allocated to 
the project, the prime example of which was the appointment of a site agent/manager to 
manage the project. This was contrary to the requirements of the project and represented 
conflictual behaviour on the part of Construction Pic. It led to considerable problems 
associated with organisation and management of construction and refurbishment works, 
on the one hand, and co-ordination of construction with the services installation, on the
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other. Thus causing high levels of destructive conflict between Construction Pic and 
M&E Co.. Furthermore, the price reduction lowered Construction Pic's contingency sums 
to levels that were incapable of covering the cost of surprises revealed by the 
refurbishment works including the additional design work that M&E Co. had to carry out. 
This constituted another source of dysfunctional conflict between Construction Pic and 
M&E Co..
The reductions in M&E Co.'s tender price subsequent to negotiations with Construction 
Pic, placed a ceiling on the resources they could allocate to the installation design and 
execution. That is why when the extra design work was imposed on them, contrary to 
their wishes and expectations, they decided to undertake it within their existing budget 
contrary to the requirements of the project. This behaviour demonstrated conflict of M&E 
Co.'s objectives with those of the project which led to relationship conflicts amongst 
M&E Co., Construction Pic, and Services Associates.
Conflict attributed to project coalition structure
The Police Station project coalition had a hierarchical structure of subcontracting 
relations, discussed in the previous section. Within this hierarchy, co-operation between 
the design team members and Construction Pic and between Services Associates and 
M&E Co. was minimal. This was attributed in part to low levels of mutual adjustment 
amongst the corresponding organisations' representatives, and in part to the design team 
members' reluctance to vary the contract documents. The mutual adjustment of 
representatives was hindered by the contractual framework and the absence of liaison 
links. The design team members' reluctance to vary the contract documents was 
attributed to their protection of self interest. The low levels of co-operation between
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Services Associates and M&E Co. denied the Project Manager the power to make 
decisions according to need and prevented M&E Co.'s engineers making decisions based 
on their expertise. This created discord amongst the Project Manager, M&E Co.'s 
engineers and Services Associates' Site Engineer.
Because M&E Co. were being coerced into broadening the range of their responsibilities, 
they did not keep their information production and installation within programme and the 
Project Manager could not do much about it. Director level meetings between the two 
organisations merely reinforced M&E Co.'s resolve not to submit to Construction Pic's 
demands for acceleration of the works. Construction Pic were dependent on M&E Co. 
not only for the services installation, but also for timely completion of the works. The 
Project Manager was aware of M&E Co.'s financial predicament on this project and knew 
that financial threats would not achieve the desired outcome.
The hierarchical structure of the subcontracting relations in conjunction with the project 
participants' collaboration problems created communication difficulties with the 
construction group. These difficulties, coupled with the slow rate of information 
production, gave rise to dysfunctional conflict between the Site Manager and the trade 
contractors' foremen and led to delays already discussed in relation to M&E Co.'s 
installation in the previous section.
Conflict attributed to project coalition culture
The culture of the services installation organisation was dominated by conflict, 
apportionment of blame, and threats. The M&E Co-ordinator's efforts in trying to sway 
M&E Co.'s Project Engineer from a confrontational, contractual approach to a co-
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operational, practical approach to the project failed every time. This failure was attributed 
to the absence of incentives, such as financial rewards, that were required to persuade 
M&E Co.' Project Engineer or indeed M&E Co.'s directors into co-operation. The 
atmosphere of the meetings was charged with anger and the tone of arguments warned of 
potential arbitration action. The pattern of M&E Co.'s failure to produce information and 
execute installation within programme recurred in every meeting. As did the pattern of 
their communication problems with Services Associates, co-ordination problems with 
construction and refurbishment works, and shortfalls with the quality of services installed.
The Project Manager, with the aid of Construction Pic's management team, directed the 
concerted efforts of the construction group towards production quality and site safety. 
Installation quality constituted one of the sources of recurring conflict between M&E 
Co.'s and Construction Pic's project staff (see Co-ordination and control of production 
inputs). The importance of site safety was reflected in the creation, maintenance and 
enforcement of the site specific safety plan and, on occasions, the overzealous 
enforcement of safety requirements (see Co-ordination and control of production inputs).
Conflict attributed to project coalition technology
The discrepancies between the information produced by the consultants and that 
uncovered by M&E Co.'s building survey gave rise to data conflicts. These data conflicts 
necessitated substantial alterations to the layout design of the services and placed the onus 
of redesign upon M&E Co.. The negotiations concerning the redesign of services layout 
in conjunction with the data conflicts constituted the perfect opportunity for M&E Co.'s 
Project Engineer to assign only one person to the task of producing information per floor. 
Thus the slow production of information was always attributed to the poor quality of
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available information and Services Associates' slow response to design related queries. 
Information production was carried out using automated draughting equipment rather 
than CAD. Although the appropriateness of this method of information production 
generated discussions between the M&E Co-ordinator and M&E Co.'s Project Engineer, 
these discussions were academic. The allocation of information production per floor to a 
single person was justified on grounds of better co-ordination and integration of data. The 
logic of a single person's responsibility for the production, co-ordination and integration 
of information resulting in better control over the information may hold true in an ideal 
world where time is not of the essence. On this project, however, it merely masked the 
conflictual behaviour of M&E Co.'s project staff.
The lack of Project Manager's control over services installation created relationship 
conflicts between Construction Pic and the trade contractors and, more specifically, 
between the Site Agent and trade contractors' foremen and operatives whose work was 
regularly disrupted owing to the clashes with services installation.
Low trust in project participants' exchange relations
Examination of the contracting parties' seemingly low trust co-operation, presented in the 
previous section, indicates that the parties' exchange relations did not incorporate trust as 
reliability or calculated risk. City Police's monitoring mechanism was put in place because 
they did not know Construction Pic and the nature of the risk they presented, and did not 
feel they could rely on them. In a similar vein, Construction Pic's monitor was put in place 
because the former did not know M&E Co. and lacked knowledge of services. M&E 
Co.'s apparent reliance on Construction Pic was a commercial necessity rather than a 
conscious choice based on calculated risk.
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The parties' exchange relations did not incorporate trust as predictability, based on the 
risk reducing mechanism of the contract. Firstly, the onerous payments systems of 
Construction Pic and M&E Co. were supported by direct supervision. Secondly, the 
punitive legal sanctions in the organisations' respective contracts could not ensure 
conformance and did not prevent the companies from behaving unco-operatively. Thirdly, 
the contracts were used to reduce one party's risk by passing it on to the subordinate 
party in the relationship rather than by helping to reduce uncertainty. Fourthly, the 
acceptance of risk by the subordinate party resulted in their unpredictably confrontational 
behaviour.
City Police manipulated Construction Pic into accepting the terms and conditions of their 
engagement by creating the impressions that the design information was based on the 'as 
built' dimensions of the building. They thus concealed the true nature of the extent of the 
works involved. Construction Pic passed on these impressions to M&E Co.. As the works 
progressed, and the onerous nature of Construction Pic's and M&E Co.'s tasks became 
clear, the M&E Co-ordinator tried to create further impressions that M&E Co. would be 
able to claim additional rewards for the extra works they were undertaking. He thus tried 
to manipulate M&E Co.'s Project Engineer into co-operation. However, the Project 
Engineer, though capitulating to the contractual requirements, did not commit resources 
to the installation based on his instructions from M&E Co.'s directors.
6.4.2 OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
Dysfunctional conflict characterised the operations of the project, the interpersonal 
relations of Construction Pic and the M&E Co., and those of the latter and Services 
Associates. Manifestations of conflict may be attributed to latent conflict at the brief
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preparation, design and construction stages, and the project management and control 
systems implemented.
Latent conflict at brief preparation stage
Although the brief preparation stage was not included in the investigation, the inductive 
use of the evidence collected during the later stages pointed to the emergence of latent 
conflict amongst the four elements of physical form of the facility, its function, 
construction cost, and construction period. The physical form of the facility incorporated 
a the two-storey extension on top of the building, which had to be reduced to a single- 
storey. Owing to time limitations the redesign associated with this reduction was deferred 
until the construction works began, therefore it could not be programmed or costed. The 
function of the building necessitated an extensive and complicated services system the 
effectiveness of which depended on the availability of adequate ceiling space. This could 
have been established by the building survey, however, time and cost restrictions 
prevented the survey. Time limitations further hampered the thoroughness with which the 
design of services should have been carried out.
Latent conflict at design stage
The contradictions amongst the physical form of the facility, its function, construction 
cost, and construction period, were handled in the following way. The Project 
Administrator rescheduled the design programme to include the redesign of the top storey 
extension. The building and services design drawings were based on an old set of survey 
drawings, which did not reflect the built state of the building. The tasks of building survey 
and a thorough services design were included in the services performance and
specification document. Therefore the latent conflict between building form, structure and 
services was left unresolved until a later date.
Latent conflict at construction stage
The conflicting elements of the brief preparation and those of the design led to problems 
of conformance to brief and conformance to design at the construction stage. The effect 
of these problems was compounded by the fact that resolution was left too late in the 
production process. Moreover because the problems were passed on to the contractors in 
an underhanded way, they created aggressive responses that had repercussions to the 
determent of every participant involved.
Conflict arising from project management and control systems
The M&E Co-ordinator did not succeed in creating a co-operative relationship with M&E 
Co.'s project staff. That is why collaboration and joint problem solving were distinctly 
absent from this relationship. Construction Pic's reduced tender price may not have 
accommodated risk sharing with M&E Co. or the provision of additional incentives to the 
latter. However, monitoring the hopeless performance of M&E Co. with no 
improvements in sight, and being aware of the root cause of their poor performance but 
not offering any realistic solutions, was hardly a proactive approach to the management of 
services installation/construction interface. It was almost as if higher level managers or 
directors of Construction Pic had recognised the problems as irresolvable and, despite 
gestures to the contrary such as director level meetings and angry or passionate site 
meetings, did not care how the project performed. They seemed to have decided to go to 
arbitration or litigation long before the project's completion was in sight. The fact that the
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position of M&E Co-ordinator was filled by three different people during the course of 
the project, goes some way to supporting this speculation.
As far as could be gathered during the investigation, the Project Manager had problems in 
leading the site management team owing to his inadequate experience. He spent little time 
in the site meetings with M&E Co. because he attended to the work on site. Therefore he 
missed out on the perspectives and problems of M&E Co.'s engineers. He had problems 
keeping abreast of the changes in the construction programme as well as the progress of 
the works. All these factors contributed to the emergence of dysfunctional conflict 
between the Project Manager and M&E Co.'s site staff which, on one occasion, 
culminated in his dismissal of one of M&E Co.'s operatives. The haphazard and adhoc 
way in which the construction inputs were organised and managed proved ineffective and 
led to additional work and rework. It is hardly any wonder that the project overran its 
construction cost by 32% and was a year late.
6.4.3 MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
To assess Construction Pic's conflict management, their project planning in terms of risk 
management through the three phases of identification, analysis and response to risk is 
examined (Lewis, Cheetham and Carter, 1992: 80-1; see Chapter 2: 74-5; Chapter 4: 
Table 4.7). To assess the impact of Construction pic's conflict management on M&E 
Co.'s performance, the former's response to conflict, whether passive or active, and the 
type of behaviour this engendered in the project staff is examined (Ibid.).
Construction Pic's risk management proved to have been far too inadequate. They did not 
foresee the nature and extent of risk posed by the refurbishment works and the services
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installation. Although they identified contingencies and allocated sums of money to them, 
changes in the scope of works, complexities of the refurbishment process, and delays by 
M&E Co. led to huge target cost and programme overruns. Construction Pic's response 
to risk was to either retain it, as in the case of the risk contained in the works; or to 
transfer it, as in the case of the risk contained in the services installation design, and 
reduction of the trade contractors' prices through negotiations. The Project Manager's 
response to conflict between Construction Pic and M&E Co. tended to be creative and 
oriented towards co-operative and joint problem solving at the start of the installation. 
However, as the problems persisted and enlarged, the Project Manager's response to 
conflict became more aggressive displaying a domineering attitude. Thus conflict between 
the two organisations escalated.
M&E Co.'s risk management was flawed. They did not identify the extent of the risks 
comprehensively at all. Therefore the contingencies assigned to the project were far too 
insignificant. They tried to transfer as much of the risk to their subcontractors as they 
could, and attempted to retain the rest. However, the scale of the risk was such soon they 
were consumed by it. The response of M&E Co.'s Project Engineer to conflict between 
M&E Co. and Construction Pic tended to be either passive, manifested as shallow 
commitment to the project goals, and capitulative, undertaking the works required of 
them by the specification document; or aggressive, displayed as withdrawal of co- 
operation, and compromising.
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6.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the Police Station project scenario to facilitate the 
interpretation of the project participants' interorganisational and interpersonal relations, to 
link them to the occurrence of conflict, and to interpret the impact of conflict handling 
and resolution methods on the performance of project participants. Section 6.2, presented 
a descriptive account of the organisations participating in the project, the engagement 
criteria of the design team members, the main contractor, and the M&E contractor, and 
the conception, history, design and construction of the facility. Section 6.3, interpreted 
the implications of the contracting parties' engagement criteria for the parties' relations, in 
terms of establishing power disparity and giving rise to various forms of power strategies, 
rather than trust, in their interorganisational relations. Section 6.3 moreover interpreted 
the Project Manager's and the Site Manager's leadership, motivation, participation, and 
team building strategies as theoretically appropriate to the project situation. However, it 
recognised the ineffectiveness of these strategies in achieving collaboration and co- 
operation with the M&E contractor, or in enforcing or enhancing the participants' 
performance.
Section 6.4, traced the occurrence of conflict in contractual and interorganisational 
relations of the contracting parties, and in operational and interpersonal relations of the 
project participants. Conflict was attributed to the contractual framework, the building 
project environment, the project coalition structure, culture and technology, in the former 
relations. It was related to latent conflict at the brief preparation, design and construction 
stages, and to project management and control systems, in the latter relations. This
section further interpreted the way conflict was managed and the impact this made on the 
performance of the main and the M&E contractors.
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CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the findings of the three cases presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, by 
comparing and contrasting them, and proposes generalisable conclusions. It is organised 
in two sections. Section 7.2, compares and contrasts the findings of the cases thematically 
in relation to the secondary questions formulated in Chapter 2. It thus provides the 
premise for answering the three research questions posed in Chapter 1. Section 7.3, 
answers the research questions, establishes patterns based on the thematic analyses and 
draws generalisable conclusions with theoretical implications.
7.2 ANALYSIS
The comparison and contrast of the cases are carried out on the basis of the questions and 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, and clustered thematically under: Conflict and its 
relation to behaviour and performance, contractual/interorganisational conflict,
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operational/interpersonal conflict, and management of conflict and its impact on 
performance. Each question constitutes the heading or theme under which the analytical 
comparison and contrast are carried out.
CONFLICT AND ITS RELATION TO BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE
This theme contains the questions relating to the emergence of both creative and 
dysfunctional conflict in building project coalitions, and their impact on the behaviour and 
performance of project participants.
Ql) Why does conflict arise in building project coalitions?
Conflict in both its creative and dysfunctional manifestations is an outcome of procedures 
and attitudes. As the case studies demonstrate, procedures dominate the organisation and 
management of building project coalitions from inception to completion. They secure the 
business contract, thus governing the nature of the interorganisational relations based on 
the relative power they broker to each party. They determine the form, function, cost and 
production period of the building, and specify and realise its configuration and 
performance criteria. They facilitate the flow of information, communication, decision 
making, management authority and control of inputs. They thus direct the effectiveness 
with which the building production process is organised and managed. Procedures contain 
contradictions. They are driven by diverse interests. They attempt to reconcile conflicting 
elements and requirements. They are designed to accommodate or achieve opposing 
objectives. Therefore procedures within building project coalitions are inherently 
conflictual.
Procedures are carried out by human agents and are consequently subject to their 
attitudes. Human attitudes are formed by their respective organisations' goals and targets, 
on the one hand, and their personal aspirations and personalities, on the other. Therefore, 
they are likely to conflict either at the level of agents' organisational orientations, for 
instance during negotiations, or as a result of their personality clashes. Based on the 
above account, and in so far that the selection of human agents is carried out by their 
respective organisations and is rarely based on project oriented criteria, the propensity for 
the collision of attitudes on building project coalitions is high.
Q2) Why does conflict become dysfunctional?
Creative conflict that encourages collaboration on the basis of collective problem solving 
may become dysfunctional when the project participants resort to politics to pursue their 
aims, or when they lose motivation. The political strategies adopted by the participants, be 
they direct control, responsible autonomy, domination, or manipulation, are the direct 
outcome of distributive bargaining that characterises building project coalitions, on the 
one hand, and the absence of trust between negotiators, on the other. The decline in 
motivation may be associated with the onerous nature of reward and punishment. Parties 
may perceive that the rewards are too small and the penalties, too large; that high 
performance does not have a direct and positive bearing on the rewards obtained; and that 
the goal difficulty is disproportionately higher than the levels of performance achievable 
by the available resources. On the other hand, low motivation may be linked to levels of 
satisfaction. The parties may perceive that their requirements have not been fulfilled or 
have been ignored; that they have been unfairly treated; and that the project manager's 
leadership has been ineffective.
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Q3) How does it affect the behaviour and performance of the parties in building 
project coalitions?
Dysfunctional conflict arising from distributive bargaining at the start of the project has a 
direct and adverse impact on the resources allocated to the project by the participants, as 
all three cases demonstrated. On the one hand, the participant organisations cannot assign 
adequate numbers or calibre of staff to the projects. This has a negative influence on the 
parties' ability to effectively organise and manage the works. On the other hand, they 
cannot pay their subcontractors and labour-only subcontractors adequately. This has an 
adverse impact of on their productivity.
Dysfunctional conflict arising from the decline in the parties' motivation has a direct and 
negative bearing on their levels of aspiration and willingness to apply initiative and expend 
effort. On the one hand, the participants' representatives feel that their contribution, be it 
at the level of the organisation or person, is not valued adequately or is undervalued. This 
results in their unwillingness to co-operate or collaborate in resolving difficulties and 
problems, as was the case in the Cultural Centre and the Police Station. On the other 
hand, the representatives feel that they are being discriminated against. This results in their 
deliberate withdrawal of co-operation to the detriment of the project, as the example of 
the Police Station project demonstrated.
The above questions correspond to the three research questions posed in Chapter 1. They 
are elaborated further under the themes of contractual/interorganisational conflict, 
operational/interpersonal conflict, management of conflict, and impact of conflict on 
performance below.
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CONTRACTUAL/INTERORGANISATIONAL CONFLICT
This theme aggregates the questions relating to the emergence of conflict attributed to the 
contractual framework, the building project environment, project coalition structure, 
culture, and technology, on the one hand; and the questions relating to various forms of 
trust in the project participants' exchange relations, on the other. The questions address 
research questions 1 and 2 posed in Chapter 1.
Q4) What is the link between the procurement method implemented and 
intracoalition conflict?
The evidence from the cases demonstrates a direct, though subtle, correlation between the 
procurement method implemented and intracoalition conflict amongst services 
consultants, main contractors, and M&E contractors. The correlation is attributed firstly, 
to the division of responsibility between professional and commercial interests; secondly, 
to the contractual independence of these interests; thirdly, to the dilution of one party's 
control over the functions and activities of the other; and fourthly, to the functional 
dependence of the interests and the need for their integration. For example, the integration 
of service related professional and commercial interests in the Cold Store led to relatively 
less intracoalition conflict between the main and the M&E contractor, compared with the 
Cultural Centre and the Police Station. The contractual independence of the services 
consultants and the M&E contractors in the latter two projects meant that neither the 
professionals nor the commercial contractors were willing to fully commit to the project. 
The dilution of the parties' control over one another implied that neither could enforce the 
performance of the other. These factors led to high level of frustration and political 
activity on both sides, directed at standing their ground.
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The impact of the nature and length of relationships between the participant organisations 
on the occurrence of intracoalition conflict is ambiguous. On the one hand, the well 
established relationships in the Cold Store appeared to contain conflict in sharp contrast 
to the almost non-existent relationships in the Cultural Centre which seem to have 
promoted conflict. On the other hand, the existence of a degree of relationship between 
the client and the main contractor on the Police Station project did not appear to make 
any difference to the occurrence or indeed the resolution of conflict.
Q5) Why do Japanese management methods succeed to avoid or contain conflict, 
or not as the case may be, in the context of the British construction industry?
Despite the Japanese ownership of the main contractor on the Cultural Centre, the 
management methods implemented in the organisation and execution of design and 
construction were not Japanese. That is, they were not the methods implemented in the 
design and construction of buildings in Japan. The main explanation that may be offered, 
based on the data gathered, is the differing context of operation. In Japan, the main 
contractor would use their in-house design team and would co-ordinate design inputs 
more effectively using CAD because that is what all the other contractors do. Therefore 
the additional cost associated with in-house design and co-ordination would not 
undermine the main contractor's competitiveness. Furthermore, the relationship between 
the main and the trade contractors are quite different in Japan as discussed in Chapter 2 
(p. 68). That is why the management methods implemented by the main contractor did not 
succeed to avoid or contain conflict.
Q6) To what extent does the project environment contribute to the emergence of 
conflict between the project participants?
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Based on the evidence presented by all three cases the project environment has a direct 
and significant impact on the emergence of conflict between the project participants. 
Economically, the disproportionate supply and demand conditions - in the case of this 
research, the excess of supply compared to the limited demand - create relative positions 
of dependence and power in business exchange relations. This economic power disparity 
is exploited in the process of bargaining and negotiations between the parties. 
Commercially, the gap between the knowledge and experience of the supply side 
compared to that of the demand side in the exchange relation also creates relative 
positions of power and dependence. This commercial power disparity is exploited, in the 
process of bargaining and negotiations between the parties, to counter the economic 
power disparity. Thus conflict emerges between the economic and commercial interests.
The history of the project participants' interorganisational relations constitutes another 
aspect of the project environment that contributes to the emergence of conflict between 
the participants. This was demonstrated in the case projects by the severity of 
dysfunctional conflict occurring between the project participants who did not have a 
history of working relationship. For instance, in the Cold Store, the rift between the client 
and the main contractor was the source of greatest relationship conflict, whereas in the 
Cultural Centre, the divisions between the main contractor and the design team members 
caused the most conflict. In the Police Station, the gulf between the main contractor and 
the M&E contractor correlated with high levels of dysfunctional conflict between them.
Q7) What power strategies and tactics are adopted by the participants?
To pursue its interest, the economically powerful party adopts one or a combination of 
strategies of direct control, responsible autonomy, or use of power in its attempt to
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dominate the dependent party by preventing or defeating conflict. In response, the 
economically dependent party defends its interest by relying on its knowledge and 
experience and discretion in the use of this knowledge and experience in its attempt to 
resist the former's domination. Thus the economically dependent party creates and 
encourages conflict towards its own ends.
The strategy of direct control is operationalised through systems of monitoring and 
approval, on the one hand, and supervision, on the other. The strategy of responsible 
autonomy is implemented through granting discretion in the organisation, management 
and execution of work. The strategy of using power is activated through tactics of 
enforcement and coercion. The above strategies are resisted by short-circuiting or 
bypassing systems of monitoring and approval, as the main contractor in the Cold Store 
project did; or under resourcing the project and not performing the tasks required, as the 
M&E contractors in all three projects did; or refusing to submit to coercion and pursuing 
one's own intentions, as the M&E contractor in the Police Station project did. The on 
going process of negotiations during the project life cycle is dominated by the power 
strategies and tactics of the parties and gives rise to circuits of power and resistance 
(Clegg, 1989: 207, 18; Chapter 2: 17).
Q8) How does the project coalition structure contribute to the emergence of 
conflict between the project participants?
The hierarchy of subcontracting relations, which based on the cases appear to be a feature 
of building project coalitions irrespective of the procurement method implemented, 
engender formalised systems of communication between the tiers. The primary function of 
these systems is to record the dissemination of information through the appropriate
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channels for the purpose of Quality Assurance or future disputes. Therefore the 
communication systems appear to be designed to satisfy the contractual or auditing 
requirements of projects rather than the practical necessities of collaboration. Their 
corollary function appears to be to provide the opportunity for information not to get to 
its destination on time for reasons of 'getting lost in the post', or 'trapped in 
organisations' systems', etc. Thus the co-operation of project participants tends to be left 
to the facilitation capabilities of the project manager/co-ordinator or the discretion of the 
representatives. It is perhaps no wonder that smoothly functioning creative teams are not 
characteristic of building project coalitions.
The competitive fee bidding and tender processes followed by negotiations between the 
contracting parties, which underpin the formation of the subcontracting relations, create 
competitive conditions. As the uncertainties inherent to the project unfold during the 
project life cycle the competitive conditions give rise to further negotiations over the 
parties' inputs and outputs and encourage political activity on both sides. The nature of 
the political activity and its outcome depends on the power disparity and strategies 
adopted by the parties as discussed in Question 7, above. However, the structure of the 
project coalition and the formal system of communication that links the structural tiers 
together, reinforce the intracoalition politics and conflict amongst the project participants. 
All three cases provided good examples of conflicting parties using the ineffectiveness of 
communication systems to pursue their own objectives.
Q9) To what extent is a conscious attempt made by the project organisers to create 
cohesive cultures within building project coalitions?
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The evidence from the case studies demonstrates that by putting in place systems for 
monitoring the quality of production and enforcing health and safety regulations, the 
project organisers made a conscious attempt to create collective consensus in relation to 
these aspects of the project. The extent to which shared values, shared meaning, and 
shared understanding were created in relation to production quality varied across the 
projects according to the importance the project organisers attached to it. For example, in 
the Cold Store the production quality was related to the budget, whilst in the Cultural 
Centre it took precedence over cost, and in the Police Station it was taken very seriously. 
The enforcement of Health and Safety requirements was treated stringently in all three 
cases because they were mandatory and the onus of accidents occurring as a result of 
failure to observe these regulations fell upon the project organisers.
Apart from quality and site safety no other attempts were made by the project organisers 
to create cohesion through the systematic application of procedures, or facilitation of 
aligning objectives and attitudes through team building. Where a history of co-operation 
existed between organisations, as in the case of the Cold Store's main contractor, 
architect and structural engineer, cohesion appeared to occur naturally. Where it did not, 
as in the case of the Cultural Centre and the Police Station, cohesion was never reached.
Q10)What impact does the technology implemented in the production, co- 
ordination, integration and control of information make on the occurrence of
conflict?
The evidence from all three cases indicates that the available technology was not used 
optimally and effectively to produce, co-ordinate and integrate information. For instance, 
the design team members on both the Cold Store and the Cultural Centre projects used
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incompatible CAD systems to produce their design information, on the one hand, and 
assigned inadequate CAD operators to information production, on the other. Therefore 
information was produced slowly and could not be disseminated swiftly through 
electronic transfers. This gave rise to a fragmented process of information production the 
co-ordination and integration of which was left to manual means and depended on the 
capabilities of the Project Manger on the Cold Store and the Design Co-ordinator on the 
Cultural Centre. The production of installation information on the Police Station project, 
though fundamentally flawed by virtue of being based on erroneous data, suffered from 
similar problems of non-existent central CAD system and human resource inadequacies.
It can therefore be concluded that the fragmented information production processes create 
problems of control over the quality and dissemination of information, which in turn lead 
to the failure to reconcile the functional interdependencies of the information producers. 
Thus conflicts arise between project organisers and information producers. The poor 
quality of information combined with its slow dissemination and conflicts amongst the 
functional requirements of the building, have adverse impacts on the progress of the 
works on site and create further conflicts between project organisers and producers.
Qll) To what extent does trust, as * reliability', feature in the exchange relations of 
project participants? Is it underpinned by calculation?
Trust as reliability in the sense of one party's decision to accept the risk in the other 
party's performance (Gambetta, 1988: 217), did not feature in the exchange relations of 
the project participants. Firstly, the expectation of an on going relationship did not exist 
other than in the relation between the client and the main contractor in the Cultural 
Centre. Secondly, when it did exist it did not provide adequate collateral for trust.
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Thirdly, the transaction costs in the form of 'self-protective' actions such as agents 
monitoring or controlling the subordinate party's actions were incurred as a matter of 
course and were included in the contract budget or main contractors' tender price. 
Fourthly, because the project participants were by and large selected on the basis of price 
rather than past performance in previous exchanges, the nature of their performance was 
unknown and could not be relied upon. Furthermore, even reputable companies did 
perform as well as was expected of them because their performance was linked to their 
resources and their resources were in short supply. Lastly and most importantly, 
governance structures incorporating constant monitoring and consultation by and between 
all project members were limited resulting in lack of commitment on the part of members. 
In the light of this discussion, the exchange relations of project participants appear to be 
underpinned entirely by calculation rather than trust.
Q12) To what extent does trust as predictability enter the project participants' 
relations? Is it underpinned by legal sanctions?
Trust as predictability in the sense of shared meanings and shared understanding created 
by the contract documents, and common expectations and beliefs conveyed by societal 
and business norms (Sydow, 1988: 36), was low in the project participants' relations. 
Firstly, codification of meaning in the contract documents was vague and open to 
interpretation by various project participants. Therefore it failed to constitute a universal 
message to all concerned. Secondly, the societal and business norms are oriented towards 
quick short-term gains. Thirdly the current norms in the construction industry have 
created the common expectations that tender prices, of both consultants and contractors, 
are negotiated down at tender stage and built back up during the project through claims 
for extra work. The common beliefs are that the clients drive a hard bargain, that
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consultants have no practical understanding of construction or services installation, that 
contractors inflate their prices, and that each organisation is concerned with its own 
business or project objectives. Thus the conditions for contractual trust, namely, the 
effectiveness with which the contract promotes information flow, spreads the costs of 
conflict, monitors organisations, and reduces uncertainty (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998: 
155), are not satisfied. Based on this discussion, the project participants' relations appear 
to be underpinned by legal sanctions rather than predictability and the contractual trust it 
is supposed to engender.
Q13) To what extent are impressions of trust created through power-induced 
predictability and capitulation? Are these impressions based on domination 
and dependency, respectively?
There was ample evidence of impressions of trust created through power-induced 
predictability by dominant parties in the exchange relations, and degrees of capitulation by 
the more dependent parties. The practice indicated opportunism and low levels of trust on 
the part of the former, and dependence on the part of the latter. The varying degrees and 
patterns of capitulation appear to correlate with the size and financial strength of the 
organisations involved. For instance, the M&E contractor on the Cold Store project, who 
was a small firm in serious financial problems, capitulated most of all by accelerating the 
works and managing to finish within the time allocated - including the extension of time 
granted by the client. It is possible that the legal sanctions included in their contract 
provided the incentive for timely completion. It may also be possible that the potential for 
future work with a sizeable contracting company provided the impetus for their final 
effort. The M&E contractor on the Cultural Centre project, though also a small firm 
experiencing financial difficulties, did not capitulate as much and certainly contributed to
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the two months delay in the completion of the project. Judging by their history and the 
project manager's comments, it is likely that they would have declared themselves 
bankrupt had the main contractor attempted to obtain liquidated damages from them. The 
M&E contractor on the Police Station project, who matched the main contractor in terms 
of size and financial strength, did not capitulate by accelerating the works as a matter of 
principle. Instead they chose to fight the main contractor.
OPERATIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT
This theme combines the questions relating to the emergence of latent conflict at brief 
preparation, design and construction stages, on the one hand; and conflict arising from 
project management and control systems, on the other. The questions address research 
questions 2 and 3 posed in Chapter 1.
Q14) What types of conflict emanate from the brief preparation stage?
The conflict amongst elements of brief preparation appears to give rise to conflict 
amongst the project participants who's interests are closely associated with one or a 
combination of the elements. For example, the client is generally interested in all four 
elements of brief preparation, whilst the consultants tend to be more interested in the form 
and function of the building, and the contractors in construction cost and duration. 
Therefore conflicts tend to occur between the commercial interests of the client and the 
professional interests of the consultants, between the former and the commercial interests 
of the main contractor, and between the latter and the professional interests of the 
consultants. In other words, conflict tends to be associated with the differences in the 
parties' perspectives, perceptions, objectives and priorities.
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Q15) How do they impact on the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, and 
willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
The conflicts of perspectives, perceptions, objectives, and priorities amongst the project 
participants present them with the challenge of reconciliation; of how to arrive at a 
common solution to the problem of building design and construction that will meet the 
conflicting criteria. The participants' requirement to pursue their respective interests 
motivate them to apply initiative directed towards competing with the others in the first 
instance, then negotiating, and finally reaching a compromise. The nature of the 
compromise depends on the strength or persuasiveness of the dominant interest and may 
or may not secure the co-operation and commitment of the other parties.
Q16) What types of conflict emanate from the design stage?
The conflict arising from the project participants' differing requirements is potentially 
creative and may result in a better design achieved through co-operative and joint problem 
solving, as some of the evidence from the Cold Store project demonstrated. When the 
participants' requirements diverge widely, or when the creative conflict is not managed 
well, as was the case in the Cultural Centre project, the conflict becomes dysfunctional. It 
may take the form of denial manifested as withdrawal of co-operation; it may be avoided 
through shallow commitment to project goals; or it may lead to capitulation. When the 
requirements of the parties to the design process are irreconcilable due to restrictions 
imposed by the project criteria, as was the case in the Police Station, the conflict may 
remain unresolved, or be suppressed, or be passed on to another party.
Q17) How do they impact upon the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, 
and willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
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In so far that creative conflict involves integrative bargaining and a process of give and 
take, it motivates the project participants to apply initiative and reach a solution that 
integrates their objectives with those of the others. Dysfunctional conflict, on the other 
hand, involves distributive bargaining and a process of giving by one party and taking by 
the other during which one side's requirements are satisfied at the expense of the other 
side's. Dysfunctional conflict therefore challenges the organisational goals and objectives 
of some of the participants, motivating them to pursue their individual interests and 
objectives contrary to those of the others and the project.
Q18) What types of conflict emanate from the construction stage?
The conflict arising from the problems of conformance to design may be creative, leading 
to collective resolution of problems on site; and may be dysfunctional, leading to 
resistance by subcontractors' foremen or operatives. Resistance may take a number of 
forms. It may be passive and involve conflict denial, manifested as withdrawal of co- 
operation; or conflict avoidance represented by shallow commitment to project goals; or 
capitulation, denoting suppression of conflict. It may, on the other hand, be aggressive 
and involve refusal to show initiative; or refusal to co-operate; or over inflation of 
demands. Resistance may jeopardise the interests of the project participants and thus lead 
to problems of conformance to brief. These problems may prolong or escalate the conflict 
amongst the project participants.
Q19) How do they impact upon the participants' level of aspiration, motivation, 
and willingness to apply initiative and expend effort?
Creative conflict by virtue of accommodating the problem owners' perspectives, 
objectives, and interests creates good will amongst them, reinforces their relationships and
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encourages future initiative. These qualities were observed on the Cold Store project. 
Dysfunctional conflict, on the other hand, acts as a demotivator and discourages co- 
operation, reduces commitment, and directs the participants' initiative towards 
maintaining their profit levels and protecting their individual interests. In extreme cases, 
dysfunctional conflict promotes confrontation, and leads it to the bitter end of arbitration 
or litigation, as demonstrated by the Police Station project.
Q20) To what extent does the project manager9 s leadership style cause conflict?
In so far that the project manager's leadership style is oriented towards achieving the 
commercial interests of the main contractor, i.e., project cost and programme targets, it 
may cause conflict with other interests, i.e., the client's, the consultants', or the trade 
contractors'. Examples of conflicts thus created are provided by all three cases. 
Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the project manager's leadership style to enforce the 
performance of other project participants may cause conflict between the party whose 
requirements have been compromised and the party whose requirements have dominated. 
Examples of situations giving rise to this type of conflict are found in the Cultural Centre 
and the Polices Station projects.
Q21) How effective can leadership be in motivating group members, encouraging 
their participation in decision-making, forging them into a team, avoiding or 
managing conflict and having a positive impact on the participants' 
performance?
The effectiveness of leadership in motivating group members is limited. Because group 
members represent distinct and disparate organisations, their motivation is related to the 
extent to which their respective organisations' requirements and objectives are being met.
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This is amply demonstrated by all three cases. Leadership can have considerable influence 
on encouraging group members' participation in decision-making, provided the 
appropriate mechanisms are in place. That is, provided all the group members are engaged 
at the same time and have the opportunity of partaking in the decision making process, 
and provided the decisions reached collectively are honoured by all members. Such a 
mechanism was in place on the Cold Store project and was definitely missing on the 
Cultural Centre project. Leadership can forge people into a team if, and only if, they are 
team players and the importance of team work has been emphasised at the start of the 
project. Team building cannot and does not evolve automatically during the course of the 
project, as the Cultural Centre and the Police Station projects demonstrated. It needs to 
be worked at.
Leadership may contribute significantly to management of conflict by way of leader's 
response to conflict. However, as the cases indicated, conflict may arise from factors over 
which the leader does not have much control. Therefore leadership alone cannot 
determine the management of conflict. Finally, although leadership may influence the 
participants' approach to joint decision-making and team work, and the way conflict is 
handled, it has a limited impact upon their performance. Because, as the cases 
demonstrated, performance is closely linked to the level of resources, which are in turn 
determined by the market transaction between the parties.
Q22)How do divisions within the flow of management authority give rise to
conflict?
Divisions in the flow of management authority correspond to the divisions or interfaces 
between the influence of various interests. Consequently they represent the points at
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which the two disparate interests clash. For instance, the management authority of the 
main contractor ends at the interface with the trade contractors' foremen. Therefore 
instructions given by the main contractor's site management team to the trade 
contractors' operatives are for all intents and purposes null and void because they have to 
be communicated to the latter through their foremen. Conflict arises when this 
communication channel is by passed.
MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
This theme groups the questions relating to the way interorganisational and interpersonal 
conflict is handled and/or resolved. The questions address research question 2, and 3 
posed in Chapter 1.
Q23) How do the power strategies adopted by the participants impact on conflict 
handling, and on the resolution or escalation of conflict and the participants' 
performance?
Based on the evidence of the cases, power strategies orientated towards defeat of conflict 
give rise to the emergence of dysfunctional conflict (for example, the client's power 
strategy on the Cold Store project; the main contractor's power strategy on the Police 
Station project). The response to this conflict may be passive, particularly if the 
responding organisation is relatively dependent on the dominant organisation, as was the 
case on the Cultural Centre project. It may, on the other hand, be aggressive, particularly 
if the responding organisation is a match to the dominant organisation, as was the case on 
the Police Station project. Aggressive responses may lead to domination of the weaker 
party, distributive bargaining between the parties, or compromise. Passive response leads 
to poor performance by the weaker party, whilst aggressive response leads to both poor
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performance and escalation of conflict. Superficially, the powerful parties appear as the 
winners of the bargaining process. However, the project delays and budget overruns tend 
to implicate all the participants in the losing process in one way or another.
Q24)\Vhat conflict management methods are implemented by project managers 
and how do they impact on the participants9 performance?
The project managers on the case studies implemented a range of conflict management 
methods at different stages in the bargaining process, in relation to different participants, 
and under different circumstances. In the early stages they tended to engage in, or create 
the impression of wanting to engage in, co-operative and collective problem-solving with 
the project participants. As the bargaining process progressed and the clients' demands 
grew, they capitulated if they had to or if they could accommodate the demand; they 
compromised if they could get away with it; and they withdrew co-operation if they felt 
they were being unfairly treated. The withdrawal of co-operation was not observed in the 
Cultural Centre as the main contractor aimed to please the client almost at any cost.
In their bargaining process with the other participants, the project managers tended to 
compromise if the creative, co-operative and problem solving approach did not yield 
positive results. However, if the participants failed to deliver their tasks or their part of 
the bargain, the project managers responded aggressively by withdrawing their co- 
operation, as in the case of the Cultural Centre project, or trying to dominate, as in the 
case of the Police Station project. The co-operative approach was the most effective in 
terms of creating cohesion and commitment amongst the group members albeit it could 
not enforce effective performance. The compromising approach presented 
acknowledgement of reality and a degree of tolerance of the participants' predicaments.
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Although it did not improve performance, it is likely that it prevented escalation of 
conflict. The aggressive approach of withdrawing co-operation was the least effective in 
terms of creating divisions and shallow commitment to project goals on the part of other 
project participants. It led to escalation of conflict and poor or very poor performance.
The above questions help the investigation of conditions on the basis of which the truth or 
falsity of the following hypotheses is asserted.
HI) '[Contractual documents provide the constitutional and constitutive grounds 
and framework within which the meaning of the contract is negotiated, 
contested, and sometimes contained9 (Clegg, 1992: 135).
The evidence of changes in design and specification of the facility, during the project life 
cycle, suggests that the original contract documents - i.e., the concept design and 
specification - merely provided a framework for the construction of the facility. Within 
this framework, the nature of the facility - i.e., the meaning of the contract - was 
negotiated by the contracting parties, contested between them and sometimes contained. 
Thus this hypothesis is indicated to apply to this project.
H2) Conflict is an outcome of the 'functioning of power/knowledge relations on 
construction sites.' Manifestations of conflict represent 'the strategies of 
power of the participants in the site organisation seeking to maintain control 
over costs and profits' (Clegg, 1992: 139).
The evidence of the contracting parties' power relations manifested domination by one 
party, based on their power of reward and punishment, and resistance by the other, on the 
strength of their knowledge. This relation created conflict and gave rise to mobilisation of
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the parties' respective powers. The ensuing political activity involved the dominant side's 
strategy of controlling the other's actions and therefore cost of the project, and the 
dependent side's strategy of resisting this action to secure their profit. Based on this 
evidence, this hypothesis is argued to apply to this project.
H3) The building project coalition is organised as a network at the start of the 
project but may be transformed into a political organisation during the 
project life-cycle (Mintzberg, 1991 (d): 374; Pfeffer, 1981: 27-9).
The project coalitions studied bear the hallmarks of network organisations (see Chapter 4: 
Figure 4.5). However, negotiations over the meaning of the contract and bargaining over 
project goals, resulted in decisions by the participants that were inconsistent with 
maximising the attainment of project goals. This reflects the inability of control devices to 
align the divergent objectives of the heterogeneous participants with those of the project. 
The participants' power strategies and tactics led to conflictual actions, the outcome of 
which was determined by the parties' relative power. Therefore the project coalitions 
portrayed features of a power model of organisation, or a political organisation (Pfeffer, 
1981: 27-9; Mintzberg, 1991(d): 374). Thus this hypothesis is shown to be applicable to 
this project.
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7.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section concludes the investigation by discussing the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1, and further clustering the findings of the analysis into the four categories 
defined in Chapter 3, in order to reach generalisable conclusions with theoretical 
implications.
7.3.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The discussion of the first research question, is based on the findings of the secondary 
questions 1,2,4, and 6 through to 13, discussed in the previous section.
1. Why do main contractors' interorganisational and interpersonal relations with 
M&E contractors in building project coalitions give rise to conflict between the 
two parties?
The main and M&E contractors' interorganisational and interpersonal relations are 
embedded in contractual and operational contexts that comprise conflictual processes, 
procedures and attitudes. The project environment creates economic and commercial 
power disparity between the parties to the exchange relation. The economically powerful 
party (the main contractor) promotes its interest at every stage of the negotiation process 
through imposition of onerous control mechanisms such as the payment system, legal 
sanctions, etc. The commercially powerful party (the M&E contractor) protects its 
interest and resists the former by limiting resources, putting in place a mechanism for 
renegotiation of the contractual terms and costs, etc. Thus the parties' exchange relations 
becomes political, underpinned by calculation, legal sanctions, domination and various 
degrees of capitulation.
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Within the building project coalition, fragmentation of the information production process 
results in the division of responsibility between the professional interests of consultants 
and the commercial interests of M&E contractors. This division dilutes the parties' 
control over the others' functions and activities and, in the absence of adequate 
integrating mechanisms reconciling functional interdependencies, undermines the parties' 
commitment and propensity to co-operate. Thus cycles of power, resistance and conflict 
perpetuate through the on going negotiations.
The discussion of the second research question, is based on the findings of the secondary 
questions 3, 5 and 14 through to 24, discussed in the previous section.
2. How do main contractors' management processes facilitate or undermine their 
relations with M&E contractors?
Main contractors' management processes involve organisation of work, co-ordination and 
control of inputs, motivation of project participants, decision making and teamwork. All 
these processes include a degree of negotiations. These negotiations, based on the 
evidence of this investigation, tend to be distributive and are perceived by the M&E 
contractors to lead to unreasonable rewards in relation to the penalties, the performance 
levels required, and the M&E contractors' goal difficulty. They do not take account of the 
M&E contractors' needs and requirements and treat them unfairly. The decisions 
influencing M&E contractors' functions and activities are taken long before the 
contractors are engaged except for when the M&E contractor is involved in the design 
process, as was the case in the Cold Store project. No proactive method of team building 
seems to be engaged in by main contractors. Therefore main contractors' management 
processes tend to undermine their relations with M&E contractors.
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3. How do main contractors' management processes and interorganisational 
relations with M&E contractors affect the parties' productivity problems?
The imposition by main contractors' management processes of a rigid framework on a 
fluid situation through the establishment and emphasis of precise procedures that link 
imprecise and vague functions and activities, restrain and stifle spontaneous and creative 
problems solving. It thus has a dampening effect on the performance of M&E contractors 
amongst other project participants. This fact, in conjunction with the resource limitations 
that the main and M&E contractors' interorganisational relations effect, adversely affect 
both the main and the M&E contractors' productivity.
7.3.2 CONCLUSIONS
The following thematic patterns emerge from the findings of the analysis and the
discussion of the research questions.
Themes: The process of conflict
Conflict is the single, potentially most creative or destructive behavioural process that 
governs the nature and effectiveness of processes and procedures through which building 
products are conceptualised, conceived, designed and produced.
Conflict arises at the contractual and functional interfaces within these processes and 
procedures. On the one hand, it is the outcome of competition between economic power 
and professional/commercial knowledge. It represents 'the strategies of power of the 
participants in the site organisation seeking to maintain control over costs and profits' 
(Clegg, 1992: 139). On the other hand, it is the by product of the participants'
demotivation and indicates the failure of onerous control mechanisms as motivational 
strategies.
The processes and procedures constituting the contractual and interorganisational 
framework within which building production is organised, have a hierarchical 
configuration and therefore a vertical orientation. Those constituting the operational and 
interpersonal framework within which tasks are performed, have a sequential 
configuration and therefore a horizontal orientation. Conflict within the vertical and 
horizontal processes and procedures creates an adversarial web that engulfs the building 
production operations and dampens the performance of participant organisations' 
representatives.
Causes/explanations: Emergence of creative/dysfunctional conflict and its impact on 
performance
The processes and procedures constituting the conceptualisation, design and construction 
of building products are heterogeneous comprising disparate organisations transacting in a 
market based economic framework. The natural tendency of these organisations is to 
compete rather than co-operate. Competition is the means to their survival and prosperity 
often at the expense of others. Therefore the emergence of conflict within these processes 
is primarily linked to the economic and legal governance structures of exchange relations, 
the disaggregation of professional bodies and commercial associations, the behavioural 
theories of power, dependence, manipulation, and opportunism and the motivational 
theories of reward and punishment and job satisfaction.
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The economic and legal governance structures in the wider business context of building 
production processes neither regulate nor legislate for the way exchange relations are to 
be governed in a fair, co-operative and non-confrontational manner. The absence of 
regulation and appropriate legislation combined with the market forces encourage the 
imposition of onerous business agreements by economically more powerful interests on 
those more dependent. However, in so far that the meaning of the terms and conditions of 
these agreements are imprecise and the functions and activities they describe are 
interdependent, they are open to opportunistic interpretation by both sides and cannot be 
enforced fully or effectively. Thus they reinforce conflictual behaviour.
The disaggregation of professional bodies and commercial associations perpetuate the 
divisions amongst the building project participants and their divergent perspectives, 
perceptions, values and beliefs. They thus contribute to a divisive culture both in the 
broader context of the construction industry and within building project coalitions. These 
divisions combined with the punitive orientation of rewards, the absence of incentives, 
poor or non-existent motivational strategies and ignorance of motivational theories form 
discordant attitudes amongst project participants. The absence of systematic procedures 
for selection of individuals assigned to projects in conjunction with their spatially, 
temporally, and functionally fragmented contribution to the project, increases their 
propensity for disagreements and confrontation.
Relationships among people: Management of conflict
The participants' interpersonal relationships are predominantly governed by the 
emergence, recurrence and escalation of conflict. Consequently, they are significantly 
influenced by the contractual framework, the coalition structure, and the intracoalition
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politics, on the one hand; and the operational framework, the project environment, the 
coalition culture and the technologies used to produce, co-ordinate, integrate, and control 
information, on the other. Management processes have only a limited effect on the 
containment or resolution of interpersonal conflict because they cannot control or 
influence the root cause of conflict.
7.3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Emerging constructs
The concluding arguments to this investigation point to the need for some fundamental 
changes in both governance structures of building project coalitions as well as attitudes of 
project coalition representatives as the means by which productivity improvements may be 
carried out. Although such needs have already been identified to a degree and are 
currently being researched in the partnering and alliancing areas of knowledge, they are 
not taken to their logical extremes. The partnering and alliancing strategies tend to limit 
their process of relationship building to two or three key players in the project coalition. 
These strategies tend to be implemented in the context of team building workshops 
organised at the commencement of the project and are repeated a number of times during 
the project life cycle either as a matter of course or as the need for them arises.
A more fundamental approach to the integration of project participants and alignment of 
their interests and objectives with those of the project would require some degree of 
regulation and legislation. In the current low-trust business climate and low levels of 
propensity for trust-based business relationships, regulation and legislation are required to 
underpin the formation of lateral rather than vertical relations, across the entire supply 
chain, at the inception of the project. These relations would need to be supported by
incentive schemes that apportion both profits and risks equitably amongst all the project 
participants. Thus a fundamental culture change is anticipated across all sectors of the 
construction industry driven by legislation. Such changes are currently encouraged in 
some sectors such as social housing and the engineering process industry and are driven 
by the Housing Corporation and the ACTIVE initiative, respectively. The culture change 
is anticipated to permeate the building project coalitions through education and training of 
the new generation of professionals, and trades and crafts people, and re-education and 
retraining of the existing people.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES
CASE STUDY 1: THE COLD STORE
CONVERSATION WITH CONTRACTOR'S BV-HOUSE M&E ENGINEER (4.5.95)
1. What do you base your subcontractors' selection procedure on?
2. What criteria do you use in formulating the terms of appointment of your 
subcontractors?
QUESTIONNAIRE 1: INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT'S M&E CONSULTANT (14.6.95)
1. Why was there a joint venture between the project Financiers and the building 
Operators?
2. How was the joint venture established? What are the financial arrangements?
3. What is the project history? How was it conceived?
4. Is there a long-term relationship between the client and their architect?
5. When was planning approval granted?
6. Who selected the procurement method? Why?
7. Do you think that D&B was an appropriate method of procurement for this project?
8. Why do you, rather than the architect, act as the client's agent?
9. Who recommended you to the client?
10. Did you have to submit a competitive tender for your fees or did you negotiate them?
11. What do you think was the basis for your selection?
12. What were the M&E design requirements?
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13. What are your roles and responsibilities?
14. What is your design input?
15. What is the extent/scope of your design responsibility and liability?
16. What is your personal role and responsibility?
17. Was your engagement based on standard conditions of appointment? Were these 
altered in any way?
18. Who recommended and selected the client's other consultants? Why?
19. What are the roles and responsibilities of the client's other consultants?
20. Why were they not novated to the D&B contractor?
21. Did you have an input into the nomination of the M&E contractors? What was the 
basis for your nomination?
22. How do you interface with and communicate to other consultants?
23. How different is your design input under a Design and Build method compared to 
your normal practice?
24. Was your detail design, if any, carried out prior to the M&E work stage/letting of the 
M&E work package?
25. Did you liaise with the M&E contractor at the design stage?
26. Do you communicate with the M&E contractor at the construction stage?
27. Did you agree to a design programme?
28. What was the basis upon which the contractor was invited to tender?
29. What were the criteria upon which the Main Contractor was selected?
30. What is the contractor's architects' design input?
31. At what stage did the structural design alterations take place?
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QUESTIONNAIRE 2: INTERVIEW WITH M&E CONTRACTOR (6.7.95)
1. Were you invited to tender? By whom? Why?
2. What did the tendering process entail?
  
What information did the tender documents contain?
  
What information were you reqired to supply?
  
How long was the tendering period?
  
Did you know how many people you were competing against?
  
How long after the submission of tender were you selected?
3. What was you lead-in period?
4. What do you think was the basis for you selection?
5. Did you have to negotiate your price after selection?
6. What is the form of contract between you and the Main Contractor?
7. Is it a standard form or has it been altered?
8. Were there any onerous conditions imposed by the contractual terms?
9. What are your conditions of engagement?
10. Are you required to provide any Collateral Warranties/Performance bonds to the 
client?
11. What do you base your tender prices on?
12. What are your (the firm's) role and responsibilities?
13. What is the extent/scope of your design responsibility and liability?
14. Do you liaise with suppliers and manufacturers in the production of your design?
15. What are your personal role and responsibilities?
16. What are the role and responsibilities of lan?
17. How many subcontractors are involved with your work package?
18. How do you select and engage them?
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19. Who selects them?
20. What is the relationship between you and the subcontractors? Are they engaged as 
specialists or employed as domestic subcontractors?
21. What is the form of contract between you and your subcontractors?
22. Do you use standard forms or do you alter them?
23. Do you impose onerous conditions on your subcontractors?
24. What are your subcontractors' conditions of engagement?
25. Do you require them to provide Collateral Warranties/Performance Bonds?
26. How do you manage your subcontractors?
27. How do you ensure that they are:
  
motivated;
  
working as a team, that is,carrying out their roles and responsibilities,
interfacing effectuively with other trades, 
having reasonable social relations with other trades; and
  
performing, that is, capable of carrying out their task,
productive,
satisfactory in terms of workmanship, and 
observing the health and safety regulations?
28. How many operatives does each subcontractor employ?
29. Who manages the operatives?
30. How do you manage the work package in terms of:
  
information flow;
  
communication channels; and
  
decision-making?
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QUESTIONNAIRE 3: INTERVIEW WITH THE PROJECT MANAGER [compiled through 
informal conversations] (6 and 20 July 95)
1. Why do you think you were invited to tender?
2. What did the tendering process entail?
  
What information did the tender documents contain?
  
How long was the tendering period?
  
Did you know how many people you were competing against?
  
What information were you required to supply?
  
Who prepared the tender documents?
  
How long after the submission of tender were you selected?
3. What do you think was the basis for your selection?
4. Did you have to negotiate your price after selection?
5. What is the form of contract between you and the client?
6. Is it a standard form of has it been altered?
7. Are there any onerous conditions imposed by the contractual terms?
8. What are the conditions of your engagement?
9. Are you providing any Collateral Warranties/Performance Bonds to the client?
10. What was your lead-in period?
11. What are your role and responsibilities?
12. What are your design responsibilities and liabilities?
13. Were you, as a Design and Build contractor, involved in formulating the client's
requirements?
14. Is there a hierarchy within the design team?
15. What are your personal role and responsibilities?
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16. Who organised the construction process in terms of breaking it down into work 
packages and inviting tenders for each work package?
17. Who prepared the tender documents for the work packages?
18. Did you select all the trade/specialist contractors?
19. What is the relationship between your firm and the various trade contractors; are the 
latter engaged as specialist contractors or employed as domestic subcontractors?
20. How do you manage your trade contractors?
21. How do you ensure that they are:
  
motivated;
  
working as a team, i.e., carrying out their roles and responsibilities,
interfacing effectively with one another, 
having reasonable social relations, and
  
performing, i.e., capable of carrying out their task,
productive,
satisfactory in terms of workmanship, and 
observing the Health and Safety Regulations?
22. Who manages the trade/specialist contractors' subcontractors?
23. How did you select the M&E Contractor?
  
How many were included on the tender list and on what basis?
  
Who prepared the tender documents?
  
How long was the tender period?
24. Did you negotiate their price?
25. What is the form of contract between you and the M&E Contractor?
26. Is it a standard form or has it been altered?
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27. Are there any onerous conditions imposed by the contractual terms, in terms of 
payment, say?
28. What are the M&E Contractor's conditions of engagement?
29. Are they required to provide any Collateral Warranties/Performance Bonds to the 
client?
30. How has/is the project been/being managed in terms of:
  
information flow at design stage;
  
information flow at construction stage;
  
communication channels at design stage;
  
communication channels at construction stage;
  
decision-making processes at design stage; and
  
decision-making processes at construction stage?
QUESTIONNAIRE 4: MAIN CONTRACTOR'S PERFORMANCE (MC's VIEW) (23.7.96)
Contract
1. What were your conditions of appointment as set out in your letter of intent?
2. Where there any adverse consequences to working on the basis of a letter of intent 
rather than a form of contract?
Project Planning
3. How did you plan against risks/to cope with uncertainties?
4. What were your aims/objectives?
5. What were your goals and targets and how did you establish them?
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Project Organisation
6. How long have you known/worked with your design team members?
7. What were their conditions of appointment?
8. To what extent did the building design change throughout the contract, and Why?
Project Execution
9. How many construction stages/work packages did construction process comprise?
10. Did you know/had you worked with any of the Trade Contractors before?
11. To what extent did the building construction vary throughout the contract, Why?
Project Management
12. How did you manage risks and uncertainties throughout the contract?
13. How did your goals and targets shift and why?
14. How does the final cost of the building compare to the initial/tender cost? What are 
variations attributable to?
15. What problems did you experience with management of design process?
16. What problems, did you experience with management of construction process?
17. How could your organisation/management have improved?
18. How effective or instrumental was the Safety Plan in preventing accidents?
QUESTIONNAIRE 5: SERVICES CONTRACTOR'S PERFORMANCE (MCf s VIEW)
Contract
1. What were the Services Contractor's conditions of appointment as set out in their
letter of intent?
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2. Where there any adverse consequences to working on the basis of a letter of intent 
rather than a form of contract?
Planning of Services Works Package
3. Did the Services Contractor plan against risks/to cope with uncertainties?
4. Do you know what their aims/objectives were?
5. What were their Programme of works?
Organisation of Services Works Package
6. How was the services works package organised?
7. What was the Programme for various stages of Services Works Package?
8. To what extent did the services design change throughout the contract, and Why?
Execution of Services Works Package
9. Are you aware of the nature of relationship between Services Contractor and their 
sub-contractors?
10. To what extent did the services supply vary throughout the contract, Why?
Management of Services Works Package
11. How did Services Contractor manage risks and uncertainties during the contract?
12. How did their goals and targets shift and why?
13. How does the final cost of Services Works Package compare to the initial cost? What 
are variations attributable to?
14. What problems, if any, did they experience with management of Services design?
15. What problems, if any, did they experience with management of services supply?
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16. How could their organisation/management have improved?
17. How effective or instrumental was the Safety Plan in preventing accidents?
Quality of Services System Delivered
19. What was the outcome of the commissioning process?
20. Does the facility meet the performance criteria specified by Client's Services 
Consultant?
21. Is the Operator satisfied with the facility?
22. What does the Services Contractor's Warranty to the Client contain?
23. How could the Services Contractor's performance improve in terms of quality of the 
services system delivered?
CASE STUDY 2: THE CULTURAL CENTRE
QUESTIONNAIRE 1: INTERVIEW WITH THE DESIGN CO-ORDINATOR (22 MAY 1995)
Phase 1
1. How many floors did phase 1 contain? Was it completed on time?
2. What was the contract value?
3. Where did the main contractor fit in the project organisation?
4. Why was he engaged?
5. What was Japan Construction's role in phase 1?
Phase 2
6. What is the contract value?
7. Why did the client choose the turnkey method of procurement?
8. Who is/are the clients agent/s?
9. How many work packages does phase two contain?
10. What is the role and responsibilities of the in-house design team?
11. What is the role and responsibilities of the external architects?
12. Why did the external architects contact Japan Construction?
13. Do Japan Construction have a long-standing relationship with the Japanese client?
14. Why did Japcol agree to finance the project?
15. Why did financial arrangements inhibit the engagement of external architects by the 
client?
16. What were the bases upon which the architect selected the consultants?
17. Why is there no Bill of Quantities?
18. What do you mean by 'labour return1 required with a breakdown of prelims?
19. Were all the consultants appointed at the same time?
20. How many construction stages are involved in phase 2? Do they correspond to work 
packages?
21. How many stages have been completed?
QUESTIONNAIRE 2: INTERVIEW WITH ARCHITECTS (26 MAY 1995)
Phase 1
1. Why was there a joint venture between the English and the Japanese clients in phase
1?
2. Was there a main contractor engaged in phase 1 ?
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Phase 2
3. What is the nature of the Japanese client? Are they a financial institution?
4. What are the financial arrangements?
5. Who owns the land on which the cultural centre is being constructed?
6. What is the history of the project? How was it conceived?
7. Which one of the clients chose the Turnkey method of procurement and why?
8. What is the extent/scope of your design responsibility and liability?
9. What are your (you and Martin's) roles and responsibilities?
10. Were the RIBA Conditions of Appointment used? Have these been altered in any 
way?
11. What is your design input in terms of M&E services?
12. Did you recommend all the consultants - structural, M&E, audio-visual and acoustic 
- used? Why?
13. How do you interface with and communicate to other consultants?
14. How different is your design input under a Turnkey method compared to your normal 
practice?
15. Have you been involved with Turnkey contracts before? Will you get involved with 
this method of procurement again?
16. Is your detail design carried out in accordance with and prior to work packages?
17. Did you agree to a design programme? Why are you behind?
QUESTIONNAIRE 3: INTERVIEW WITH M&E CONSULTANTS (30.5.95)
Phase 1
1. Were you engaged on phase 1?
2. Who selected you?
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3. Did you have to submit a competitive tender for your fees or did you negotiate them?
4. What do you think was the basis for your selection?
5. What were your roles and responsibilities?
6. What was your design input?
Phase 2
7. Do the above criteria apply to phase 2?
8. What is the extent/scope of your design responsibility and liability?
9. What are your (you and Richard's) roles and responsibilities?
10. Was your engagement based on standard conditions of appointment? Have these 
been altered in any way?
11. Did you have an input into the selection of the Audio/Visual consultant? 
12.1 was told that you nominated one of the M&E contractors for phase 2. What was the 
basis for your nomination?
13. How do you interface with and communicate to other consultants?
14. How different is your design input under a Turnkey method compared to your normal 
practice?
15. Have you been involved with Turnkey contracts before? Will you get involved with 
this method of procurement again?
16. Is your detail design carried out prior to the M&E work stage/letting of the M&E 
work package?
17. Do you liaise with the M&E contractor at the design stage?
18. Do you communicate with the M&E contractor at the construction stage?
19. Did you agree to a design programme?
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QUESTIONNAIRE 4: INTERVIEW WITH THE PROJECT MANAGER (7.7.95) 
Phase 1
1. What was the contract value on phase 1 ?
2. Was it exceeded? Why?
3. Why was the completion of this phase late? 
Phase 2
4. In view of the fact that Japan Construction initiated the project, did the firm have to 
submit a tender for the works or was the contract sum negotiated?
5. If the firm tendered, who prepared the tender documents? How long was the tender 
period?
6. What is the form of contract used between Japan Construction and the client?
7. Is it a standard form or has it been altered?
8. Are there any onerous conditions imposed by the contractual terms?
9. What are Japan Construction's conditions of engagement?
10. Is Japan Construction providing Collateral Warranties/Performance Bonds to client?
11. What are Japan Construction's roles and responsibilities?
12. What are Japan Construction's design responsibilities and liabilities?
13. Were you, as a Design and Build contractor, involved in formulating the client's 
requirements?
14. Is there a hierarchy within the design team?
15. What are your personal role and responsibilities?
16. Who organised the construction process in terms of breaking it down into work 
packages and inviting tenders for each work package?
17. Who prepared the tender documents for the work packages?
18. Did you select all the trade/specialist contractors?
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19. What is the relationship between Japan Construction and various trade contractors; 
are the latter engaged as specialists or employed as domestic subcontractors?
20. How do you manage your trade contractors?
21. How do you ensure that they are:
  
motivated;
  
working as a team, that is,carrying out their roles and responsibilities,
interfacing effectively with one another, 
having reasonable social relations; and
  
performing, that is, capable of carrying out their task,
productive,
satisfactory in terms of workmanship, and 
observing the health and safety regulations?
22. Who manages the trade/specialist contractors' subcontractors?
23. How did you select the M&E Contractor?
  
How many were included on the tender list and on what basis?
  
Who prepared the tender documents?
  
How long was the tender period?
24. What was the basis upon which you selected the current M&E Contractor bearing in 
mind that their performance on the previous phase had not been satisfactory?
25. Did you negotiate his price?
26. What is the form of contract between Japan Construction and the M&E Contractor?
27. Is it a standard form or has it been altered?
28. Are there any onerous conditions imposed by the contractual terms?
29. What are the M&E Contractor's conditions of engagement?
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M&E 
Phase 2
10. 
20. 

10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 


(MC's (17.7.96) 
Contract
Project Planning
Project Organisation
Project Execution
Project Management
10. 
14. 
Planning of Services Works Package
Organisation of Services Works Package
Execution of Services Works Package
Management of Services Works Package
11. 
Quality of Services System Delivered
CASE STUDY 3: THE POLICE STATION
QUESTIONNAIRE 1: INTERVIEW WITH BUILDING SURVEYORS (9.9.96)
11. 
13. 
16. 
17. 
Background information
Tender and selection processes
Contract
11. Is 
12. 
13. 
Project planning
14. 
15. 
Project organisation and execution
19. 
21. 
Background information
Tender and selection process
Contract
Installation planning
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Installation organisation and execution
